A report on the history of school integration in Riverside, California, describes the city and traces the inception of a desegregation plan. Chapters discuss the developing consciousness of the need for improvement in minority group education, the confrontation in 1965 between school officials and minority group parents, and the commitment of the school board and school administration to total integration, and the preparations and programs for integration. Also noted are the community reactions and problems related to the desegregation of the schools. A final chapter is devoted to general perspective on school integration. There is an extensive bibliography specifically relevant to California. (NH)
A SCHOOL INTEGRATION PLAN
IN
RIVERSIDE, CALIFORNIA:
A HISTORY AND PERSPECTIVE

By
Irving G. Hendrick

The Riverside School Study
A joint project of the
Riverside Unified School District

and the
University of California, Riverside
State McAteer Project Number M7-14

September, 1968
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PREFACE

On October 25, 1965, the Riverside Unified School District's Board of Education adopted a comprehensive plan for the integration of the city's elementary schools. As of that date, few school systems in the United States -- and no school system as large -- had succeeded in doing more. Although the secondary schools in Riverside were not racially balanced, none was as yet in danger of becoming de facto segregated. Three years later, when it appeared that this condition was indeed developing at one school, that challenge too was met.

Rarely are social scientists presented with an opportunity to engage in a comprehensive study of integration's effects upon white and minority group children in the same school system. Almost never would a coincidence of life permit this to be accomplished in a home city. Soon after the board's integration decision was announced, a small group of faculty from the University of California, Riverside, joined with representatives of the school district to form the Riverside School Study. The original university participants included Thomas P. Carter (education), Frederick O. Gearing (anthropology), Harold B. Gerard (psychology), Jane R. Mercer (sociology), Norman Miller (psychology), and Harry Singer (education). Those from the school district included E. Raymond Berry (associate superintendent), Mabel Purl (director of research), and Jesse Wall (director of intergroup education).

Recently, President Charles J. Hitch of the University of California asked the staff of the university to carry "thought and research
of the campus directly to the heart of the city." This, in part, has been a goal of the Riverside School Study, although the university's role in it has been directed more toward measuring change than toward recommending reforms. Fortunately, the latter have been stimulated in some measure by school district personnel themselves, based in part on the study's findings.

The present narrative is the product of my association with the study, one that has lasted exactly two years. In a sense it is more of a prologue to the study than a part of it. The psychological and sociological evaluations of integration's impact on pupil adjustment and achievement, as well as on the school system itself, are being undertaken by my colleagues. Nevertheless, it was thought appropriate that some kind of historical record be made of the fascinating social and political forces which developed along the way from segregated to integrated schooling in Riverside.

One of the chief limitations of contemporary history is the difficulty of achieving proper perspective. A great advantage, on the other hand, is the availability of an almost overwhelming wealth of information. Wherever possible, which includes most of the report, a heavy reliance has been placed on written documents. Special thanks are in order to E. Raymond Berry, Donald N. Taylor, and Jesse Wall of the Riverside school district for making their files available, for granting lengthy interviews, and in other ways rendering repeated assistance.

Numerous other individuals within the school district, the community at large, the city and county libraries, historical societies, city
and county offices, and the University of California libraries at Riverside and Los Angeles, spent many hours of their time in graciously granting interviews and supplying other forms of information. Certainly the resources of this project would have been seriously lacking without their help. Properly, appreciation should be expressed to about sixty persons not recognized individually, without whose help the project would have been diminished. Some, of course, are acknowledged at an appropriate place in the text and bibliography. A few have provided information with the understanding that their names will be kept confidential.

Special mention must be made of the assistance provided by Superintendent Bruce Miller and Richard Purviance of the school district administration, Margaret Heers and Arthur L. Littleworth of the school board, and Robert Bland and Dean C. Newell of the community. All were intimately involved with the issue of segregated education in Riverside between 1961 and 1965. Wilson Riles, Armando Rodriguez, and Theodore Neff, all of whom were associated with the California State Department of Education's Bureau of Intergroup Relations in 1965, generously granted interviews and supplied documents from the bureau's files relevant to the Riverside experience. To all I am most indebted.

During the past two years the history project has benefited from the assistance of Lloyd L. Sturtevant, Linda Burchell, Mita Brar, and Robert Wilde. The final three months were particularly demanding, and it was during that period that I was especially fortunate to be assisted by Annette I. Scarpino, Michal J. Schwartzkopf, Forrest S. Mosten, and
Herbert L. Nickles II. In addition to numerous other duties, Mr. Nickles also prepared the maps appearing in the text. Without the diligent help of this group, completion of the project would have been seriously delayed.

Final typing and attention to details was handled by the central office staff of the Riverside School Study, under the watchful and capable supervision of Jeanne Thornburg. The actual manuscript typing was done by Ferne Vorhes. Their service in this instance, as with that rendered throughout the course of my association with the study, is deeply appreciated. The historical project was supported by the California State Department of Education, from funds administered by the Office of Compensatory Education, McAteer Projects, Raymond J. Pitts, project specialist. Needless to say, that too is appreciated. Without it there simply would have been no project.

The help provided by those assisting in this venture was highly competent. Any inadequacies which the reader finds are clearly attributable to the author.

Riverside, California
September, 1968

Irving G. Hendrick
CHAPTER I

SOCIETY'S MANDATE FOR INTEGRATED SCHOOLS

The Riverside Unified School District in California was not the first school system in America to develop and implement a plan for the total desegregation and eventual integration of its schools. What is somewhat surprising, and as much a commentary on national reluctance in this area as on Riverside's progressive attitude, is that its school integration decision in 1965 entitled it to a couple of other "firsts." It became, for example, the first school system in a city exceeding 100,000 in population, and with a total kindergarten through grade twelve enrollment of more than 20,000, to develop and implement a full-scale racial balance plan.1 Another somewhat unique feature of the Riverside experience was that the administration and board were able to develop and adopt this plan within seven weeks after being confronted with a petition from minority parents requesting integration.

Riverside is located in the southern portion of the state, approximately fifty-five miles east of Los Angeles, in the San Bernardino-Riverside-Ontario metropolitan area, an area with a population slightly in excess of one million. By most criteria, the cities in this area

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1 "Racial balance" appears to have many and variable meanings. As used here it refers to a school with a maximum minority enrollment of less than fifty percent. Ideally, each school in a racially balanced district would not deviate more than ten percent from the district average. See Meg Greenfield, "What is Racial Balance," The Reporter, 36 (March 23, 1967), 20-26.
are not considered suburbs of Los Angeles. In 1965, the year the schools faced a crisis over integration, Riverside's population was estimated at approximately 133,200. Although the boundaries of the school district are not contiguous with the city boundaries, the population of the school district approximates that of the city. The total school enrollment for the 1965-66 term was 25,374, spread between three senior highs, five junior highs, twenty-seven elementary schools, and one school for physiologically handicapped youth.

During this same year, 1965-66, the minority enrollment of the Riverside schools stood at 16.71 percent, including 6.09 percent Negroes, 9.96 percent Mexican-Americans, and .66 percent other minorities. By 1967-68 all figures had increased slightly; 18.95 percent total minority, 6.76 percent Negro, 11.17 percent Mexican-American, and 1.15 percent other minorities. This represents for Riverside a minority enrollment very close to the state average for school districts of the same size, i.e., those with pupil enrollments between 20,000 and 49,999. The 1966-67 figures placed the state minority average at 20.49 percent for districts of this size. Riverside enrolls slightly more Negro and slightly fewer Mexican-American pupils than other California districts of comparable size. Although the Mexican-American enrollment averages approximately fourteen percent for districts of all sizes, the Negro percentages increase significantly in the larger districts, those with enrollments exceeding 50,000. In this category the Negro

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2 See Appendix B of text.
percentage averages 18.91, compared to 5.59 among school systems in the 20,000 - 49,999 range.\(^3\)

Integration is obviously more difficult to achieve in larger cities with a higher concentration of minority youth. At the same time, one should not conclude that it is anywhere near to becoming common practice even in the smaller and middle sized communities. As a matter of fact, since integration has moved at such a sluggish pace, virtually every school system developing and making operative any kind of racial balance plan can doubtlessly lay claim to some sort of uniqueness.\(^4\)

Uniqueness, however, is neither a goal nor necessarily a virtue for a public school system. Effective education for all pupils enrolled in the system is both the goal and a virtue. Education has long been looked to by Americans as the most effective means of achieving the good life. Progress toward the attainment of that noble end, though halting at times, has been consistent enough to sustain a considerable faith in education. Although not always agreeing on type or emphasis, notable Negro Americans, having far less assurance of education's uplifting qualities, have, nevertheless, historically agreed that this faith has been justified.


\(^4\) It is easy to get caught up in a pedantic exercise of attempting to differentiate between such terms as desegregation, integration, and racial balance. As used here, racial balance indicates the level or extent of desegregation; integration implies desegregation plus active attempts to encourage full minority participation in all activities for which the school is responsible; it involves more than the reassignment of minority students to majority schools.
Within the last decade, however, a number of outspoken Negro and white critics have pointed out repeatedly that the schools, as segregated institutions of education in a segregated society, have fallen considerably short of their high calling. Accompanying this loss of confidence have come vigorous demands that schools integrate Negro and white students in a meaningful way. More recently have come expressions of serious doubt as to the will, and even the capacity, of Americans to accomplish this goal. Some militant Negroes have even come to the point of expressing complete rejection of the public schools in favor of various kinds of educational agencies serving black Americans and controlled by black Americans.\(^5\)

The feeling that school officials must produce fundamental changes in the institutions under their control is not, of course, the exclusive view of minority spokesmen. It just may be that in the case of America's largest school systems the options open for introducing racial integration and instructional reform are so limited as to make further imploring fruitless. Yet the effort to narrow the gap between the education received by middle class children and children from poor families has become the most frustrating one in the history of America's common school system. Indeed it has led to the most serious challenge the system itself has witnessed since tax support for schooling was won over a century ago. Talk of the school's failure by scholars and politicians

alike has led to some serious discussion of alternative public school systems sponsored by universities, labor unions, industry, the Department of Defense, and other private and public agencies. Still, for the foreseeable future at least, education is likely to remain under the immediate direction of local school boards and dependent upon their wisdom and courage.

It will likely remain the responsibility of local leaders to confront and hopefully help solve the educational and social problems produced through a history of racial isolation, problems the schools have not met successfully heretofore, and may have even, as some suggest, helped cause. Through an infusion of federal money during the decade of the sixties, many school authorities have attempted to answer the demand for an end to racial isolation with stepped-up efforts to improve the segregated schools. In the largest cities it may well be that the opportunity to integrate the schools with the means and know how at hand has passed. In most small and middle sized cities and even a few large cities -- Los Angeles being a notable example -- the opportunity still remains.

The extent of racial isolation in the public schools has been documented with meticulous care by the United States Office of Education

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6 Kenneth B. Clark, "Alternative Public School Systems," Harvard Educational Review, 38 (Winter, 1968), 100-113. Still other alternatives to public education have been revealed in the contemporary speeches and writings of Milton Friedman, Christopher Jencks, James Coleman, and other social critics.
and the United States Commission on Civil Rights. Strong inferences concerning the educational effects of that isolation were drawn in a systematic way by James C. Coleman, director of the massive survey and data analysis for the U.S. Office of Education.\(^7\) Even the most serious critic of some conclusions made in the Coleman Report, based on an alleged misuse of "multiple regression analysis," acknowledged that the fact of significant racial segregation in both the North and the South, and very great differences in the achievement levels of racial and ethnic groups throughout the country, "is not likely to be refuted."\(^8\)

While the most critical problems of segregation occur in the large cities, much segregation takes place in middle sized cities that are not helpless to correct the situation, providing they possess the will to do so. Finding a reservoir of will has remained a most substantial problem for school administrators and members of school boards. Making adjustments in the status quo have never been easy. The status quo, a segregated school system in a segregated society, has so far proved almost impenetrable to integration. It would be naive to assume that integration is being delayed mainly because school leaders are, as yet, still unconvinced of its benefits. This may be a factor for some, however.


So far the bulk of evidence -- some of it contestable -- appears at base to affirm that the positive attributes of the dominant majority in a classroom have a measurable impact upon the achievement of individual students in the same classroom, regardless of their own backgrounds. This proposition is, of course, a central and powerful educational justification for integration, a central conclusion of the Coleman Report, and appears to be agreeable, with some equivocation, to other researchers as well.

Even without research support, many social and humanitarian justifications can be advanced for school integration. Indeed, it is most difficult philosophically to explain the acceptance or sanction of segregation in a society priding itself as a model of democracy. Nevertheless, even school boards operating in a milieu where eliminating de facto school segregation is feasible have been hesitant to deal with the issue. Fear of recall elections and the loss of bond elections, together with a feeling of relative comfort in the status quo, the absence of a crisis situation, and cost are likely to account for some hesitancy. Undoubtedly too, attitudes as malignant as outright racism, and as benign as honest doubt concerning the wisdom of an active integration policy, hold sway in some quarters.

Significant integration has not developed in large cities, sometimes for serious and legitimate reasons. The record of small and

9 Equality of Educational Opportunity, p. 22.

middle sized cities is at least as bleak, once resources, percentage of minority population, and other conditions are considered. However, a few smaller cities have achieved some measure of success in this endeavor. Almost all of the full-scale integration plans implemented to date have been in cities with populations of less than 50,000 — usually considerably less. Beginning with Princeton, New Jersey's pairing of two elementary schools in 1948, several small cities and suburbs carried on with various plans of achieving some semblance of racial balance. Three years later, Greenburg, New York, developed a similar, but slightly more complex plan of pairing, involving three elementary schools instead of two. Most of the substantive efforts, however, had to await the decade of the sixties. Between 1963 and 1967 plans of note involving full desegregation on the elementary level were implemented in Garden Grove, Riverside, and Sausalito, California; Evanston, Illinois; Leavenworth, Kansas; Coatesville, Pennsylvania; Englewood, Morristown, Teaneck, and Woodbury, New Jersey; Manhasset and White Plains, New York. Partial desegregation attempts have been far more numerous, usually occurring in cities where problems to be overcome are more substantial. Berkeley, California and Syracuse, New York, for example, instituted plans for complete junior high desegregation.

While complete desegregation of the schools has been a characteristic of the plans implemented in perhaps a dozen small and middle sized

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11 Cities named have been derived from a follow-up survey made in 1967 of seventy cities having earlier received some recognition for their efforts in the national press or professional journals. Most are also mentioned in *Racial Isolation in the Public Schools*, Vol. 1, pp. 142-146.
American cities, each has been somewhat unique in terms of what constituted the stimulus to action, as well as the nature of the proposal itself. Up until 1966 one of the most notable plans among the smaller cities was implemented in White Plains, New York, student enrollment 8,700. It called for the closing of one all minority school and the reassignment of pupils, most by means of transportation, to the remaining ten elementary schools. In 1966, the Riverside Unified School District applied similar means to achieve racial balance in a district approximately three times the size of White Plains. Like White Plains, the Riverside plan involved closing schools, three in this case, and some extensive pupil transportation. One year later, Evanston, Illinois, a school system slightly larger than White Plains, but smaller than Riverside, used essentially the same means -- pupil transportation and the redrawing of district boundaries to achieve desegregation. The circumstances by which these school systems arrived at their decisions are not nearly as similar as the plans themselves.

Beginning in the fall of 1968, the boldest desegregation plan yet devised in a city exceeding 100,000 population will become operative in Berkeley, California; boldest in the sense that it requires bus transportation for majority as well as minority pupils. Writing in the Winter,


13 The Evanston commitment to eliminate de facto segregation predates The Riverside commitment by nearly two years, but the Riverside plan became operative in September, 1966, one year prior to the Evanston plan.

14 Reports of the Berkeley plan have been disseminated widely by the Berkeley Unified School District and are available from that district. Several published accounts have also been written, one being "Total Desegregation in Berkeley," Phi Delta Kappan, XLIX (April, 1968), 468.
1968 Harvard Educational Review, Berkeley Superintendent Neil V. Sullivan, a man known for deviating somewhat from the super-cautious approach sometimes endemic of school leaders, asserted: "Now that national and local returns are in from Coleman, the Civil Rights Commission, Berkeley, and White Plains, how can educators and communities of good faith and good will procrastinate further? "Desegregate now!" 15

Even the casual observer of American institutions, and the process by which they change, can find ample explanations for why educators and communities procrastinate. While the magnitude of the problem itself may be a chief reason in at least thirteen of the twenty largest cities, a less charitable explanation would have to apply in the case of the 518 unified school districts in the United States with student enrollments ranging from 10,000 to 50,000. 16

With fewer than a dozen middle size school systems having adopted fully workable plans for eliminating de facto segregation, progress has quite obviously hardly begun. Where meaningful programs have been initiated, they have usually followed minority requests, sometimes vigorously waged and taking the form of concentrated protests. Certainly minority pressure applied directly at the level of local school boards,


clearly implied legal obligations to desegregate the schools, and even fear of violence have been some of the less lofty motives for action. Higher motives have probably played a part too. Except in cases where desegregation was begun under direct legal orders, administration and board resistance could have blocked the slight progress already made.

While the immediate responsibility for carrying out desegregation rests with local school administrators and boards of education, the chief societal sanctioning body for action has been the courts, and to a lesser extent legislative bodies and state school officials. Even in Riverside, where no court action was involved, the integration decision was explained, and to some extent defended, on grounds that the district was under legal obligation to act. Up to the present, however, the courts have fallen short of ordering racial balance in the schools, making it possible for those seeking to avoid taking corrective steps to do so. Over the past fourteen years the courts have come to rule consistently against legal or de jure segregation. More recently they have become consistent in ruling against school districts that deliberately gerrymander school boundaries to effect segregation. But that is where the consistency stops.

Far and away the leading legal impetus given to desegregation has been the renowned Brown v. Board of Education decision of the United States Supreme Court, Monday, May 17, 1954: "We conclude that in the field of public education the doctrine of 'separate but equal' has no place."
Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal." The decision's impact on the American conscience was not limited to issues of law. Although a legal decision, this concluding sentence became remembered also as a kind of moral pronouncement. Concerned individuals have made frequent reference to it in appealing to the moral conscience of man. Extensive news of the decision doubtlessly penetrated into the conventional wisdom of enough Americans to establish the generally recognized awareness that it is somehow illegal deliberately to segregate the races in schools. Then too, no one would doubt but that the Brown decision provided a very substantial stimulus to the American civil rights movement.

Subsequent federal court decisions affirmed the unconstitutionality of de jure segregation, including deliberate de facto segregation. The second Brown decision, May 31, 1955, in directing the federal district courts to require the defendants to "make a prompt and reasonable start toward full compliance with our May 17, 1954 ruling," permitted the courts to allow additional time, if necessary, "to carry out the ruling in an effective manner." Furthermore, the lower courts were given leeway to act "with all deliberate speed." This precise and well thought out wording empowered the lower courts to adjust the impact of the decision in light of local governmental conditions. By the 1960s it was

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not unusual for critics of the excruciatingly slow process of compliance to observe that the emphasis had not been on speed. Subsequent limitations notwithstanding, Brown v. Board of Education stands as the most important civil rights decision in the history of the American courts.

Subsequent court decisions, legislation, and pronouncements by sanctioning agencies, such as state boards of education, provided local school districts with additional incentive to act. One important federal district and circuit court decision, Taylor v. Board of Education of the City School District of New Rochelle, found a northern community to have violated the requirements of the Brown decision. Its significance was to demonstrate that denying equal protection of the law through the gerrymandering of school attendance areas was as illegal as de jure segregation. Indeed it virtually became de jure segregation.

The general applicability of the law is, of course, modified and enforced by specific requirements of the states. In June, 1963, New York State Commissioner of Education, James Allen, asked each school system in the state to develop, file and inaugurate a plan for reducing the minority enrollment in all schools where such enrollment exceeded fifty percent. His attempt to inaugurate this policy of affirmative desegregation was annulled by the State Supreme Court a year later.

In the case of Hummel v. Allen the New York Court pointed out that the United States Constitution forbids segregation by law, but does not prohibit racial "imbalance; nor mandate racial balance. 21

The most clearly defined state legislation requiring affirmative desegregation has been the Massachusetts Racial Imbalance Act of 1965. It permits the State Board of Education to cut off state funds to any local school board that has failed to file an acceptable plan for ending imbalance. Imbalance is defined in Massachusetts as a situation in which "non white" students constitute more than half the student body. 22 The law's impact is yet to be felt.

While the most pronounced and long standing practice of deliberate separation from the dominant elements in society has been inflicted upon Negroes, other minorities have been forced into similar predicaments. Until after World War II, California law permitted schools to segregate children of Indian, Chinese, Japanese and Mongolian ancestry. Moreover, until after the case of Mendez v. Westminster School District of Orange County, many school districts practiced open segregation of Mexican-American children. The District Court had based its decision in that case on two entirely separate grounds: (1) that the Education Code, while excluding some minority groups, did not specifically list Mexican-Americans, and (2) that equal protection of the laws was not provided by furnishing "equal but separate" schools. The decision was


upheld by the Circuit Court of Appeals, but with the second argument deleted, the court not wishing to depart from what had evolved over half a century as a far narrower interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment.

The major issue of interpreting "equal protection under the laws" was left to the Supreme Court, but the effect of the Westminster case was to uphold the right of Mexican-American children to attend the public schools of California without segregation. It thus contributed much toward ending a long standing practice in the state. De facto segregation of Mexican-Americans, as with other minorities, would continue through the drawing of school district boundaries.

Beginning in 1962 the California State Board of Education, the state courts, and the legislature began to strengthen markedly the legal case for school desegregation. Most of the policy statements, judicial decisions, and legislation appeared to be rather more effective as preventive than as corrective steps. On June 14, 1962, the State Board of Education stated that "in all areas under our control or subject to our influence, the policy of elimination of existing segregation and curbing any tendency toward its growth must be given serious and thoughtful consideration by all persons involved at all levels." Lest anyone assume that segregation would be permissible after "serious

and thoughtful consideration," the policy filed and made a part of the California Administrative Code on October 23, 1962 required the agencies responsible for school attendance areas to "exert all effort to avoid and eliminate segregation of children on account of race or color."24

The crucial issue raised by this declared policy in the minds of some school officials was, assuming finally that the deliberate gerrymandering of school boundaries to segregate pupils was illegal, to what extent should local school boards again become color conscious, this time for the purpose of achieving desegregation? The answer of the California courts and the California Attorney General was that affirmative steps to correct existing segregation through the placing of school boundaries was mandated. On June 27, 1963 the California Supreme Court accepted the concept of "affirmative integration" advanced by the amicus curiae briefs in the case of Jackson v. Pasadena School District:25

Although it is alleged that the board was guilty of intentional discriminatory action, it should be pointed out that even in the absence of gerrymandering or other affirmative discriminatory conduct by a school board, a student under some circumstances would be entitled to relief where, by reason of residential segregation, substantial racial imbalance exists in his school. ... Where such [Residential] segregation exists it is not enough for a school board to refrain from affirmative discriminatory conduct. ... The right to an equal opportunity for education and the harmful consequences of segregation require that school boards take steps, insofar as reasonably feasible, to alleviate racial imbalance in schools.

24 California Administrative Code, Title 5, sec. 2010.

25 The two amicus curiae briefs in this case (briefs filed by interested bystanders for the assistance of a court) were filed by Herbert Bernhand on behalf of the American Jewish Congress, and Robert E. Burke, Deputy Attorney General for the State of California, and Curtis J. Berger, Professor of Law at the University of Southern California, on behalf of themselves as individuals.
The words "reasonably feasible" were made somewhat more explicit further on in the decision:

School authorities, of course, are not required to attain an exact apportionment of Negroes among the schools, and consideration must be given to the various factors in each case, including the practical necessities of governmental operation. For example, consideration should be given, on the one hand, to the degree of racial imbalance in the particular school and the extent to which it affects the opportunity for education and, on the other hand, to such matters as the difficulty and effectiveness of revising school boundaries so as to eliminate segregation and the availability of other facilities to which students can be transferred.26

Since the decision affirmed the obligation of school districts to be color conscious in determining school boundaries, it ran counter to some interpretations of the 1954 Brown decision's "color blind" requirement.27 Largely for this reason, and its own edification, the State Board of Education requested a clarification from California Attorney General Stanley Mosk. His opinion was that a local school board "may consider race as a factor in adopting a school attendance plan, if the purpose of considering the racial factor is to effect desegregation in the schools, and the plan is reasonably related to the accomplishment of that purpose." He reasoned that recognition of present inequality was a starting point in a program designed to help achieve equality. Thus, not to permit school boards to consider race in determining boundaries would be "not merely to conclude that the Constitution is color blind, but that it is totally blind."28


27 The County Counsel of Los Angeles, for one, interpreted the Brown decision as precluding any kind of racial consideration in the selection of boundaries.

Even prior to the Attorney General's opinion, the State Board acted to establish guidelines for districts to follow in determining attendance practices. These clearly required the districts to be cognizant of ethnic composition in all manner of decisions concerning attendance practices and the selection of school sites.29

The workability of the "affirmative integration" interpretation as defined in the Jackson case was tested almost immediately. On October 8, 1963, a Sacramento County Superior Court, in the case of Keller, Jr., v. Sacramento City Unified School District, directed that the school board study the racial composition of all schools in the district and complete a plan for correcting racial imbalances "in conformity with law" before September 1, 1964.30

While the legal guidelines for ending the de facto segregation of pupils have become increasingly clear, school boards choosing to proceed slowly, if at all, are still permitted to do so. The process of law almost always works slowly. Courts do not render judgment without the formal presentation of cases before them. School districts choosing to do less than they might eventually be required to do by the courts have been able to delay action for a considerable period of time.

Interpretations by a county counsel, coupled with a long process of litigation can still stifle integration efforts. The courts, both state and federal, have ruled that segregation is illegal. But the law has not moved beyond mandating affirmative integration through the redrawing of school boundaries. In 1967, for example, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that school boards were under no legal obligation to transport Negro or white children out of their neighborhoods for the purpose of alleviating racial imbalance they did not cause. 31

Apart from the changing interpretations of justice, laws, and important legal decisions, other components of the societal context furnished direct and indirect stimulus to school desegregation during the first half of the 1960s. It is extremely doubtful that desegregation could have taken place ten years earlier anywhere it developed. Something defined as globally as societal "climate" or "context" is necessarily made up of the influence particular people and events have on the nation's communities. The national civil rights movement, the hope conveyed in the "New Frontier" of John F. Kennedy, the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the nonviolent demonstrations led by Martin Luther King, and the start of rebellion in some of the nation's cities were only a few notable stimulants to change. Passage of an initiative measure repealing California's open housing law in 1964 contributed something additional in the way of stirring racial distrust and tension in that state.

The direct factors which led to integration in Riverside were local and are not particularly difficult to determine. The indirect factors were both local and national in nature, and are somewhat more difficult to assess with the same confidence. Three and a half weeks prior to the school integration controversy in Riverside, the Watts riots were acquiring national attention and even closer local attention. During the immediate week prior to Riverside's direct confrontation over integration, the local newspapers carried articles headed "Racial Violence Erupts in North, South Cities," "Two Inquiries Under Way into Los Angeles Riots," "Greene County Schools Off Limits to Dr. King For Demonstrations," "Mississippi Governor Calls Out Troops To Prevent Riots," "Negroes Turned Away By Two Alabama Schools," "Boston Negro Pupils Move To White Schools." It would be most difficult, even dishonest, to attempt to draw a direct cause and effect relationship between these reports and the school crisis in Riverside. They may be taken, however, as illustrations of what was developing in America during the late summer of 1965. Even though the exact relationship between national developments and local developments cannot be determined, it would be naive to assume their absence.

CHAPTER II

THE CITY, THE SCHOOLS, AND SEGREGATION

"Riverside is 'All-America, 1955'; and of us we sing," wrote the editorial writer for the Riverside Press on December 17, 1955. The adulation followed quite naturally after the National Municipal League had found Riverside and ten other cities worthy of the League's "All-America" award for 1955. Riverside did not win the citation for its efforts in race relations, nor for ending de facto segregation in the city's schools. None of the 1955 awards bore mention of such problems. In any case, Riverside would not have been deserving in this area. Indebting itself in order to solve an anticipated water need, dealing effectively with problems of "explosive growth," and adopting the council-manager plan of city government were among the specific merits cited.¹ "We did not, as the Municipal League observes in its citation, wait for our troubles to become acute before taking action."²

In that same editorial of December 17, the Press referred to Riverside as a "clean, solid, progressive community." Clean and solid it was and has remained to this date. Its claim to being progressive would be on somewhat more shaky ground, although at times it still reflected an early history of progressive attitudes. The decision of

the local school board to desegregate completely the city's elementary
schools in 1965 was a "progressive" move by almost any standard, but it
was viewed by leaders in the city government with slight support, some
opposition, and considerable caution.

Much discussion has been given in recent years to the meanings
of terms such as progressive, moderate, and conservative. Depending
on the particular evidence looked at in the last twenty years, a case
could be made for dubbing Riverside any of the three. Politically,
however, it has been a Republican town since its early founding by
easterners almost a century ago. Based on political party registra-
tions and voting trends, there are few signs that any significant
change in this pattern is imminent. ³

Like the rest of California, the area now known as Riverside
has a history dating back through the Spanish and Mexican periods of
California. As early as January, 1776, the explorer Juan Bautista
De Anza crossed the Santa Ana River near Mt. Rubidoux during his trek
opening an overland route from Sonora to San Francisco. ⁴ A large
Mexican land grant in 1838 made Don Juan Bandini, a Spanish-American
born in Peru of Italian parents, the first actual settler and owner
of what is now part of Riverside. Through the 1840s Bandini sold
parts of his Jurupa Rancho holdings to several Americans, one being

³ Recent registration and voting records comparing Riverside with
Berkeley and the state appear in Appendix C of text. Berkeley, like
Riverside, has developed a plan for full scale integration of its
schools.

⁴ Elmer W. Holmes, History of Riverside County, California, (Los
Angeles: Historic Record Co., 1912), p. 10; Tom Patterson, Landmarks
Benjamin D. Wilson from Tennessee who became the first American to settle in the Riverside area. He also offered a tract of land to Mexicans from New Mexico in return for protective services against horse thieves. One source cites the names of seven families living in the nearby settlement of Agua Mansa as early as 1842. Mexicans and Mexican-Americans clearly have been a part of Riverside's history even prior to its founding as a colony by American easterners.

A series of transactions involving parts of the Bandini land led in 1847 to the purchase of a large tract by Louis Roubidoux, a Frenchman from New Mexico. Roubidoux remained in the area during the early American period which began with the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, July 4, 1848. After prospering for a time as a successful rancher, the floods of 1862-63 and the droughts which followed ruined him. Largely through the efforts of another Frenchman, Louis Prevost, the California Legislature appropriated funds for the planting of Mulberry trees to encourage a silk culture in Southern California. The local result was the formation of the "Silk Center Association," a short lived enterprise begun in 1869 with the purchase of the Roubidoux estate and the remaining unsold lands of the Jurupa Rancho.


6 James H. Roe, *Notes on the Early History of Riverside, California, 1870-1890*, An unpublished manuscript, Typewritten from the original handwritten copy, Riverside Public Library, Riverside, California, p. 4; The seven names included were Trujillo, Moya, Garcia, Alvarado, Archuleta, Baca, and Atencio.
After publishing a circular for the establishment of "a colony for California," in March, 1870, Judge John W. North and his delegation of easterners bought 7,555 acres of land from the Silk Center Association on September 13, 1870. By December, Riverside was adopted as the colony's name. For the most part, the colony was made up of small land proprietors, a circumstance that prohibited the use of mass servile labor. North himself had been active in the Connecticut Anti-Slavery Society, and had been a delegate to the Republican National Convention that nominated Abraham Lincoln in 1860.7

An overriding concern in these early days was one of obtaining water. Soon after his purchase, North built a nine mile irrigation canal to the Santa Ana River, but its adequacy was seriously limited. Transporting water always has been crucial to the town's survival. The comment of a missionary visiting Riverside sometime in the early 1880s, after an absence of twelve years, was most descriptive: "When I first came to Riverside it had only a ditch and a future and the future was in the ditch."8 In 1874 North was bought out by Samuel C. Evans, an Ohio banker, and W. T. Sayward, a San Francisco businessman who had invested in an adjacent 8,600 acres in the Arlington district. They had first called their acquisition the New England Colony, but subsequent to the purchase from North, formed the Riverside Land


8 Boyd and Brown, History of San Bernardino and Riverside Counties, p. 376.
and Irrigation Company. Even the incorporation of the town in 1883 was related to a desire to control water rates.

All descriptions of Riverside prior to the "All-America" City Award of 1955 concur that for its day and under the conditions of the times, it was a clean and peaceful city, even a progressive city. As time passed, all of this would grow into a kind of proud tradition. Indeed there was much for a former small farming community to be proud of. The first public building was a school, constructed in 1871 at a time when only twenty-five families resided in the town. Fifteen years later it built the first city-owned electric and power system in California. It became a city of trees, and tree-lined streets, even though no trees were native to the area.

Riverside, like many Southern California communities, was greatly affected by the land boom of the 1880s, and the boom itself was largely, although not exclusively, the result of favorable railroad routes. Riverside was fortunate enough to find itself on the route of the California Southern, a branch of the Santa Fe which rambled southwest from San Bernardino through Riverside and on through seven smaller communities before reaching San Diego. The boom brought on land inflation and overstatements of virtues, but it also brought growth, city improvements, and an expanded economy. An 1892 post-boom summary,

10 Hornbeck, Roubidoux's Ranch in the Seventies, p. 151.
possibly overstated slightly, reflects the general virtue and comfort
of the community:

A half-dozen school houses, with exceptionally well-paid teachers, with 1,300 scholars, four banks, a public library, railroads, tele­
graphs, telephones, free delivery of mails, and other modern conven­
iences not ordinarily incident to farms go to enhance the attractiveness of this curious village.\textsuperscript{11}

As the citrus industry grew and prospered, the need for water
grew and was met. The success of the citrus economy had contributed
greatly to the personal wealth of the residents. \textit{Harpers Weekly}, April 2, 1904, reported the progress:

By means of this irrigation system which ranks as one of the best
in the world, Riverside has become the greatest orange producing
section of America. Riverside is rated as the richest community per
capita in the United States. The schools rank with the best.\textsuperscript{12}

From its early beginnings, the Riverside population included a
strong abolitionist element. Luther Tibbets, best remembered today for
his wife's contribution of planting and caring for the first two naval
orange trees in California, was remembered by a local historian as a
strong abolitionist and a hothead.\textsuperscript{13} Abolitionist sentiment was joined
by another well-remembered nineteenth century cause, the temperance
movement. In 1876 the Good Templar Lodge was formed to advance that
noble goal.

\textsuperscript{11} W. C. Fitzsimmons, "California Farm Village," \textit{American Review of
Reviews}, VI (September, 1892), 208.

\textsuperscript{12} "Home of a Great Fruit Industry," \textit{Harper's Weekly}, 48 (April 2,
1904), 517-518.

\textsuperscript{13} Hornbeck, \textit{Roubidoux's Ranch in the Seventies}, p. 171.
The active presence of these early progressive causes did not have a permanent impact on shaping thought in the city. Prior to World War I, Riverside had become a "populated orange grove," and relatively free of serious social upheavals. Indeed it was already a "clean, solid, and progressive" community, or as the historian of 1912 preferred to call it, one with "no saloons, no slums, and plenty of genuine Christianity." Few industries had entered the city, but the citrus industry was still growing. In 1907 the Regents of the University of California authorized the leasing of lands in Riverside for a citrus experiment station. By 1915 they had acquired the present site of the University of California, Riverside, at the foot of the Box Springs mountains. March Field was activated on March 6, 1918. Since then, first Army and later Air Force personnel have had an impact on the local economy. Industrial growth, though fairly steady, was not dramatic prior to World War II. Even yet, Riverside is not known as an industrial community.

Minority groups have been part of the city's past since its founding, but owing largely to a scarcity of industry, they have never been very numerous. Mexicans, and later Mexican-Americans, were early employed as laborers in the fields and citrus groves, and in the packing houses. Chinese did most of the labor on the Southern Pacific Railroad through the neighboring community of Colton in 1876 and the


15 Hornbeck, Roubidoux's Ranch in the Seventies, postscript.
California Southern through Riverside and vicinity during the 1880s. They also worked as household servants and helped in the planting of citrus during the late nineteenth century. By 1920, however, the Chinatown of Riverside was declining and slowly died.

Negroes came to Riverside early, but their numbers grew slowly. As late as 1960 they constituted only 4.7 percent of the total population, while Mexican-Americans constituted 8.5 percent. The American Methodist Episcopal Church, the oldest Negro Church in Riverside, was founded officially in 1879, but its earliest records (1893) show only three members. Park Avenue Baptist Church, the second oldest Negro Baptist Church in California, recorded thirteen members in 1892. Indications are that most of the first Negroes were employed by the railroad in San Bernardino but otherwise were not concentrated in any particular industry. When the present pastor of Park Avenue Baptist, the Reverend L. B. Moss, came to Riverside in 1929, there were 730 Negroes in the city, almost all living on the Eastside of town within the boundaries of 10th and 13th streets, mainly along Park Avenue.

A survey made by the Reverend Moss and Frank H. Johnson in 1938 recorded approximately 1,600 Negroes in the greater Riverside Area, including Belltown. Between 1911 and 1939 no more than nine Negroes


18 Statement made to Michal Schwartzkopf and Herbert Nickles by Rev. L. B. Moss of Park Avenue Baptist Church on June 21, 1968.
graduated from Riverside Polytechnic High School in any single year. In eight of the years, there were none. A social survey of Riverside made in 1927 showed that Mexican-American minors constituted 14.5 percent of the population and Negroes 2.3 percent.

All historical evidence indicates that the minority population of Riverside was unobtrusive, caused the majority population very few problems, and thus received little notice. The infection of conscious and subconscious racism, however, was felt in Riverside as elsewhere in the nation. Racial and ethnic discrimination in the areas of employment, housing, and social relationships was the result. Restrictive covenants legally permitting segregated housing were as applicable in Riverside as elsewhere. Nor was Riverside without its segregated schools, swimming pools, and even an occasional cross burning by the white knights of the Ku Klux Klan. A crowd estimated as at least 5,000 witnessed a cross burning at the stadium of Polytechnic High School during the summer of 1924. For its part the school board asked only that the meeting be unmasked, the buildings be left in good condition, and that no automobiles be allowed on the field. The following January the Ku Klux Klan staged a parade through the downtown section

19 The Stag, 1911-1913, and The Orange and Green, 1919-1946, Yearbooks of Riverside Polytechnic High School.

20 George Mangold, A Social Survey of Riverside, California, (Riverside: Chamber of Commerce, October 4, 1930).

21 Segregation of municipal swimming pools never received legal sanction in Riverside, although it is still remembered by some residents.

22 Minutes of the Board of Education of the Riverside City School District, July 10, 1924; Riverside Press, July 12, 1924.
of the city. 23

It was not until the decade of the fifties that Riverside experienced dramatic growth, although only in the decade of the 1930s did the city fail to grow in population by at least twenty-seven percent. Between 1910 and 1950 the population grew from 15,212 to 46,764. Ten years later it stood at 84,332. 24 Even from the earliest days the minority population of the town had been concentrated in segregated areas, segregated through restrictive covenants in real estate, custom, tradition, choice, racial discrimination, and economic condition, but segregated nevertheless.

For the most part the minority population was concentrated near the tracks of the Santa Fe Railroad in the Arlington, Casa Blanca, and Eastside sections of the city. The packing houses of the Arlington Heights Fruit Company and the Riverside Orange Company were located south of downtown in the Arlington and Casa Blanca area. Mexican-American laborers serving the citrus industry were thus concentrated in this area, a development that had taken shape prior to 1910. 25 Most Mexicans not living in Arlington or Casa Blanca, and virtually all of the city's Negroes lived on the east side of the Santa Fe tracks north of Fourteenth Street, with the Mexicans concentrated between the tracks


25 Smith, History of the First Baptist Church of Riverside, p. 74.
and Park Avenue, and the Negroes between Park Avenue and Eucalyptus. While this pattern is still recognizable to some extent, the area has expanded considerably and the number of exceptions has continued to grow more numerous since World War II.

In spite of the fact that an isolated minority property holder or two could be found residing in most of Riverside's residential areas, a survey published in 1966 found Riverside to be a city of marked segregation. Research conducted by Joan W. Moore and Frank G. Mittelbach, in conjunction with the Mexican-American Study Project at UCLA, found Riverside ranking third among thirteen California cities in terms of Negro and Mexican-American segregation as measured by an index of residential dissimilarity. By way of comparisons in degree of overall residential segregation, Riverside was found to be at very nearly the same level as Los Angeles, but considerably more segregated than San Francisco, Oakland, or San Diego. The same study also found Mexican-Americans to be more rigidly segregated than Negroes in the Southwestern states. 26

Even prior to 1883, when Riverside was incorporated as a city, the residents of the area made special efforts to support their schools. During the years that followed this tradition was sustained. Prior to 1907, when the City Charter was adopted, and the four school districts

(Riverside, Palm Avenue, Arlington, and Victoria) were incorporated as the Riverside City School District, the relatively few Negro and Mexican-American residents of the city were integrated into the schools. Soon thereafter a new tradition of segregation arose, gradually at first, and never absolute. As the city grew and new neighborhood schools were added, the patterns of segregation were modified somewhat.

Two of the three elementary schools with minority enrollments of virtually one hundred percent in 1965, Irving and Casa Blanca, had been recognized as minority schools for over forty years. The third, Lowell, had served the city eminently as a school for white children from 1911 until the early 1950s when it became desegregated. Legal segregation of Negro children was not permissible under California law. Separation of Mexican-American children, on the other hand, was assumed to be legal and was practiced. Nevertheless, in the case of both, the school board perpetuated the administration of segregationist practices from about 1910 until 1952.

Because the segregation of Mexican-American children was common practice in California, and was even viewed as sound pedagogy, the policy was discussed openly and frequently. Although the segregation of Negroes was almost as common, it was not discussed quite as openly or with quite the same sense of righteousness. On at least one occasion

27 Holmes, History of Riverside County, p. 103; Tom Patterson, "There is Some Segregation in Riverside's Schools," Riverside Press, October 16, 1962.
however, the Riverside Board came close to revealing its segregation policy openly and publicly. On August 6, 1928, three ladies from the Longfellow attendance area presented the board with a problem concerning "the apparent increasing numbers of colored children attending the Longfellow School and asked that some consideration be given toward segregation." The response their request was given is recorded as follows:

The Board advised [them] that segregation could not take place under the California Law, but that the matter of re-zoning the District might be taken up and that this matter would be given further consideration by the Board.  

Indeed, the matter of gerrymandering attendance areas was taken up — and practiced — many times over. Occasionally minority parents were able to penetrate deeply enough into a predominantly white neighborhood to permit their children to attend the neighborhood school there. For the most part, however, the school district was successful in adjusting boundaries so that larger groups of minorities were excluded effectively from the white schools.

The school board and administration were no more racist in attitude than the community they served. Almost all of their early decisions reflected accurately the public attitudes of the day. In the early years the board even attempted weakly to resist segregation. In August, 1906, after finding that several white families in the Irving

28 Minutes of the Board of Education of the Riverside City School District, August 6, 1928.
district had registered their children in Longfellow, the neighboring school to the north, the board instructed the superintendent to send all such children to the right school, and that no exceptions be made. "We hold a child to reside where the real home of the parent is," declared the board. Problems similar to this would plague the district for most of the next sixty years. It was not uncommon at all for white parents living in the Irving area to send their children to Longfellow or Lowell, sometimes by giving the school administration addresses other than their own.

Irving School, on Fourteenth Street east of the Santa Fe tracks, served the Eastside area as an elementary school from 1891 until 1966. Opened as a four room schoolhouse, five additions were made to it prior to its total rebuilding in 1954 and 1956. From 1909 until its closing, Irving was viewed by Riverside residents as the Negro school, even though it was attended by substantial numbers of Mexican-Americans and other whites during its entire history. In 1909, the board ordered a "school census of the Irving District taken and a map made showing

29 Minutes of the Board of Trustees of the Riverside Schools, August 23, 1906.

the racial distribution in said district." The results of the census confirmed that a considerable number of Negroes did indeed populate the area.

It was at this point that construction of Lowell School, not quite one-half mile and five blocks distant to the south, was begun. From 1911, until after World War II, Lowell continued to operate as a segregated school serving white children east of the railroad tracks and south of Fourteenth Street. The boundaries separating Lowell from Irving were adjusted periodically between 1911 and 1952 in an attempt to maintain this status.

Between 1950 and 1961, during a decade of rapid growth, a series of administration and board decisions made the problem of Eastside segregation even more intense. By 1952 the minority population had already moved south of Fourteenth Street in significant enough numbers to threaten the school district's segregation practices. The final unsuccessful attempt to keep Lowell predominately white was made in 1952. It was doomed to failure. As a matter of fact, it even would have been difficult to maintain Lowell as an integrated school had the board sought to do so.

31 Minutes of the Board of Education of the Riverside City School District, December 7, 1909.
1952 BOUNDARY CHANGE
LOWELL - IRVING ATTENDANCE AREAS
In the early 1950s Lowell's minority enrollment was less than twenty percent. Ten years later, it would exceed ninety percent. The principal at the time, J. V. Miller, recalled that the first Negro child did not enter Lowell until about 1950. As the white population continued to grow to the east and south of the Lowell-Irving area, new schools, Victoria and Emerson, were opened in 1955 and 1956 respectively. Each of the new school openings helped assure that Lowell would become a predominately minority school. Finally, with the opening of yet another school, Alcott, in 1961, Lowell moved from the fifty percent to the ninety percent level. By 1964-65, Lowell's last year of full-scale operation before fire destroyed its main building, only seven non-minority students were enrolled.

Segregation practices on the Eastside over the years also affected Longfellow School, but only slightly. The desire to control newly opened Emerson's enrollment in general, and its minority enrollment in particular, presented the district with an opportunity to draw a strange boundary pattern separating Emerson from a minority section one block wide and six blocks long. Instead of including this area, the western end of which met the eastern boundary of Irving, in the Emerson attendance area, the district placed it in the Longfellow area. Longfellow had been Riverside's best example of an integrated school for many years, and this small addition did not change its minority composition drastically. Somewhat ironically for the school system, although this was

one of their less blatant efforts of gerrymandering, it appeared as one of the most visible on a map.

During the decade of the 1950s, the school district attempted to give its minority schools equal treatment in all material ways, and, for the most part, furnish them with competent teachers. Integration was not considered, nor was it requested by the minority community. Evidence appears to indicate that "separate, but equal" facilities were the most that the minority community could hope for, and that if they dropped their vigilance they might not even get that.

Beginning very early in the decade, Eastside citizens requested significant improvements for Irving School, and shortly thereafter requested total replacement of the facility. The administration's five-year building program, presented on March 3, 1952, stated that "consideration should be given to the replacement of this structure in its entirety and certainly the replacement of three sub-standard bungalows and kindergarten as a first item." A month and a half later the Superintendent received a long and detailed letter signed by five leading

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33 The "Longfellow Corridor," as it became known, was closed in 1968, although it had not existed for purposes of segregation for at least seven years. See Appendices D and E of text.

citizens of the area. Their message was clear: "Irving has been neglected." The district's building plans should include provision for eight new classrooms at Irving instead of four. Board President Lewis P. Alabaster explained that the district proposal of four classrooms would be only the beginning of a new school, with additional buildings to follow.

On June 7, 1954, Superintendent Bruce Miller read a letter to the board from the Eastside Citizens Committee requesting that consideration be given to building a complete school at Irving from funds made available by a recent school bond election. Consideration was given. The administration and board agreed with the need for new facilities at Irving. In September, 1954, the first six new classrooms were accepted, and by April, 1956, the entire reconstruction of the facility had been completed. Built at a total cost in excess of $225,000, including the cost of razing the old school, Irving became one of the finest four or five elementary school facilities in the district.

Its structural merit notwithstanding, Irving was still a totally segregated school. Had the board, the administration, or even

35 Emphasis in original letter to Bruce Miller, Superintendent of Schools, Riverside Unified School District, April 15, 1952, from Mrs. Lucille Taylor, President, Irving PTA; Philip C. Ramirez, Commander, Legion Post #740; Jesse M. Carlos, President, Latin American Club; Jess R. Martinez, President, Eastside Neighborhood Council; L.B. Moss, President, N.A.A.C.P. Letter is printed in full in Minutes of the Board of Education of the Riverside City School District, April 21, 1952.

36 Statement made to author by Bruce Miller, superintendent, on May 22, 1968.
the minority community possessed the same social values and commitments they were to possess by September, 1965, Irving would never have been rebuilt. Once rebuilt, it provided an additional barrier to early integration, although there is no evidence that the board would have moved decisively in the direction of integration had Irving not been rebuilt.

The Eastside, especially that part of it within the Irving School attendance area, was populated by more Mexican-Americans than Negroes in 1950. However, the distinctly Mexican-American barrio in town was Casa Blanca. As the Chinese left the citrus industry near the turn of the century, a growing number of Mexicans replaced them in the fields, groves, and in the packing houses. Some time prior to 1910 the Mexican settlement of Casa Blanca was established. By 1913 the area was served by a first grade and kindergarten in an abandoned warehouse. Five years later the wooden building was moved from Prenda Street to its final site in the heart of Casa Blanca. Five years after that, soon after Mabra Madden was appointed Casa Blanca's principal, the building was burned.

The history of Casa Blanca School, in spite of temporary dislocation, overcrowding following the fire, and the eventual construction of additional facilities in 1927, 1954 and 1959, is not particularly significant for schoolhouse foundings. It was very significant for its uniqueness as a community school in the barrio.

Over a period of forty-four years, Casa Blanca School developed into a significant community entity with a closer relationship between the people of the community and the school than was typical of other elementary schools in Riverside. More than a school, it seemed almost as a kind of white America consulate to the people of Casa Blanca. For forty-one of those years the school was headed by the same principal, Mabra B. Madden. If it served as more than a center of elementary grade instruction for children, it was because its leader served as more than a school principal.

Madden was helpful on many fronts, sometimes urging parents to use hospitals, directing them to the appropriate public and private agencies for needed assistance or service, helping them find employment, occasionally paying a telephone bill or offering other limited service himself, acting as a notary public, marital counselor, amateur attorney, and unofficial mayor for the people of Casa Blanca. Particularly during the earlier years, but continuing to some extent through 1964, a number of parents became dependent upon his helping hand. Others were less involved, and a few, particularly in the later years, even resented what they considered to be a kind of benevolent patronship cultivated by the principal.

Through the course of more than four decades, the situation changed markedly. By the mid 1950s, instead of opening school in September with one-third of the pupils registered, as had been the case during the twenties and thirties, school would begin with nearly its full enrollment. Illiteracy had been greatly reduced, and community
pride increased. An active minority within the community, now including a few Negroes, became vigorous advocates of community improvements. So far had the community come by the mid 1950s that the Saturday Evening Post featured an article concerning Casa Blanca entitled, "The Slum that Rebelled."  

Casa Blanca was not the only Mexican-American school in town. Independiente, in the Arlington area, approximately two miles southwest of Casa Blanca along the Santa Fe tracks, was the other. Its founding in 1924 followed a request from a delegation of P.T.A. mothers at Liberty School that "there might be segregation of the Mexican element now attending Liberty."  

Segregation of Mexican-American children into special classes had already been the established practice at Liberty, but as the school became crowded, the board thought it best to build a separate segregated school.  

Until 1948, Independiente operated as that totally segregated school, serving the children of orange pickers residing in three camps or clusters of small homes -- Campos de Pasqual, Campos de Leonardo, and Campos Modesto. Although its closing came one year after the federal courts in Mendez v. Westminster School District found the maintenance of such schools illegal, Independiente was closed primarily because of an inadequate enrollment. Only thirty-eight pupils

38 Frank J. Taylor, 228 (April 21, 1956), 32-33, 136-138.  
39 Minutes of the Board of Education of the Riverside City School District, May 16, 1922.
enrolled on opening day of classes in September, 1947.

The practice of community isolation and segregated education was common to the rest of Southern California too. Mass immigration from Mexico to California began about 1910, sparked to a considerable degree by unfavorable economic conditions in the homeland. A survey made by the California State Department of Education in 1927 revealed that 79.2 percent of all Mexican children under eighteen in California resided in the ten southern counties. By 1930 Mexicans and Mexican-Americans constituted the largest group of unskilled, low wage labor in the state. Often viewed as a labor commodity, they composed from sixty-five to eighty-five percent of the total labor force in the United States. 40

Mexican-American children were relegated to segregated schools for many reasons. Undoubtedly, prejudice was the single most important reason. Then too, Mexican families lived in colonies geographically separated from the majority culture. Owing to the transient nature of their lives, schooling was often irregular and grade level placement difficult to determine. Many of the children entered schools without the ability to speak English, thus creating special instructional problems. While lower in grade level, Mexican-American children were often older, thus causing them embarrassment in an integrated setting. Educators, themselves impressed and frustrated by these and other significant differences, often recommend segregation as the most feasible answer. 41


Functional segregation of Mexican-American children on the elementary level was a reality of life in Riverside until 1966. Independiente operated throughout its entire twenty-four year history as an exclusively Mexican-American school. Casa Blanca, on the other hand occasionally enrolled other white children, and during its later years, an increasing number of Negro children. Nevertheless, prior to the opening of Madison Elementary School in the fall of 1952, Casa Blanca stood out as a kind of minority island, with non-minority children on all four of its sides attending other Riverside schools, principally Palm.

The decade of the fifties, in spite of rapid growth, was one of considerable progress in Riverside; progress which included, for example, the springing up of seven new elementary schools, plus substantial additions and improvements in most of the rest. A combination of conscious and de facto segregation continued on the elementary level without any significant interruption, but in other ways, specifically in terms of school plants, facilities, materials, and staff, the minority schools were treated much better than they had been before. Casa Blanca, which had been clearly neglected during most of its history, began to receive

42 During the 1964-1965 term, 133 Negroes were reported out of a total minority enrollment of 464. One Caucasian child was enrolled during that year, making the total enrollment 465. Pupil Enrollment by Race, 1964-1965, (Riverside Unified School District: 1964).

43 The former segregation policy of the school district was discussed publicly in the Riverside Press, October 16, 1962.
CASABLANCA ATTENDANCE AREA 1945

Palm Attendance Area
NE to Magnolia and Lowell Attendance Areas

Esperanza

Casa Blanca Attendance Area

Palm Attendance Area
SE to City Limits

Palm Attendance Area
NW to City Limits

Liberty Attendance Area
SW to City Limits

Washington

Magnolia

Indiana

Jefferson

Emerald

Madison

Lincoln

Victoria

Adams

Monroe
fair treatment. When buildings were completed at the new Palm School in 1924 and 1927, the old furniture there had been transferred to Casa Blanca. This was not the case during the decade of the fifties. Casa Blanca, greatly in need of new construction, was given a fair share of the bond money won at the elections of 1954 and 1959.

The bond and tax elections were passed by overwhelming votes, for the most part, during the late forties and through the fifties, with the minority neighborhoods supporting them along with the rest of the community. One passed in May, 1949, by better than a five-to-one margin. During earlier years many passed by even greater margins. As the decade of the fifties grew shorter, the difficulty of passing school bonds increased somewhat. One failed on June 9, 1959, but was passed five months later. 44

As the minority communities became better organized, more vocal, and better educated after World War II, they also became better able to make their most critical needs known to city and school officials. Both school and municipal improvements had been part of the result in Casa Blanca. So had the total rebuilding of Irving School on the Eastside. These significant improvements notwithstanding, school segregation, a generally lower level of education, discrimination in housing, a lower standard of housing, job discrimination, lower family incomes, and personal indignities arising from social prejudice, remained problems. As

44 Minutes of the Riverside Board of Education. Conclusions regarding bond elections have been drawn from official reports of results. See Appendix F of text.
recently as 1966, after a serious and rather comprehensive study of minority conditions in Riverside, the League of Women Voters issued a three part report on the aspects of housing, education and employment. The housing committee concluded, not unexpectedly, that "Riverside is far from an ideal community for a large segment of its population." 45

Both Negroes and Mexican-Americans in Riverside occupied the lowest employment positions, had the lowest median incomes and were lowest in the socio-economic index. While most of the white-majority population held white collar jobs, the majority of Negroes and Mexican-Americans occupied blue collar occupations. By far the lowest median incomes, $4,543 and $4,164 based on 1960 census data, were in the census tracts served by Casa Blanca and Irving schools, while the highest median incomes were in the neighborhoods served by two of the "best" elementary schools in town. 46

In the summer of 1965 the San Bernardino-Riverside-Ontario labor market area joined twenty-one other major labor areas in the nation as a region of "persistent unemployment." The United States Department of Labor had down-graded the area to one in which the number of workers was defined as exceeding the number of jobs at from six to nine percent. The state average rate of unemployment in 1965 stood at 5.4 percent.


46 United States Census of Population and Housing: 1960, San Bernardino, Riverside, and Ontario, California, Tract 135, Table P-1.
while that of Riverside was 6.4 percent. Although this reflects a less than desirable picture for the labor force in general, owing for the most part to a lack of industry in the area, the unemployment rates of minorities were substantially greater — about four times as great.

In housing, the conditions of minority residents were not as desirable either. In 1960 the City Planning Department listed 9.3 percent of the city's housing as substandard. By 1966 the percentage had increased slightly to 9.7; in 1968 it was 10.08. Geographically, the two areas where minority residents were concentrated stood out in both compilations. There the most recent figures were approximately five and six times higher than the city average. In 1960 the average home in Riverside was valued at $14,200. Those on the Eastside served by Lowell, Irving, and Longfellow Schools averaged approximately $8,500; those served largely by Casa Blanca School, about $8,300.

Similarly, in terms of the number of years completed in school, irrespective of its quality, adults in the areas served by the Casa Blanca, Irving and Lowell Schools had experienced fewer median years


of education. Compared to a city average of 12.4 years, census tract 13, roughly contiguous with the Casa Blanca attendance area, showed a median level of schooling of 8.1 years. In census tract 4, which included large sections of the Lowell, Irving and Longfellow attendance areas on the Eastside, the median level of formal education completed was 9.2 years.

It was not until the decade of the 1960s that the schools became actively concerned about the socio-economic similarities and differences among children, and began to adopt programs intended to equalize educational opportunities.

50 United States Census of Population and Housing: 1960, San Bernardino, Riverside, and Ontario, California, Tract 135, Table P-1.
CHAPTER III

A DEVELOPING CONSCIOUSNESS

Reflecting back over the Riverside School District's efforts to improve the educational program for minority students between March, 1961 and September, 1965, Superintendent Bruce Miller voiced the sentiments of many when he acknowledged, "Every single one of us was mistaken in thinking we were doing what we could."¹

The first half of the 1960s did bear witness to a growing consciousness of minority problems on the part of both the school district's board and administration. Although some individuals possessed a much deeper awareness of these problems than did others, for most it was a case of growing slowly, and then realizing rather dramatically in 1965 that the situation was far graver than had been thought. Of course all had become aware much earlier of the national civil rights movement and of the Negro's struggle for equality.

The board and administration had not ignored the Negro's predicament completely. Treatment of the two de facto segregated schools, Irving and Casa Blanca, had improved in several tangible ways after 1950. The structures themselves had been improved markedly. Their instructional material was comparable to that found anywhere in the school system. The teachers apparently were competent and dedicated, although some parents

¹ Statement made to the author by Bruce Miller on May 17, 1965.
and administrators have offered some reservations on this point.

Following the complete rebuilding of Irving School by 1956, the only significant complaint advanced by an organized minority group during the remainder of the decade concerned the district's policy of hiring teachers. On January 19, 1959, William H. Davis, vice-president of the local N.A.A.C.P. branch, charged that minority groups were discriminated against in hiring, and that when hired, they tended to be placed only in minority schools. Two years later the N.A.A.C.P. complained again, this time to the State Fair Employment Practice Commission. While recruiting enough minority teachers was and still remains a problem, Riverside was not guilty of discriminatory hiring practices between 1960 and 1965. The number of Negro teachers increased from ten in 1958 to thirty-one in 1966. Minority teachers, like other teachers, were assigned to schools without regard to the racial composition of those schools.

Faculty integration and alleged job discrimination were not to be the central issues affecting the relationship between minority groups and the schools during the first half of the 1960s. The right of all

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3 Audrey M. Sterling, Commissioner, Fair Employment Practice Commission, Sacramento, California, to [Bruce] Miller, [Riverside, California], June 7, 1965, L.S.

pupils to receive a high quality education in an integrated school was the chief concern. For the first forty years of its history (1911-1951), Lowell School was maintained as virtually an all white school. By the fifties the board could no longer maintain it in this status. The neighborhood around the school was changing significantly and rapidly. New neighborhoods to the south and east were opened and served with new schools. Together, these two factors pushed the minority enrollment up at Lowell, from virtually nil at the end of World War II to approximately fifty percent by 1960.

By the 1960-61 term, the minority population residing in the immediate area surrounding Lowell School had grown into a distinct majority. Yet, because approximately two hundred majority-white pupils still attended from an area south of the Tequesquite Arroyo, the ethnic composition of the school remained slightly more than fifty percent majority. But 1960-61 was to be the last year of this arrangement. Had the immediate neighborhood surrounding Lowell been willing, it might have been nearly the final year of the school itself.

The opening of Victoria School in 1955 and Emerson School in 1956 had cut into Lowell's enrollment of Caucasian pupils. The opening of Alcott School in 1961 came close to evacuating Caucasian children from Lowell. The actual number of majority group children would be reduced as a result of that opening to approximately thirty-five, out of a total projected enrollment of 356. The board and top level administration were no longer attempting to implement a segregationist policy. But neither were they willing to adopt a policy that would deliberately
avoid segregation. Paramount among their concerns was to provide nearby and easily accessible school facilities for new neighborhoods. The fact that new neighborhoods were all white, while older neighborhoods, such as the one around Lowell School, were nearly all minority, was of little concern. Thus, rather than pursuing an unwritten but well understood policy of segregation, as had been followed in earlier years, the new position was one of innocence and detachment. It was assumed by 1961 that gerrymandering school boundaries in order to preserve segregation was wrong. At the same time, it was also assumed that setting boundaries for the specific purpose of achieving integration was also wrong, or at best, highly questionable.

Richard Purviance, principal of Lowell School, was aware of what was developing so far as the racial and ethnic composition of Lowell was concerned. As early as 1957, after learning from a friend in the real estate business that the school district was seeking a site in what developed as the Alcott area, Purviance expressed his feelings in favor of maintaining Lowell as an integrated school to Lewis Wicken, then director of elementary education. He also suggested that the school be located to the south and east of the location finally chosen.

The Riverside City School District, like other districts in rapidly growing areas, kept a constant watch out for school sites in areas of projected growth. Price and location were crucial considerations. Prior

5 Statement made to the author by Richard Purviance on July 10, 1968,
to 1963, the ethnic and racial composition of neighborhoods was not. Even had they been, the board could have justified the opening of Alcott School at its present location on the basis of land available, cost and feasibility. Besides, the main building at Lowell, completed in 1911, was now the district's oldest structure still in service. While very serviceable, and in some respects superior to the newer buildings, consideration had been given to abandoning it as a school.

On March 20, 1961, the same day as the Lowell-Alcott boundary decision was announced, Superintendent Bruce Miller was asked by board President Richard Hampson to "work out data for the Lowell district with consideration given to closing this school and dividing the district between Irving and Emerson Schools." From the standpoint of the board and administration, this seemed like a course worthy of exploration. Irving School was practically new and was already being operated with a below capacity enrollment. Below capacity enrollments for fall, 1961, were also being projected for other neighboring schools, including Emerson, Longfellow, and Alcott.

Response to the board's action of March 20, 1961, was not quite as one might have expected in light of subsequent developments, but quite

6 Richard Purviance, principal of Lowell from 1956 to 1966, discussed the structural qualities of the building with a city engineer and the school district's business manager, Harry Young. Although the building was of a heavy frame construction and had large airy rooms, it was in need of rehabilitation. Harry Young was of the opinion that the school was not worth the investment which would be required to bring it up to standard.

anticipatable in light of the context. Hampson's proposal concerning
the closing of Lowell was reacted to swiftly and negatively. One meet-
ing of several parents in the Lowell neighborhood was held later in the
same evening. A petition was circulated asking the board not to close
Lowell. Larger meetings were scheduled. Then, on March 30, after con-
sulting with Hampson, Superintendent Miller announced that the board
had "no intention whatever of closing Lowell School." The reaction
opposing the closing came primarily from minority parents. For them
Lowell was still an integrated school with a distinguished past. At
the time it maintained a fairly close balance between majority and
minority pupils. Its closure would mean almost certain segregation
for their children at either Irving or Emerson, not to mention the in-
convenience.

Equalizing the loads of schools was an important consideration,
but one that the board and administration were willing to back off from
temporarily in order to avert a confrontation with the Lowell community.
Instead, they agreed to look forward to a master plan which would con-
sider the Lowell problem in the context of an overall study of projected
growth and the movement of people.

Superintendent Miller stated publicly that he believed there would
be no objection to the Tequesquite Arroyo as the southern boundary of
Lowell, separating it from Alcott, since the arroyo was a "natural divid-
ing line." His prediction was very wrong. On May 1, a petition drawn

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by a group of parents in the Lowell attendance area was presented to the board objecting to precisely that. Their effort had received encouragement and even some direction from Lowell principal Richard Purviance. His own efforts to influence the district's policy on the Lowell boundary issue had not succeeded. He and concerned parents, mostly Caucasians, felt that the only remaining chance to influence policy rested in the hands of parents themselves.

The petition requested the board to restudy the boundaries of Lowell School and all adjacent schools immediately. If the problems were not obvious to the board, they were to the petitioners:

1. The Lowell School boundaries for next year have been set, leaving less than 35 Caucasian children to attend Lowell out of a projected enrollment of 325 pupils.

2. This low ratio insures the fact that Lowell will become virtually a segregated school.

3. Due to these facts, families of 12 of the above mentioned children plan to enroll their children in private schools.

4. The above mentioned group of citizens wants the neighborhood to remain integrated and desires to maintain a balanced ratio of integration.

5. This group wants their children to have the privileges and the responsibilities which go with the right to attend and be fully educated in an integrated school.

6. This citizens' group thinks that it is unfair and not in the American tradition to deny any racial or religious groups the motivation and the superior program that inevitably go with integrated Riverside City schools. These citizens further believe that the schools have a responsibility to their majority groups to teach them to live in harmony with Riverside's minority groups.

7. This citizens' group reminds the School Board and staff that the public school traditionally has a responsibility for its resident community. Good schools assure leadership in making an outstanding residential area. Poor schools detract from the desirability of a residential area.
8. Lowell School has been a model integrated school, a credit not only to the city, its school officials, and the Lowell principal and his staff, but also to the nation and a world in great need of examples of how to live together. Our group is proud to be a part of such a school, and those of us who are living in an integrated neighborhood are morally proud of this fact. We sincerely ask the Riverside School Board’s aid in keeping the school the model that it is, or providing its equivalent. This is necessary in order to keep the adjacent area one in which we can all, regardless of race or ethnic difference, take pride.

9. The low ratio of integration resulting from the district boundaries precludes many families with grade school children from moving into the district. Thus the boundary policy condemns the area to eventual complete segregation.

10. Sociological studies proclaim that segregated residential areas require a larger proportion of the tax dollar in proportion to their tax contribution than do integrated areas. The assessed valuation of the Lowell area is in fact declining. It is in the interest of tax supported institutions to encourage integrated residential areas to remain integrated in order to slow or stop their declining valuations.9

After praising the work being done at Lowell by the principal and teachers, the petitioners suggested that an immediate restudy be made, and "an acceptable, fair, and responsible solution be found and placed in effect before the opening of school next fall, 1961." The committee believed that the board and administration possessed the "knowledge, wisdom, and moral courage to find and carry out a solution to this problem which you know is legally and morally right." The faith was premature.

No member of the board or administration voiced any opposition to the proposal. In fact they agreed with it, but were unwilling to

9 "Proposal to Riverside School Board," a petition signed by twenty-seven residents of the Lowell attendance area, and presented to the Board of Education on May 1, 1961. Of the twenty-seven signers, seven were Negro, four Mexican-American, and sixteen majority-white.
take the kind of decisive, costly, and potentially controversial action
necessary to maintain Lowell as an integrated school. President Hampson
noted that the problem went beyond the Board of Education into all in-
fluences of the community, while Superintendent Miller pointed to a host
of personnel problems, transportation problems, and boundary problems
which could not be solved by September. Both the board and administra-
tion indicated a willingness to give the matter full consideration and
offer some sort of solution, even if only a temporary one.

At the following board meeting of May 15, the proposal was again
considered. Dean Newell, principal spokesman for the Lowell group, empha-
sized that a temporary solution to the Lowell boundary question needed
to be arrived at, as well as a long range solution to the entire problem
of integration. His appeal was limited to two requests: (1) a stay of
segregation for Lowell, and (2) the formation of a study committee to
consider the entire problem. 10 On a motion by Carolyn Diffenbaugh, sec-
onded by Arthur Littleworth, a committee to be composed of different
ethnic groups, city officials, board members, and school personnel was
formed to look into these issues. Arthur Littleworth served as the com-
mittee's chairman. The Lowell Study Committee, as it became known, in-
cluded one member from each of the four families that had sparked the
petition, and was thus amply representative of the earlier group's
thinking.

The long term value of the Lowell committee's work is hard to
determine. It was the first community study group to deal with the

10 Riverside Press, May 16, 1961; Confirmed in interview with Dean C.
Newell, August 8, 1968.
many ramifications of integration, not in terms of Lowell alone, but in
terms of Riverside in general. The committee considered transporting
additional Caucasian children into Lowell, adjusting boundaries to in­
clude more Caucasian students, instituting a program for the gifted to
encourage attendance by pupils outside of Lowell's attendance area,
abolishing boundaries or opening corridor like areas around the school
so families could be given an opportunity to choose their own school,
and finally, the controlled dispersal of minority group pupils to other
Riverside schools.

In the end it was the last point that presented the greatest
appeal, even though the committee "recognized that the complete appli­
cation of this principle would, in effect, mean the abandonment of
certain schools." Several variations of dispersal were studied. They
included: (a) the possibility of transporting all fourth, fifth, and
sixth grade pupils from Lowell to other Riverside schools where capac­
ity was available, (b) making the above plan applicable to Irving School
as well, and dividing the Lowell attendance area in such a way that
children in the three upper grades living within one mile of Emerson or
Alcott would walk to these respective schools, with the remaining upper
grade pupils being transported to other schools not adjacent to Lowell
where continued space was anticipated.

Whatever was attempted, the committee stressed the importance of
harmonious integration within the receiving school or schools and that
pupils leaving or being transported from Lowell to any other school be dis­
tributed evenly within all classes of a given grade level. The prevailing
committee opinion was that bus transportation would be required to accomplish dispersal, "although there were indications that parents may be willing to assume this responsibility." Specific recommendations of the Lowell Study Committee were two:

1. We feel that the best solution to the Lowell problem would be one of controlled dispersal of the upper grades into as large a number of Riverside schools as is feasible, and we recommend that the Board of Education and the school administration implement such a program for September, 1961.

2. We strongly urge formation of a city-wide committee for study of the overall problem of integration in regard to schools, housing, and recreation and recommend that the Board of Education wholeheartedly support, and be represented on such a committee. Several members of the Lowell Study Committee have expressed a willingness to serve on such a committee.\(^{11}\)

Three days later a one sentence minority report was written by Frank Ellison recommending that the Board "implement the same program as outlined in the first recommendation of the basic report for both Irving and Casa Blanca School district by fall term, 1962." Although the committee's recommendations made no mention of attempting to save Lowell as an integrated school, they did advocate a more advanced policy than the board and administration were willing to implement.

Arthur Littleworth, member of the school board, and chairman of the Lowell School Study Committee, presented the recommendations to the

\(^{11}\) "Report of the Committee Deliberations and Recommendations," from the Lowell Study Committee to the Board of Education, Riverside City School District, June 16, 1961. Members of the committee included Arthur Littleworth (chairman), Mrs. Carolyn Diffenbaugh, and B. Rae Sharp from the Board of Education, and the following members of the community: Mrs. Richard S. Brill, Mrs. Hubert L. Cline, Francis G. Ellison, Mrs. E. McCoy, Dean C. Newell, John Sotelo, and Jess Ybarra. By racial and ethnic composition the group included two Negroes, two Mexican-Americans, and six majority-whites.
board, three members of which, including himself, had been on the committee. Following Littleworth's presentation and the presentation of the minority report by Frank Ellison, the board ordered itself and the superintendent's office to react to both reports. Since a majority of the board (Littleworth, Diffenbaugh, and Sharp) had already explored the problem in depth while serving as individual citizens on the committee, much of their reaction could be anticipated. While favorably disposed, they would await the superintendent's recommendation. The superintendent's leadership would be crucial to the final decision.

In making his decision Superintendent Miller was influenced by many factors including his staff's advice, the cost, the community's support, and all other considerations that come under the rubric of feasibility. Certainly the Lowell School Committee favored meaningful integration. The board was sympathetic and could have been persuaded to act, but there was still no widespread vocal support for mandatory integration within either the majority or the minority community. The committee had not asked for a boundary adjustment, which, though it might have caused some strain, the administration could have made. On June 28, Superintendent Miller revealed his plan. Following board discussion of the plan on July 3, the Press headlined its article covering the meeting, "Plan Will Prevent Lowell Segregation." Such was not to be the case. Instead the plan actually hastened total segregation.

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There had been some reaction against the Lowell committee's recommendation of controlled dispersal. The same meeting that heard the superintendent's alternative plan also heard Board President Hampson read a letter from a "group of professional men" requesting that the board not act upon the Lowell report until its next meeting. By July 17, the board was ready to take action on the superintendent's recommendations and adopted them almost exactly as presented. In order to provide integration experiences for those pupils whose parents desired them, a kind of open enrollment plan was adopted, applicable only to fifth and sixth graders attending Lowell. Parents would have to provide their own transportation, register their children at Lowell and have them remain at Lowell for up to a week until transfers could be made to other schools in the district.

In the mind of the superintendent the plan was an attempt to satisfy the need of elementary school children to experience an integrated education prior to entering junior high school. Prior to adopting the plan, the board made it clear that "the principle of the neighborhood school should be preserved." From a public relations standpoint, the plan was reasonably pleasing to everyone. The principle of the neighborhood school had most certainly been preserved. Then too, an open enrollment plan was, after all, a fairly progressive commitment by 1961 standards. Taxpayers could complain of nothing, since the plan cost virtually nothing. Dr. Ellis Darley, a signer of the original petition to save Lowell as an integrated school, applauded the board for

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its action. The administration and board had proved themselves to be the willing listeners and implementors of new ideas while at the same time acting as conservators of funds and preservers of the neighborhood school.

So far as realizing the central goal of the Lowell Study Committee -- integration for pupils of the fourth, fifth and sixth grades at Lowell School -- the plan was a total failure. In August, Superintendent Miller sent letters to parents of eighty-eight fifth and sixth grade students asking their preference of elementary schools. Of the forty-five from whom responses were received, parents of only eight children indicated a preference for a school other than Lowell. During the first week of school a follow-up check was made of the eight. Parents of three children had changed their minds. Two other children had enrolled in parochial schools, and one was still undecided. Of the remaining three children, two were transferred to Pachappa and the other to Victoria. Not a single Negro student transferred out of Lowell School during the first two years of the policy. Not until 1963-64 did four Negro children request and receive transfers out of Lowell.


It appears clear that history was not on the side of integration in 1961, as indeed it had not been in 1952 when the decision was made to rebuild Irving School. While the national civil rights movement had been gaining in momentum, it had not markedly affected the relatively small local minority community to the point where integration was demanded, or even considered a realistic hope. The dominant majority in the white community was by no means convinced that a decisive integration policy was either desirable or warranted. Even the Riverside Press, probably the most influential progressive voice in town, was somewhat reluctant to support major boundary revisions. While accepting as proper the act of taking racial composition into account for the purpose of avoiding segregation, it did not believe that factor should be the "primary consideration."  

There was no strong commitment to integration within the top level of the school administration in 1961. Superintendent Miller knew that lasting integration could not be accomplished without bussing. 18 Neither he nor his staff was of any mind to try that without strong support from any group in the community. The opening of Alcott School had transformed Lowell from an integrated school into a segregated minority school, but as future events unfolded, it promised to be the last time such action would be permitted.

18 Statement made to the author by Bruce Miller on May 22, 1968.
For one thing, during 1962 and 1963 the State Board of Education, the California Legislature, and the California Supreme Court took some important steps to prevent segregation of this type. Even though the Lowell-Alcott boundary decision was not arrived at with the deliberate intention of segregating the races, it is doubtful that it could have stood the test established by the California Supreme Court in the Jackson case of 1963.

Dean Newell, a prime mover in challenging the Riverside Board of Education on the Lowell-Alcott boundary issue, had explored the legal ramifications of that issue with the California Department of Justice. He had remained far from satisfied with the school district's token solution to the segregation problem through a voluntary transfer policy. However, since the school board had not intentionally created a segregated school district, Deputy Attorney General Clara E. Kauffman advised Newell that no legal basis existed for pursuing the matter further.

In October, 1962, soon after the State Board of Education's decision requiring local school authorities to "exert all effort to avoid and eliminate segregation of children on account of race or color," Superintendent Miller initiated a study on school boundaries and attendance areas. By March, the district's policy on boundaries was amended to permit "ethnic composition of the residents near the school, the student

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body, and the adjacent schools and school areas" to be considered for
the purpose of avoiding de facto segregation. In concrete terms, it
meant some relatively small adjustments in the boundaries of some ele-
mentary and secondary schools.

Four streets in a predominately minority area near Casa Blanca
were placed within the new George Washington School attendance area
when that school opened in March, 1963. By September, 1963, additional
blocks in the Casa Blanca area were designated optional territory, per-
mitting minority, as well as any majority pupils in the area, to attend
Washington if they preferred. In September, 1964, another boundary
change permitted pupils west of the Santa Fe tracks to attend Madison
School. Prior to that time, Madison had almost no minority students,
although it was located only eight blocks from the all-minority Casa
Blanca School. While none of these decisions changed the basic segre-
gated nature of Casa Blanca, they did increase the minority percentage
attending Washington and Madison, and help reduce the class sizes at
Casa Blanca.

Finally, even the 1961 "Lowell School Policy" of open enrollment
was modified markedly. At the board meeting of September 21, 1964, the
policy was expanded to include Casa Blanca and Irving, in addition to
Lowell, and was made applicable to all grade levels, instead of being
limited only to the fifth and sixth grades. The new policy was intended

20 Minutes of the Board of Education of the Riverside Unified School
District, March 18, 1963.
to be "consistent with the goal of ultimately integrating the three schools." To be sure, there had been some change of attitude on the part of both the administration and board after 1961.

Attempts by parents and the Lowell School principal to avert the segregation of Lowell had been unsuccessful. The district's attempt to provide fifth and sixth grade Lowell children with "integrated experiences" through a voluntary open enrollment policy failed completely. De facto segregation emerged as a more widespread problem than ever before. Owing to a growing awareness of the problem through widespread dissemination of news concerning new programs of compensatory education, court decisions, state actions, civil rights activities, etc., de facto segregation became recognized as a problem to be coped with -- or more accurately in the beginning -- a problem worthy of a compensatory program.

Compensatory education, without integration, did not produce significant results. It lasted as an official district program for two years, was never funded adequately, and in a sense, was not even given a chance to fail. The new programs that were implemented did touch the minority pupils in the three de facto segregated schools. If the benefit was minimal, at least this much was accomplished. The Lowell School Policy to provide "integrated" experiences had not even touched its target group.

Ray Berry, then associate superintendent, believed that the compensatory education program held some promise for helping students improve

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their academic skills, and may have even made some minimal progress in that direction, but he acknowledged that the program was too limited in scope and that it received inadequate financial support. One principal of a de facto segregated school described the program as "really more talk than compensatory." Nevertheless, for two years the three de facto segregated schools were provided with some slight advantages above and beyond the standard district program.

Casa Blanca and Irving had long been segregated schools. It was Lowell that had passed through a change, from a school serving white children almost exclusively, to an integrated school, and finally into a completely racially imbalanced minority school, all inside of ten years. The pattern of majority exit from the neighborhood and minority entrance, already well established prior to the Lowell boundary question, was accelerated. The composition of the neighborhood changed, and so did the ethnic and racial balance of the school. As this happened and the socio-economic well-being of the area declined, it became evident that the instructional program at Lowell would also require some modification. The opening of Alcott School in 1961 resulted in the loss of approximately 200 white pupils from Lowell and the transfer of several faculty members as well. There was, however, no major dislocation of staff. Most of the teachers remained, and the few who left were replaced by others equally as competent.

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23 Statement made to the author by Richard Purviance, former principal of Lowell School, on July 10, 1968.
To say that compensatory education began on a very small scale is true, of course, but does not imply that it was ever run on a grand scale. It began on a very limited basis at Lowell in 1962. Mrs. Mary Ellen Cline, one of the local white residents active in community affairs, had suggested to Richard Purviance that the school begin something like a "higher horizons" program about which she had read. During the first two years, the parts of the program which required extra financial support, primarily field trips, were funded largely by the Lowell P.T.A. Much of the program, both before and after it became a part of the district compensatory education program, required little or nothing in the way of extra expense. At Lowell, for example, adults from the minority community were brought in to discuss their occupations and professions. Interest hours at the end of the school day, offering subjects as diverse as chess and Negro history, had already been a part of the Lowell program prior to discussion of "higher horizons."

The superintendent and board became involved with the issue of compensatory education for the first time in the summer of 1963, as news of court decisions and other events in the area of civil rights sparked their interest. Their commitment to the cause of providing equal educational opportunities grew as their realization of the problems inherent in segregated education increased. Although the compensatory education program did not in itself contribute very much to equalizing educational opportunity, it represented an early demonstration of the board's growing concern for a serious problem. It also provided an
opportunity for members of the superintendent's staff, particularly the associate superintendent, to make contacts in the minority community. The last factor, although not particularly important to minority leaders pushing hard for integration in 1965, was important to the administration and the board in that it helped reduce their sense of frustration and futility during that later predicament.

In July, 1963, Superintendent Miller invited Jesse Wall, a Negro teacher at Ramona High School and president of the Riverside N.A.A.C.P. chapter, to discuss with him the question of minority grievances against the school district. Miller's central concern was: "Are we discriminating against Negroes without knowing it?" In the course of their discussion a series of Negro grievances were pointed out, some of which were already known to the administration. Certainly Negroes were not pleased with the manner in which the school system had handled the Lowell boundary question in 1961. They resented the fact that the schools were doing little to correct the relatively low academic achievement of minority students; they felt that school counseling was inadequate, and they thought the district could hire more minority teachers.

Subsequently, and all within the next month, Wall held additional meetings with Arthur Littleworth, now president of the school board, and Ray Berry, associate superintendent. All of the meetings were satisfactory in the sense that the three individuals pledged to cooperate in the solution of minority problems. The board president was understandably...

24 Statement made to the author by Bruce Miller on May 22, 1968.
interested in school-community relations and expressed a willingness
to discuss educational problems with members of the minority community.
It was on the occasion of this August meeting between Wall and Littleworth that the board president accepted an offer to join the newly forming Human Relations Council, an unofficial agency independent of the city government.

From these initial meetings between Jesse Wall and school officials during the summer of 1963, there developed a series of both formal and informal meetings involving from two people to much larger groups. The importance of some seemed at the time to be historic in proportion, only to lose their lustre in light of subsequent developments. One such meeting occurred on September 16, 1963, shortly following the series of private meetings held between individuals in the school system and Jesse Wall. It involved two school board members, the associate superintendent, Wall, and three other individuals thought by Jesse Wall to be interested leaders in the minority community. Operating in his dual role as a

26 Progress to Date on the District's Compensatory Education Program, Mimeo, (Riverside Unified School District, [1964]).

27 Dr. Donald Taylor, assistant to the superintendent, was active on the council and represented Arthur Littleworth and the school district at most of the meetings.

28 Organizational affiliations came to have no meaning in 1965 when the integration drive began in earnest. Thus it is misleading to infer a relationship between a person's membership activities in 1963 and his leadership role in 1965. With this qualification in mind, those in attendance at the September meeting were: Mrs. Alice Key, president of VOICE (Victory Over Inequities, Civic and Economic), a local organization; Robert Bland, member of the United Council of Clubs and the education committee of the N.A.A.C.P.; Etienne Caroline, a member of the Riverside Police Department and the N.A.A.C.P.; Jesse Wall, teacher at Riverside's Ramona High School and president of the local chapter of the N.A.A.C.P.; Ray Berry, associate superintendent of schools; B. Rae Sharp, and Arthur Littleworth, members of the school board.
teacher in the district and local N.A.A.C.P. President, Wall was an ideal person to bring people together.

Of the four Negro representatives at that meeting, only Robert Bland would be a major force behind the Negro drive for full and complete integration two years later. Having received from a friend in the school system some results of standardized tests administered in the district, Bland was able to point out with evidence more persuasive than bald assertions, that students in the three de facto segregated schools had not performed as well as children in comparable schools in the district. His conclusion was that children in the de facto segregated schools had not received an opportunity to learn equal to that of children in other schools. In the wake of Bland's comments, discussion developed on ways in which the schools could help equalize opportunity. This in itself was somewhat significant, since the schools had formerly held that the real issue was housing, with the school's responsibility being limited to providing "equal" facilities in the various neighborhoods. All accounts indicate that the meeting was congenial, harmonious and filled with understanding. One could hardly have expected it to have been otherwise. On the issue of integration; board member B. Rae Sharp's account of what transpired is highly informative:

It was pointed out that a complete desegregation of the schools, which would result in putting the less qualified students out into schools with higher standards, where competition with Caucasian students might only build their individual sense of frustrations, was not the ideal solution to the problem. They suggested that a better solution might be that of transferring the better-qualified students, those who were capable of competing in a school with higher scholastic standards, to one of the other elementary schools in the district. They suggested that the three segregated schools
be then treated as remedial schools, with assignment to these schools of teachers who are especially qualified to encourage and motivate the students to do a better job in school, with the thought that any of such students who could show ability and willingness could then be transferred to some other school in the district.

They suggested that some "sales program" might be developed to bring about a motivation for better scholastics among those students who presently find a lack of encouragement for such effort, either in school or at home.

They pointed out that the general plans suggested would probably require that the school district furnish transportation to those students transferring to other elementary schools in the district, to the extent that such transfers were made beyond the normal walking area, because in most families in the area, both parents work and economic conditions are such that furnishing of transportation by parents is often times an impossibility.29

The district did not encourage capable minority children to transfer out of the de facto segregated schools, nor indeed did those minority representatives who attended the meeting pursue the idea further.

The dominant view in the minority community revealed a feeling that the likely result of such a policy would be the further deterioration of educational standards at the de facto segregated schools.30

Soon after the September 16 meeting, the district did take a number of other steps designed to improve the educational opportunity of minority students. Furnishing transportation to students seeking transfers out of the de facto segregated schools was not among them. Three members of the minority community, including Robert Bland, served as


panelists on a symposium held for district principals and other administrative staff. Its purpose was to focus attention on the problems of segregated schools and the need for solving these problems. On October 7, Associate Superintendent Berry presented the board with a specific set of "Proposals for Integration". Most of the proposed improvements would require extra effort on the part of the staff, and a more flexible and creative approach to instruction, but were not expensive.

It was proposed that the installation of libraries at Lowell and Irving receive top priority in an existing plan of providing all elementary schools with libraries. Teacher aides from the University of California, Riverside's teacher preparation program, could fill specific assignments in classrooms where the need was greatest. The inclusion of Negro history and contributions in the material for all grades and schools could be accelerated. Contacts and opportunities for children to broaden their experiences through a "higher horizons" type program could be undertaken. Finally, the schools could work directly with organized community groups to adjust attendance boundaries, improve the counseling and guidance program, and promote "greater elementary level integration on both a short and long-range basis." Specifically, this referred to readjusting attendance areas on a long-term basis wherever feasible, extending the Lowell policy to other grades and schools, and the "initiation of a policy allowing children of appropriate ability and achievement to attend classes in other schools where there is room."

Certainly the proposals were consistent with the feeling of minority spokesmen as expressed at their September meeting with school officials.
The board indicated complete agreement that "Mr. Berry's five recommendations be implemented immediately." All five proposals were implemented, at least partially, and almost immediately. By January, 1964, the libraries at Irving and Lowell opened for the circulation of books. The utilization of teacher assistants from the university began immediately, with twenty-one divided between Casa Blanca, Irving, and Lowell Schools during the period from October, 1963, to January, 1964. Boundaries were adjusted in favor of integration in the case of elementary and secondary schools whenever the opportunity was presented. By the following fall, 1964, the open enrollment policy was opened wide to include all grades and all three de facto segregated schools.

Conferences and consultations with community groups and individuals were held on matters pertaining to "higher horizons," boundary questions, and the extension of the Lowell School policy. The "higher horizons" program, essentially a program of field trips, ran on sparse funding, with the school system's contribution being limited to providing transportation on several occasions. Begun prior to extensive federal aid, parts of the program were sponsored by the Lowell P.T.A., the Eastside Cultural Fund, and by various donations of admission tickets from theaters.

Other district actions indicated that a firm interest in compensatory education was developing. The two individuals most responsible for the idea, Richard Purviance and Jesse Wall, were appointed to

coordinate the program. Beginning in the spring semester of the 1963-64 term, Wall's teaching assignment at Ramona High School was reduced to one-half time. By fall, 1964, Purviance was made "supervising principal" at Lowell and Irving, with each school also having a teaching principal. It was anticipated that these adjustments would enable both men to give more attention to the development of the compensatory education plan. Otherwise the new assignments were in addition to their regular responsibilities. On several occasions one or both men spoke before P.T.A. groups, school faculty meetings, and talked with individual administrators concerning the program. Teachers were assigned to relieve the teaching principals in these two schools and were chosen on the basis of their ability to offer specialized help in remedial reading during the half day when they were not in the classroom.

Additional aspects of the program included the assignment of over a hundred voluntary tutors from the University of California, Riverside, Tutorial Project to aid children with particular learning problems. A self-help program for parents entitled "Help Your Child at School -- At Home, in the Community" was held on four successive Sundays in January and February, 1964, at the Community Settlement House on the Eastside. In May of that year the attitudes of Negroes and Mexican-Americans toward education were discussed at the district's conference for administrators and other participants.

Clearly the administration and board were becoming aware of the special problems besetting students of the three de facto segregated

32 During 1964-1965 this same policy was applied to two other pairs of small schools, Bryant-Grant and Lincoln-Highgrove.
schools. The annual instructional reports of the associate superintendent for 1963-64 and 1964-65 made extensive mention of problems inherent in de facto segregation. Through the compensatory education program, some principals, teachers, and minority parents were also becoming aware of these problems. Changes made in the regular district program sometimes held particular advantages for students needing special assistance. Each school, for example, instituted a staggered reading program in the primary grades, permitting the teacher to render greater assistance to pupils in the reading group without distractions from the rest of the class. The timing of this particular program, beginning on October 6, 1964, coincided with the specialized activities in the compensatory education program.

Most signs seemed to indicate that the little bit being done by school officials to solve the problems of de facto segregation was being appreciated. As usual, the Eastside community leaders supported the district's bond election of November 5, 1963. Robert Bland reminded his readers in VOICE, an Eastside weekly newspaper, that "we have within our community three schools that are de facto segregated which has resulted in lower academic levels at these schools," but that it would cost money to solve the problem. 33

The compensatory education program seemed to be well received, or at least it was being spared criticism by most individuals on the Eastside thought by school authorities to be the vocal leaders. On May 16, 1964, the Board of Education received an award for "outstanding service

33 VOICE, October 25, 1963.
to the community in acknowledgment of and sincere efforts toward resolution of the problem of de facto segregation in Riverside" from the Riverside branch of the N.A.A.C.P. In May, 1964, after receiving responses from Superintendent Bruce Miller and Board President Arthur Littleworth that the schools would be represented in force at a Freedom Banquet, celebrating the tenth anniversary of the United States Supreme Court's famous decision on school segregation, a Voice account concluded:

There has been an unusually gratifying rapport between Riverside's School District administrators and the Negro Community since recognition of the problems involved by de facto school segregation in the local area was brought sharply into focus here, and a program was initiated for effecting resolution of these problems.34

Certainly, in terms of race relations, the 1963-64 school year had been an outstanding one for the school district. It seemed that the 1964-65 year should be equally as good. No major expenses would be incurred, but progress would continue at a slow pace. Early in the term a group of thirteen Mexican-American and Negro representatives met with the board president and five administrators, including the superintendent and associate superintendent, to discuss the district's compensatory education program and make suggestions for improvement.35


35 Those listed in attendance at that meeting included: Jess Ybarra, Gay Caroline, Etienne Caroline, Jesse Carlos, Robert Bland, Bill Davis, Jack Clark, Alice Key, Mrs. [Frances] Allen, J. Baker, and Donald Renfro from the minority community; James Jordan and Jesse Wall were administrators in the school district, but also minority citizens; Bruce Miller, Kenneth Farrer, Ray Berry, Donald Taylor, and Richard Purviance represented the administration.
Neither the superintendent nor the board president recalled any particular sense of dissatisfaction or urgency coming out of this or other meetings held during the 1964-65 term. Several relevant points were discussed, however. Of the twenty-three major points summarized from the meeting by the Office of the Superintendent, six bore directly on the problem of segregation: "Do not let compensatory education be a substitute for real integration. Continue program, but work on de facto segregation also." "Aim toward closing Casa Blanca and placing students in adjacent schools." "Plan future schools in such a way as to permit closing of Casa Blanca." "Seek funds from Office of Education for desegregation." "Don't be too concerned with feelings of the community in closing a school. There would not be much resistance to closing Irving and Lowell, even if parents had to provide some transportation." "Enlarge attendance area of Emerson to maintain racial balance." 36

From time to time throughout the 1964-65 year, Richard Purviance, still principal of Lowell, had occasion to discuss the problems of de facto segregation and the limitations of both the special and regular programs at Lowell with several minority parents, including Lowell PTA President Donald Renfro. At one point Associate Superintendent Berry met with some concerned minority parents from Lowell to discuss these same problems, plus the district's practice of hiring minorities. Their concern centered on an alleged slow rate of acting on promises together

with complaints and suggestions concerning various facets of the Lowell program. The reduction of class size at the de facto segregated schools, though not a widely publicized goal of compensatory education, was a goal communicated to minority leaders. It was also one that was not being realized to any appreciable extent prior to integration in 1965.37

Dissatisfaction with the compensatory education program and the board's failure to reduce class size was also expressed directly to the board president in a private meeting with one Negro man. The primary complaint concerning compensatory education was not with the board, but rather had to do with how the program was being run. A failure to reduce class size, on the other hand, was seen more directly as a shortcoming of the board.

Once discussion began of what could, should, and would be done, minority aspirations and hopes, followed shortly by disappointments and even bitterness, developed at a far faster pace than the school system's willingness and ability to institute the changes. On May 17, 1965, Associate Superintendent Berry's "Supplemental Report on Instruction, 1964-65," was presented to the board but was not discussed. Noticeable among the points made in the context of his brief discussion on improving educational programs for economically and educationally disadvantaged youth, was the following statement:

37 In October, 1964, the ratio of pupils to teachers in regular classes was 30.20 for Irving and 31.27 for Lowell. These compared favorably to the district average of 31.82, but could hardly be considered a significant improvement. Only at Casa Blanca was the ratio markedly lower, 26.88, Enrollment Statistics, Monthly records, Department of Child Welfare and Attendance, (Riverside Unified School District: October 9, 1964; May 21, 1965; October 8, 1965).
Considerable thought and effort should continue to be found, not only on how to improve programs in de facto segregated schools, but how to eliminate the schools themselves.38

The report, of which that statement was only a small part, was not discussed immediately. As far as the board and superintendent were concerned in the spring of 1965 the problem of providing all children with a high quality education was real; it was one that the district would continue to keep abreast of, and work toward, but not one that demanded any immediate and substantive corrective attention, certainly not one that demanded an immediate policy of school desegregation. Within three and a half months the minority leadership would demand precisely that. It would be left for school officials to re-examine their own commitment and test their own will.

CHAPTER IV
CONFRONTATION

Two key factors led to a heated confrontation between Riverside school officials and minority parents in September, 1965. One related to a mounting disappointment over the ability of the compensatory education program to resolve the inadequacies of segregated schooling. The other pertained to a deep and direct hostility toward administration of the district's open enrollment policy. The spark to action resulted from the latter, but once the protest began, all manner of grievances toward the schools, some of long-standing, emerged to sustain a short but very effective movement.

"For the last five years we have received nothing but promises with no action," complained one man in a letter to Governor Edmund G. Brown. The local newspaper quoted another: "There is a strong determination in our community to have integrated schools. It is not a new thing. It has been building up two or three years." Thus, by September, 1965, it suddenly became plain that a serious discrepancy in perception had been developing between school officials and minority parents on the issue of the district's previous efforts. The board and virtually the entire administration, with the possible exception of the associate superintendent, felt assured that all was going well.

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1 [Name withheld], Riverside, California, to Governor [Edmund G.] Brown, [Sacramento, California], September 13, 1965, L.S.
2 Donald Renfro, as quoted in Riverside Press, September 10, 1965.
True, Board President Littleworth had discussed some problems relating to the compensatory education program and the large classes at Lowell with a prominent Negro in the community, but he had not been impressed by a feeling of general dissatisfaction toward the schools.  

Although the September confrontation could not have been predicted more than a week in advance, even by those who forced it, a growing feeling of dissatisfaction had indeed been developing for several years. In his appearance before the California State Board of Education on January 12, 1966, Littleworth remarked: "Looking back on it now, I can see that the entire situation was considerably more volatile from 1963 on than we had actually recognized."  

In spite of a few minor boundary adjustments and the board’s decision of September 21, 1964, expanding the open enrollment policy to include all grade levels within all three de facto segregated schools, the issue of meaningful desegregation had simply not been faced. As late as the winter of 1965, enrollment projections released by the Office of the Superintendent foresaw the full utilization of Lowell, Irving and Casa Blanca Schools through the 1967-68 term. While policy is not determined by the district statistician, it is abundantly clear that no plans had been laid to proceed with desegregation prior to September,  

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3 Statement made to the author by Arthur L. Littleworth on July 10, 1968.

4 Statement made to the State Board of Education by Arthur L. Littleworth, in transcript, Presentation Made by Bruce Miller, Superintendent of Schools, Riverside Unified School District, to the California State Board of Education, January 12, 1966.
The reality of segregation was likewise crystal clear. During the 1964-65 term, Casa Blanca enrolled one majority child out of a total enrollment of 465. 133 Negroes and 330 Mexican-Americans constituted the remaining 99.8 percent. At Irving the record of segregation was complete, 100 percent minority; 183 Negroes, 142 Mexican-Americans, and one "other minority." Lowell still enrolled seven majority children, along with 198 Negroes, 145 Mexican-Americans, and two "other minority," a total of 97.2 percent minority. Interestingly, in this last year prior to the integration decision, Alcott School, since 1961 Lowell's neighboring elementary school to the south, enrolled 0.7 percent minority, the lowest percentage among the twenty-seven elementary schools then in the district. Six other elementary schools enrolled fewer than three percent minority pupils.

Obviously, in spite of a growing awareness, some concern, and little action, the Riverside Unified School District was as segregated on September 1, 1965 as it had been on September 1, 1961. In discussing the social and educational plight of minority children, Negro leaders, both nationally and locally, had not always insisted upon immediate integration. Increasingly, however, they became impatient with programs

5 Projections 1964-65 to 1967, Riverside Unified School District, Office of the Superintendent. It was foreseen that Casa Blanca's attendance would grow from 457 in January, 1965, to 468 by October, 1967; Irving attendance would also grow from 331 in January, 1965, to 342 by October, 1965 where it would remain; Lowell attendance would increase from 355 in January, 1965, to 360 by October, 1965, but would not expand beyond that.

which they perceived as delusive and of dubious value.

In the last issue of VOICE, there appeared a report by Mrs. Etienne Caroline, local president of the N.A.A.C.P., on her trip to the fifty-fifth annual convention of that organization. While certainly not one of the more militant civil rights leaders in Riverside, Mrs. Caroline's article reflected a growing national attitude toward compensatory education, one that was also quite descriptive of the local attitude as well:

We were reminded that desegregation is an integral part of good education, that compensatory education and integrated education are needed simultaneously. We must look closely at special programs, i.e., higher horizons, etc. and reject them when they are used as a substitute for desegregation, or are misused to perpetuate the same old doctrine of separate but equal. Compensatory education and integrated education should go hand in hand, but if we are forced to make a choice, then we must choose integration.7

By the mid 1960s, one really did not have to be very cynical at all to see that in some cities, compensatory education programs were being used as a kind of tokenism to hold off meaningful integration. Negro leaders had become aware of this. So had some political leaders. In California, the McAteer Act of 1965 required that state funded compensatory education programs not "sanction, perpetuate or promote the racial or ethnic segregation of pupils in the public schools."8

7 Gay Caroline, "We Have So Much To Do," VOICE, July 16, 1964.
The compensatory education program in Riverside, having been inadequately supported and operating in a city where integration was possible, could hardly be called a booming success. After functioning on a small scale for two years, some slight progress may have been made. According to Associate Superintendent Ray Berry, the relative rankings of the three segregated schools on standardized achievement tests had not improved in comparison to other schools in the district, but average scores within the schools were on the rise. It was also his feeling that some teachers may have received additional stimulation as a result of participating in a new program. As it turned out, the program accomplished little, but its little accomplishment was consistent with the small investment and short duration of the program itself. The commitment and effort expended by Richard Purviance and Jesse Wall, the two program coordinators most directly responsible for compensatory education, were admirable under the conditions of minimal support. At bottom, the charge of failure from the minority community was mostly the result of their awareness that the school district was capable of doing much more than it was attempting.

Very little in the program was actually objectionable. Rather, it was simply inadequate to the task at hand. The overall pupil-teacher ratio in the three schools had been lowered very slightly, but still a few classes had enrollments above thirty-five. Soon after several minority parents at Lowell complained of this situation in the spring of 1965,

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9 Statement made to the author by Ray Berry on January 26, 1967.
additional staff was added to correct it. Yet, due to the central problem of continued low achievement at the three de facto segregated schools, much of that attempted simply could not have had an immediate impact. Such things as in-service training sessions for teachers, the addition of library facilities, pupil exchange visits with other elementary schools, field trips, all intended to produce desirable change over a period of time, were not likely to stimulate measurable improvement in pupil achievement immediately. Other parts of the program may have had a more immediate impact. The assignment of a half-time reading teacher at each of the three schools was well received, except that the teacher could work with only about twelve percent of the children enrolled.

Disappointment has been a fairly consistent reaction to compensatory education programs in more than a few communities. The feeling hasn't been limited to the intended benefactors either. In Syracuse, New York, for example, the board itself became increasingly concerned that after three years of compensatory education, in spite of much effort and a large sum of money expended, evidence could not be found to demonstrate "any significant or even measurable improvement in educational achievement."\(^{10}\)

In Riverside, it seems clear that the compensatory program was conceived differently by the minority leadership and by the school officials. The early restrained optimism of some parents, possibly

the result of their discussions with school representatives concerning the many and diverse plans being conceived and executed, gave way to disappointment, cynicism, and even bitterness. Leaders had hoped for more rapid progress, indeed a "crash program," to eliminate the educational disadvantages of Negroes and Mexican-Americans. Integration had remained a high priority objective for those who were to lead the boycott of the schools in the fall of 1965, although their restraint in pushing it was taken by school officials as a sign of satisfaction with what was being done. Prior to the confrontation of September, 1965, some key leaders in the minority community feared that compensatory education would be used as a substitute for integration. They feared, for example, that the district's installation of library facilities in the de facto segregated schools represented something of a commitment to the continued operation of those schools.

Regardless of compensatory education's merits, or lack of same, some distraught Negro parents were interested in a more immediate solution to the problem of securing better schooling for their children. Their approach would be an intense and concentrated effort to force action from the school board. School officials had not yet shown any disposition to change the virtually totally segregated conditions at Casa Blanca, Irving and Lowell. While having engaged in a few casual discussions of the subject, they had no plans of facing the issue during the 1965-66 term, nor did they anticipate a crisis developing over the situation. But a crisis did develop.
Unlike the opening of school in September, 1964, "one of the smoothest openings" Superintendent Miller had ever experienced, the beginning of school in September, 1965 would be hectic. At no time in his long career had the superintendent been faced with such a tense situation. Opportunities to have confronted parts of the problem in earlier years, particularly in 1952 and 1961, had been missed and could not be recaptured. The responses of the superintendent and board in 1965 would be crucial.

Nineteen years earlier, while superintendent in the neighboring community of Ontario, Bruce Miller had faced a somewhat similar problem of lesser magnitude. On that occasion he successfully resisted pressure from majority citizens opposed to his proposal for ending the segregation of Mexican-American children. But local circumstances in Ontario during 1946 were much different from circumstances in Riverside during 1965. In Riverside, it was minority parents, not the administration, who initiated the campaign for integration.

General dissatisfaction with the schools sustained the integration drive, but a specific grievance on the part of several parents initiated it. It was almost ironical in a way that the initial and most bitter parental dissatisfaction was directed toward the district's


transfer policy. While still the only means of escaping segregated schools, the once heralded policy had been an almost total failure in accomplishing its original purpose of providing minority children with integrated experiences. Had perhaps twenty families who were seriously interested in securing transfers, been able to secure them readily, and to their satisfaction, the school integration showdown may have been delayed indefinitely. Virtually all transfers applied for had been granted, including all twenty-one formally requested during 1964-65. A delay of up to three weeks, and the problem of negative interpersonal relations between applicants and the school district administration, were the more serious problems.

Plans for a confrontation between minority parents and the school district were formulated shortly after the Donald Renfro family met with what they considered to be resistance and delay in securing transfers for their two children, Donald and Danice. Prior to September, 1965, when the policy was modified, it had been necessary for parents wishing to make a transfer to file a written request in the Office of Child Welfare and Attendance, located downtown at the administration building; indicate on the form provided their first three choices of schools, state in writing the reason for the request, and wait up to a maximum of three weeks before learning if the transfer had been granted. Since the board policy stipulated that transfers were to be made on a space available basis, the attendance officer waited to determine how fall enrollments were developing in the various schools before granting the transfer. In the meantime, pupils were expected to be enrolled at their own

13 Statement made to the author by Mrs. Edna Lockhart, July 2, 1968.
neighborhood school until receiving notification of transfer.

Having filed a "Request for an Out-of-Area Attendance Permit" with the Director of Child Welfare and Attendance on August 24, 1965, Mrs. Renfro returned on August 31 for a clarification of the policy. The explanation she received, particularly the matter of waiting for a settling down of enrollment, together with what she perceived as a negative attitude on the part of the person she spoke with, stimulated her to take further action. Shortly thereafter, her husband, Donald Renfro, visited the same office to learn of the situation himself.

The prime concern of the Renfroes, as expressed on their application for transfer, was simply that their children receive a first rate education. Mrs. Renfro wrote that her children were being denied the full benefit of education at Lowell, owing to a lower level of instruction and easier grading system. It was, she believed, a slow school. On September 14, exactly three weeks after making application, Mrs. Renfro's transfer request was granted to her third choice school. By that time a literal crisis had mounted and nearly passed.

After an angry reaction to the transfer policy in late August and early September, circumstances were so different as to render the issue closed. As a kind of anti-climax, Superintendent Miller discussed the problem before the board on September 13, and announced that the policy would be changed. In the future, parents would apply to the principal of the school in their attendance area, who in turn would make

the necessary arrangements with principals of other schools where space was available. Thus the necessity of parents coming to the central office would be avoided, as would some of the delay. Not only had the transfer policy been ineffective, but the problems and ill will resulting from it were substantial.

On Wednesday, September 1, Mrs. Donald Renfro, Mrs. Robert Bland, and approximately three or four other Negro women, met to discuss their grievances toward the schools, particularly as they related to the transfer policy. Most had children in Riverside's segregated schools; one had no children. All were friends and acquaintances who had discussed the issue of segregated schools in the past and had demonstrated an interest in the problem. None were active in the local civil rights organizations. The most concrete decision coming out of this very informal get-together on Wednesday was to hold a larger meeting on Friday, September 3, at which time men would be invited to attend, and, it was hoped, a more concrete plan of action would be formulated.

Although the idea of presenting the board with a petition was tentatively agreed to, the ladies realized that whatever course was followed would require a full community effort. Thus, they proceeded, in a more or less random manner, to invite people to attend the Friday meeting. The invitations were not quite random, however. Mrs. Sally Banks

invited Mayor Ben Lewis. Councilman Sotelo was also invited, but the prime purpose was not to bring together influential political leaders; it was to bring together minority citizens who, it was felt, could be counted on to provide leadership. "Action people" were included, while those Negroes assumed to be anti-direct action, or organizational types, were excluded. Some N.A.A.C.P. members were present as individuals, but since this was being shaped as a movement of parents, organizational representation was deliberately avoided.

It was at this Friday meeting that the decision was reached to circulate a petition calling for the closing of Lowell and Irving Schools, and to push rapidly for complete integration of the school system. Old and new grievances were aired. Tempers flared. Militant comments were followed by more moderate ones. Determination, followed by vacillation, followed again by determination, was the order of the evening. Through it all there arose a commitment to accomplish something tangible. In spite of reservations expressed by some middle class Negroes, a petition drive was agreed upon. The group felt that it could at least propose integration to the community. If support appeared adequate, the result of their success, a signed petition, would be presented to the school board on the following Tuesday, September 7. Thus, the petition effort was both a means of communicating a feeling of discontent with segregated schools to the minority community at large, and a process of signature gathering for whatever impact it might have on the board.

16 Negro men and women whose previous behavior had led the organizers to think of them as acting in a manner subservient to the white power structure, i.e., "Uncle Toms" and "Handkerchief Heads," were not invited.
The actual number of signatures attained on that three day Labor Day weekend -- 396 -- was only moderately impressive. It did represent, however, a substantial percentage of those parents actually contacted. No particular effort was made to collect the signatures of influential members in the community. Rather, it was a grass roots movement designed to determine actual community sentiment. As expected, some parents were content, or at least reasonably comfortable, sending their children to segregated neighborhood schools, and hesitated to sign the petition. On balance, however, the indigenous community leaders were able to muster a united front on behalf of their cause.

The petition itself was simple and direct, with no threats of any kind stated or implied:

We, the undersigned parents of the Riverside school district, do hereby petition the Riverside School Board to take affirmative steps to improve the educational opportunities for minorities and to eliminate segregation in city schools by closing Lowell and Irving Schools and by reassigning these students to other schools in the area which have previously had less than 10% minority group students.17

By Monday night, September 6, the leaders of the petition drive were armed with a small bundle of petitions, and their own determination, as they prepared to confront the school board at 4:00 p.m. the following day. With no more going for them, a good guess is that they would have

17 From a petition presented to the Board of Education of the Riverside Unified School District, signed by 396 persons, on September 3, 1965.
won a "study" and a sympathetic expression of agreement with their goals to end segregation.

As events developed, however, the petitioners had far more going for them, namely momentum and a historical setting as favorable as if it had been written for a dramatic production. Shortly before 4:00 a.m. on Tuesday, September 7, 1965, a fire swept through the old building of Lowell School, laying waste to six classrooms and the auditorium, thereby displacing 143 pupils who were scheduled to begin classes on the following Monday. All evidence pointed to a clear case of arson.

Guesses by individuals in and out of city government as to who started the fire have been diverse, and entirely speculative. Police could think of only two persons to question seriously and both leads proved totally unproductive. The detective investigating the case admitted having no reasonable leads, owing largely to the fact that in crimes involving arson much of the evidence is burned too. Leaders of the boycott movement, believing that the Negro community had been infiltrated by police, were hesitant to speculate about who had put the match to Lowell School.

The question of who started the fire was not particularly relevant to school authorities, and certainly not to the petitioners for integration. The fact of the fire was relevant to all. Fear of "another Watts," coupled with the fact that no link could be drawn between the fire and the petition, proved a stimulant to action. The inability of any responsible official to link the fire with the petition helped check
the possibility of a significant white backlash. Robert Bland summarized the position of the petitioners when he stated:

No matter what we say there is going to be some association drawn between the fire and the petition. I don't expect to change my recommendation on account of it. What was good for the children before the fire is good after the fire. We still believe the two segregated schools should be closed and the children enrolled in other schools where they aren't segregated.18

Coming three and a half weeks after the devastating killing, burning, rioting, and looting in the Watts area of Los Angeles, and coinciding with the Negro petition drive in Riverside, the fire made a great impression on the school board and some city officials, particularly the mayor. There is no question but that this unsolved case of arson worked for the benefit of the school integration campaign materially, psychologically, and politically. The literal destruction of six classrooms at Lowell left the board with several options. It could put the entire school on double sessions after fencing off the ravaged area; it could transport the 143 displaced upper grade students to other schools; it could transport the primary grade children to other schools, or, with considerable strain, it could even close the entire school immediately. With the opening of school less than a week away, the last possibility was not feasible. From the minority point of view, on the other hand, the first possibility would demonstrate incredible callousness on the part of the administration and board.

The wheels of the school establishment began to crank slowly, but assuredly, immediately after the fire, then faster but less assuredly as the week progressed. Bruce Miller, back in his office on Tuesday after an August vacation, was informed of the fire by his secretary, Betty Smith. He had returned to the office on Sunday to find on his desk a brief memorandum from Associate Superintendent Ray Berry informing him that an Eastside petition movement was gaining momentum, and the likelihood that a petition would be presented to the board on Tuesday. Neither bit of news was particularly shocking at first, though both aroused some concern. Like most veteran superintendents, he had dealt with petitions and petitioners before. News of the fire, and a later inspection of the site, did not shake him at first either. "I knew that double sessions were still feasible."¹⁹

Meanwhile, Arthur Littleworth, president of the Board of Education and attorney at law by profession, was discussing a zoning question before the Riverside City Council on Tuesday morning when he learned of the fire from City Manager John Wentz. Earlier that morning he had received a call from Mayor Lewis informing him of the grievances aired at the Friday night meeting on the Eastside. After concluding his presentation, Littleworth left the council chambers, and for all intents and purposes, left his law practice for the next week. Together, the board president, the superintendent, and other top level administrators planned their course of action for the afternoon meeting. They

¹⁹ Statement made to the author by Bruce Miller on May 22, 1968.
also talked by telephone with city officials.

The first important recommendation from the superintendent to the board was a wrong one. Lowell, he had decided, should be put on double sessions as a "strictly temporary" solution, while the administration sought space in other schools. Pupils would be transferred within the next few weeks, as soon as arrangements could be made to accommodate them. Miller's goal was to restore some certainty to an uncertain situation. Instead, the double session proposal, more than anything else, served to infuriate the petitioners and assure their continued escalation of the crisis, specifically a decision to boycott the schools.

Meeting that Tuesday afternoon, September 7, the board received petitions and listened to petitioners. Without further study, it was not about to agree on the permanent transfer of all Lowell and Irving pupils to other schools. It did agree to hold a special meeting on Monday, September 13, to consider the requests further, and it accepted the superintendent's recommendation to put Lowell on double sessions temporarily. The meeting was obviously not pleasant for the board, and it was decidedly unpleasant for the administration. In less than two hours most of the long standing minority grievances were thrown back at the board for quick recall.

Since the board itself had undergone some marked changes since 1961, the discussion was more than heated; it was instructive as well. Of the five members, only Arthur Littleworth and B. Rae Sharp had been
a party to the Lowell-Alcott boundary decision four years earlier. Both
had also served on the Lowell Study Committee. They had been on the pro-
gressive side of all relevant issues, and although both had participated
in decisions now being attacked, neither considered himself a devotee of
the status quo. The board -- the "power structure" -- could thus listen
with no intense personal sense of guilt and only a minimal ego involve-
ment with old policies. None were racists by any reasonable standard.
Neither could any be considered an avant-garde liberal or an eager social
reformer. All were very white. All were sympathetic. All were willing
to listen, and, under suitable conditions, approve integration.

The petition was presented and the instruction began. Accusations,
some overstated, but almost all valid, were hurled. Segregated schools
offered inferior education. The schools had gerrymandered school bound-
daries in order to segregate minority pupils. They had made exceptions
to their own rules, permitting children from the majority group to attend
majority schools, even when living in a minority district. Compensatory
education represented "separate but equal" education, but it was not
equal; it was a "paper tiger." The transfer policy was impractical for
most Negro families, and besides, most Negroes had trouble getting trans-
fers.

20 Some teachers at Lowell and Irving took this charge personally and
were offended by it. On some occasions it was asserted outright, or
strongly implied, that since the schools were inferior, the teachers
were inferior too. Such assertions were particularly invalid in the case
of Lowell School. There, half of the faculty held master's degrees, two
teachers were bilingual, one spoke three languages, two were considered
district-wide experts in the teaching of reading, and one was an expert
in speech therapy. The entire faculty was well above the district
average in competence among elementary teachers.
The meeting began with a kind of restrained bitterness. Before it had ended, school officials were in a still more difficult position. Even the mayor contributed something to the atmosphere, although his remarks made little difference to the future unfolding of events. Having attended the Friday night planning meeting at which time the decision to petition the board was made, Mayor Ben Lewis remarked that someone at that meeting had gotten up and said, "if we don't get it, it's burn, baby burn." After laughter had greeted his remarks, he added, "...you're not going to get it by burning." A fire had indeed followed the Friday night meeting, thus assuring Negro indignation over what they inferred to be the mayor's linking of the two events. Robert Bland's version of what had been said at that Friday meeting was totally different.

This episode was not a fair indication of the mayor's sentiment. Compared to a majority of the city councilmen, he appeared almost progressive. It was not to be the mayor's remarks, but rather the school district's lack of immediate constructive action that stimulated the protest group onward. Robert Bland, leading spokesman of the group, charged that the double sessions at Lowell, rather than transferring the


22 According to Bland, after listening to the vacillations and disagreements going on at that meeting, Don Harris stood up and said, "If we don't stop postponing and discussing and postponing, people may get so fed up that we'll start to hear things like 'burn, baby, burn' here in Riverside," As quoted by Troy Duster, Desegregation in California; A Combination of "Fear" and "Right." (Unpublished manuscript, University of California, Berkeley: [1967]), p. 35, To be published in Raymond W. Mack, ed., Our Children's Burden, (New York: Random House, 1968).
children to other schools, would be "punishing the children for the fire." Donald Renfro, another prime mover in the integration campaign, accused the superintendent of planning to leave children out in the rain. That evening, Bland, Renfro, concerned minority parents, and others interested in pushing for integration, a total of approximately fifty persons in all, met at the Community Settlement House to plan further action. Boycott plans were formally announced the following morning:

At a meeting Tuesday night concerned parents decided that they would not allow their children to return to segregated schools to receive an inferior education this fall.

The parents felt that they were left with no other choice by the school board's failure to meet the problem of segregated schools and insistence that children continue to use the facilities of Lowell School, which are half-burned out for an indefinite period of time.

Many of the parents who had previously gone along with the compensatory education program expressed regret and disillusion over the realization that the program would have little or no effect on their children and could at best only bring about gradual changes in the future generations.

The feeling of most parents was that something must be done now to improve educational opportunities for our children and that one more day of segregated and inferior education is too much.

The parents further stated that this is not just a matter concerning minority children. It is unfair to place white children in a school that does not contain a cross section of the total community when, after leaving school, they go into a world where eight out of ten people are non-white. For this reason several Caucasian parents have expressed intent to participate in the boycott.

At the boycott headquarters, 2470 Carlton Place, preparations are being made to establish freedom schools for the interim education of the children.

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The threatened boycott touched a sensitive nerve at school headquarters. Early on Wednesday both the superintendent and board president attempted to make contact with the boycott leaders, but without success. It was clear that boycott organizers were not going to initiate contacts with school officials. "We have no intention of going to them. We have been talking to them three years and getting nowhere," remarked Mrs. Renfro to a Press reporter. The Negro leadership, in their desire to see the boycott plans through and apply maximum pressure on the board to end segregation, was not particularly interested in talking the problem through with either the administration or the board. Neither were they completely hostile to the idea. Rather, they doubted that anything positive would result from such a meeting.

While holding to his idea of temporary double sessions at Lowell through at least part of Wednesday morning, Miller, in concert with his staff, particularly Associate Superintendent Ray Berry and Donald Taylor, Assistant to the Superintendent, decided that at least some children could be bussed out of Lowell on the opening day of school. Littleworth concurred, as did all of the other board members who were contacted throughout the course of the day. The board had agreed to an important demand, but too late to make an important immediate difference.

By Thursday afternoon a meeting was finally arranged between Littleworth and the boycott leaders, having been set up by a Negro lady known to both the board president and to Robert Bland. The meeting was held on the patio of the Renfro residence, which at that time was also serving

as boycott headquarters. Fear, suspicion, and plain caution led to insistence by the police chief that Littleworth be accompanied by a 26 Negro plainclothes officer.

On this occasion Littleworth revealed his concession, which both he and the administration felt was an important one. Kindergarten through second grade at Lowell would be transported to other schools, thereby eliminating the need for double sessions. His prime purpose, of course, was to try and convince Bland and Renfro to call off the boycott. While Littleworth was talking to the men who could have done much to affect this de-escalation, they implied to him that the movement was out of their hands. To some extent they were right. A small but loosely knit boycott committee had already been organized. Several individuals were already giving considerable voluntary support to the boycott drive, and most certainly would have been disappointed by a "sell out." For the most part, however, Bland, Renfro, and their wives, were themselves key people. Although both men made it plain to Littleworth that they planned to proceed with the boycott, they did invite him to present his case to the community on the following night, Friday, September 10. This he reluctantly agreed to do. For his part, Littleworth pointed out emphatically that no interference with the normal passing of children and adults in front of the schools would be tolerated. Children

26 Detective Etienne Caroline, the same man who had earlier in the year complained to Littleworth about the compensatory education policy, accompanied Littleworth to this meeting. Boycott leaders could well suspect that Caroline was there in the role of a bodyguard and police officer, but they could not be certain. He was also known to them as a man who was upset with school policies.
wishing to enroll at Lowell and Irving on the following Monday would have to be left free from harassment.

That Thursday evening the Human Relations Council met to discuss the problem of segregated schools. Discussion was all it could do, and the immediate problem was well beyond that stage. Since it held no authority, the Council was impotent in a crisis situation. Prior to the crisis it had been unable to deal effectively with the real problems of human relations. As one member put it, "We were a talk group." Most of the talk concerning the educational problems of minority students did not even touch on the matter of segregation. Rather, the inadequacy of school counseling, and problems resulting from homogeneous grouping practices on the secondary level, were discussed at length.

The next really relevant public meeting was the one held at Irving School on Friday evening. This was Arthur Littleworth's night to meet the minority community on their own side of town. Significant elements of the Negro community had been aroused for a week, and by the time of this meeting on September 10, a few Mexican-Americans living on the Eastside were becoming interested also. The boycott leaders now knew that they could not stop their drive with merely a Lowell School solution. Irving and possibly even Casa Blanca would have to be included in any acceptable plan offered by the board.

Jesse Wall, a former Negro teacher at Ramona High School, local N.A.A.C.P. president, and "young man of the year," was now working full time in the administration as director of intergroup education. His contacts among all elements of the Negro community had remained good,
but as his role with the "establishment" changed, so too did his relationship with some members of the Eastside community. If he was not to be trusted quite as much as before, he could still be of service to them as a provider of information, and be respected as one who had not let professional success force him into the abandonment of his people. In part, however, the administration was hopeful that Wall could help head off a boycott. On that score, while his contacts were much better, he was as helpless as the rest of the administration. On Friday he advised Ray Berry that the board president should not appear at Irving School that night unless he was prepared to commit himself to integration for Lowell and Irving area children, preferably by September, 1966. Things were too tense on the Eastside for a calm discussion of ideas.

Meanwhile, the administration had already begun to study the feasibility of integration. Littleworth wanted to promise nothing he could not be sure of delivering. By Friday evening he could not deliver as much as Jesse Wall knew it would take to call off the boycott, but he could offer slightly more than he had been able to the day before. The atmosphere at the meeting was tense, but it began peacefully enough. Littleworth made his presentation and then fielded a few not very hostile questions. Children in grades kindergarten through three at Lowell would be transported by bus at district expense to seven schools with low minority enrollments. There they would be integrated into established classes. The entire problem of segregation would be studied. No plans were being formulated to replace the old Lowell building on its present site. On the contrary, it would be logical to phase the remainder of the school out in future plans. Any future move toward integration would include Irving and Casa Blanca.
Soon the questions, assertions, and impassioned pleas grew more and more hostile. Many speakers demanded complete integration immediately. One pointed out that Irving was a perfectly good school and could well be shared by white students. Bussing had been used for purposes of segregation prior to 1961. Now it could be used to aid integration. The dominant sentiment that evening was clearly running in favor of a boycott and against the board president. One impassioned critic charged: "You cannot lose your momentum. He wants you to go home and feel they are going to do something when they are not going to do anything."

As the tempo of anger increased, Mrs. Josephine Stewart, who was chairing the meeting, suggested to Littleworth that he leave; advice he gladly followed. Later that same evening a second smaller meeting involving about 200 persons affirmed the boycott plans. While no formal vote was taken, one speaker asked how many would keep their children out of the public schools on the following Monday. The response was overwhelmingly in favor of such a course.

The second weekend of the crisis began very badly for the school officials. The Friday night meeting, from their point of view, had been a disaster. The entire board had been invited to attend, but only Littleworth was asked to speak. Largely as a result of fear and caution on the part of the police chief, the two women board members were asked not to attend. Possibly the most awesome sign of all was that Superintendent Miller was advised not to attend. As the symbol of an intensely distrusted

school authority, he represented to some much of what was wrong with
the schools. Associate Superintendent Berry, on the other hand, possess-
ed much greater rapport with the minority community, partly the result of
personality factors, but also because of having worked more closely and
directly with Eastside parents over a period of several years.

While Littleworth and Berry represented the schools, Miller remain-
ed at home with hurt pride. Following the meeting, the two representatives
drove to Miller's home where together, all three, joined by Donald Taylor,
Miller's assistant, commiserated over the deteriorating situation. More
than that, they were fearful of violence. At about 11:00 p.m., Littleworth
called City Manager John Wentz and advised him that the matter was now a
city problem as well. A meeting between city and school officials was
scheduled for Saturday morning, September 11. A few outsiders had been
spotted at Irving School on Friday night, and police reports had already
confirmed the presence of "outside agitators" in town. Four weeks earlier
Lt. Governor Glen Anderson had been criticized vigorously for alleged
slowness in ordering the National Guard into Watts. Riverside officials
made certain that all law enforcement agencies were at least advised of
what was feared to be a potentially explosive situation. The precautions
taken amounted to an over-reaction on their part, but it was not particular-
ly conspicuous. Plainclothes officers were stationed around all schools
where a potentially volatile situation was thought to exist. In addition,
one plainclothes officer was assigned to each principal in these schools.

During the week of September 7 and the weekend that followed, meet-
ings were held after meetings, followed by more meetings. In addition to
numerous personal contacts between administrators and board members, between both school officials and city officials, and between school officials and the boycott leaders, several group meetings were held in a sometimes frantic attempt to avoid trouble on the opening day of school, Monday, September 13. More importantly in the long run, much of the hectic activity was being directed toward a long term solution that would also have a viable short term beginning. On Friday morning, September 10, the annual district teachers' meeting marking the beginning of a new school year was turned over to the topic of desegregation. Both Littleworth and Miller participated. On the afternoon of the following day, after the meeting with city officials in the morning, principals were gathered together, alerted to the possibility of disturbances at their schools, and informed of what had been developing. Part of Sunday was spent finalizing plans with Lowell teachers concerning the opening of that school on Tuesday, instead of Monday.

All the while, even after Littleworth's bleak experience at Irving, school authorities continued to seek ways of heading off the boycott. A serious loss in reimbursed state revenue would result from a protracted drop in school attendance, but more critical was the thought of violence and continued bitterness between the schools and an important segment of the community. Apart from all manner of discussions among and between local parties in the dispute, was the active involvement of the California State Department of Education.

Bruce Miller was not at home on Sunday evening when State Superintendent of Public Instruction Max Rafferty telephoned him, but he was
soon able to return the call. Rafferty's first words were to advise Miller that he had a problem in Riverside, a fact of life Miller had been growing steadily aware of on his own. More valuable, the state superintendent offered to render all the support he could from the State Department's Office of Compensatory Education, and to process rapidly Riverside's requests for funds available through federal programs.

Telephone conversations between Wilson Riles, then Chief in the Bureau of Intergroup Relations, and Superintendent Miller, led to the assignment in Riverside on Monday, September 13, of Theodore Neff, Consultant in Intergroup Relations. The feeling of state officials, from Max Rafferty on down, was that a serious confrontation should be avoided if at all possible. Disagreements should be settled in as amicable a way as possible. Obviously, no opinion within the schools was at odds with such thinking.

The Office of Compensatory Education, out of which both Riles and Neff worked, was strongly opposed to boycotts. The state's way was to solve problems through discussions. By Sunday, September 12, the local superintendent and board were deep believers in that too. According to Riles, later appointed Assistant Superintendent of Public Instruction in charge of the Office of Compensatory Education, State Superintendent Rafferty, and those under him in the Office of Compensatory Education, believed that, (1) white parents should not be required to bus their children into a ghetto, (2) every child should be permitted to attend any school in the district, and (3) if a local district decided to integrate its schools, and bussing was required, costs of that
transportation should be met by the district. Everything in the eventual Riverside solution would be basically consistent with that policy, even if only coincidentally consistent with it. The hand of the state, although helpful to a limited extent, was not a heavy one. State influence, apart from state law, was minimal and not an important factor in the eventual decision to integrate the schools.

Wilson Riles had first become aware of the situation in Riverside on Sunday, September 12, when he received a call from a Negro lady visiting in Riverside. In addition to this conversation, and his conversations with Miller that same day, Riles talked by telephone with one of the boycott leaders who explained in greater detail what was occurring. It was clear to Riles from these conversations that the Negro community completely mistrusted the sincerity of school officials. The school district intended to do nothing, the boycott leader told Riles. In the course of that conversation Riles asked pointedly if there was anyone in the administration "you trust." "Ray Berry," was the reply.

Without a positive program, even Ray Berry was helpless to avert a boycott, but he met with Bland and Renfro anyway. Berry explained that the board needed additional time to prepare a comprehensive integration plan. Boycott leaders wanted a definite date, and a definite plan, including as a very minimum, the immediate integration of grades kindergarten through three at Lowell (which Littleworth had already promised), plus kindergarten and first grades at Irving. By this time the boycott movement had gained enough momentum to assure itself of at least a one day stand.

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Monday marked the beginning -- and end -- of a peaceful boycott, and an important school board meeting that afternoon at 4:00. The boycott, as well as registration at the city schools, was carried on without any notable incidents. Robert Bland and Donald Renfro had not the slightest confidence that meaningful integration would occur without maximum and effective pressure on the school board. Their most effective weapon, it was thought, would be to boycott the schools.

The threat of a school boycott did prove to be effective pressure, but it also served to demonstrate a deep distrust of school officials, and concern for the educational futures of minority children. It would have been embarrassing to boycott leaders if their movement had failed prior to its Monday beginning. So far as pressure was concerned, the actual holding of boycott classes on Monday probably was not necessary. Two days prior to the Monday boycott and board meeting, Ray Berry had revealed to Bland and Renfro what the board proposal would be. The administration and board did not alter their plans after seeing the boycott classes in session, but they certainly had made some alterations in the process of trying to head off those classes from meeting in the first place.

The actual number of pupils attending the Freedom Schools, as they were called, was approximately 200 to 250. This was a respectable enough attendance for a project conceived only five days before the start of classes. Meanwhile, the peaceful enrollment at Lowell and Irving was cut in half. Many other students simply did not attend any school that day. Freedom School students were transported to five different locations, churches and other halls, for their classes. Volunteer faculty on hand
included a couple of college teachers, graduate and undergraduate students, and other volunteers. The program, though fun for many children, was of very diverse quality. It would be silly, however, to assess a program's quality on the basis of its first and only day as an organized entity. It would be even a little silly to attempt to assess quality at all. Freedom Schools after all, were not established to replace the public schools, only to open some of their doors a bit wider.

The "Parents Boycott for Better Education," as the movement was called in some notices, was indeed a movement led by parents. Early fears that "outside agitators" would capture the movement never materialized. Virtually all of the direction and most of the work for the boycott came from Eastside parents. It began when they put the movement together and ended when they decided to call it quits. On the Monday of classes, other volunteers, mainly college students, did most of the actual work. The parents' main work was done prior to the day of classes. The N.A.A.C.P. was totally removed from the project. As an organization, was C.O.R.E., although a few of its members rendered active service. Floyd Thweat, brother-in-law of Robert Bland, and local president of C.O.R.E., was very active in the project, and also served to stimulate action from others.

There was also a different kind of boycott which developed that same Monday, one that coincided with, but was not a part of, the Freedom School movement. Fifty-four minority children, mostly Negroes living in

29 A copy of the application form used by the boycott group is found in Appendix G of text.
the Casa Blanca attendance area, suddenly appeared at Washington School in what amounted to a sit-in. The immediate incident was resolved quickly and equitably when the children were permitted to remain. Additional teachers and classrooms were brought in to relieve overcrowding.

Meetings, first to head off the main boycott, and then to stop it, were rapidly reaching a point of diminishing returns. The problem wasn't that the two sides did not understand each other's position. It was simply that the boycott leaders held little confidence that the board would keep its commitment, even if it made one.

Littleworth met with Renfro and others in the boycott movement late Sunday evening. Theodore Neff, the state consultant, discussed the problems at hand with both district officials and boycott leaders on Monday, September 14. Neither he nor district officials knew of any way to end the boycott. It simply was not in their hands. Neff's recommendations to the superintendent and board president were two: (1) All events should not deter the district from making a study to determine if a policy change is legal and desirable; (2) in relation to plans and procedures, they should make no promises they could not fulfill. 30 Miller and Littleworth were already favorably disposed to have the board come up with a major policy change, and for a week now they had been careful not to overpromise.

At about 2:45 p.m. Neff, together with Jesse Wall, Jesse Ybarra, Director of the Community Settlement House on the Eastside, and some of

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the less active Negro leaders, met with the boycott leaders. Neff pointed out to the boycott group that it was obvious they had the board's attention, and advised them to go to the board meeting that afternoon and see if anything had happened to meet their demands, a course of action they were already disposed to take. The special board meeting that afternoon gave the board an opportunity to voice publicly its commitment to integration and to tell what initial steps it was taking to achieve it. The chief leaders of the boycott already knew all of this and were not impressed, but some others in the movement were.

The stated purposes of the afternoon board meeting were to hear a report from the superintendent concerning the week's events, and then consider the petition to close Lowell and Irving, which had been presented six days earlier. Superintendent Miller explained the administration's latest plan, which was immediately ratified by the board. Approximately 239 Lowell students in kindergarten through third grades would be transported to seven other elementary schools. The entire facility there would be phased out in a maximum of three years. After the superintendent's announcements, Littleworth introduced open discussion of the petition with the following statement of policy:

The Riverside Unified School District from the Board of Education through the staff is committed to the full and total integration of the schools in the district.31

Miller then pointed to a few practical problems relating to space and transportation which needed to be solved prior to full implementation.

of this goal, but he indicated that they could be taken care of in a comparatively short time. It was then that he suggested that kindergarten children at Irving could also be transferred immediately. As planned, this too was approved by the board during the course of the meeting.

William Conde, speaking for protesting parents, presented a specific list of demands to the board. All, except for the last, "that the district be totally desegregated by September, 1966," were essentially agreed to by Littleworth. Neither he nor anyone, he felt, could state with absolute assurance that the final demand could be met, primarily because at that early date he had been advised by the administration that not enough classrooms could be found by September, 1966. What protesting minority parents did not know, and most would not have believed it if they had been told, was that Littleworth and the administration wanted integration as badly as anyone by that time.

Parents, however, with memories of previous "promises" still vivid, pushed for a more precise commitment, with specific dates for action indicated. This the board was still unwilling to make without further study. The many questions and charges had all been aired before, this time with a little less passion. A couple of Negroes attempted to make a case for cross-bussing, involving the transportation of Caucasian children into Irving School. The principal boycott leaders themselves were not at all interested in pushing this idea. They felt, and with precise accuracy, that Littleworth considered it unthinkable. Nothing could have done more to arouse white counter-pressures than an active consideration of this
idea. Riverside, after all, was not known for its liberal social and political views.

The meeting concluded when board member Margaret Heers moved that the superintendent's office be instructed to prepare a comprehensive plan for further desegregation, and that the plan be reported not later than the second meeting in October. Since Friday, Littleworth had been making known to boycott leaders the need for a thirty day period to prepare such a plan.

Activities at the board meeting in the afternoon acted as a kind of preliminary event to the important business of that evening. The earlier meeting had been spirited, but not nearly as spirited as the meeting of minority activists, parents, and concerned observers that followed. The board's apparent reasonableness, and the initial steps it had taken toward desegregation, helped to produce a marked split in the thinking of those who had worked in the Freedom School program. At bottom, one group included those who had faith in the board; the other, those who held little faith. Among those who were in favor of calling off the boycott, two very different reasons were advanced. About half felt that the board was acting in good faith, and that in thirty days they would, without any additional pressure, come up with an acceptable proposal for integration. The other half were not particularly impressed with the beneficence of the board, but felt that it would not be feasible to continue.

The boycott leadership was clearly not optimistic concerning the board's noble intentions, but the feasibility argument, coupled with an opportunity to withdraw pressure and still appear victorious, proved
very compelling. Many of the Freedom School teachers and staff were student volunteers who themselves would be returning to college campuses within a week. Also, the temporary facilities offered by the several churches were far from adequate. Support of the Freedom School by minority parents had been impressive enough for a one day stand, but there was growing evidence that it could not be sustained.

In spite of all these apparent difficulties, a small group, including Robert Bland, Donald Renfro, Floyd Thweat, and several others who constituted a large part of the leadership, felt that the acceptability of the board's final integration plan would be in direct proportion to the amount of pressure that could be sustained. Even they could see, however, that a serious division was present in their own ranks, and that it simply would not be feasible to continue. If continued, a fiasco would very likely result. The boycott was called off. It had served its maximum purpose.

Negro parents, upset with school problems, and acting as individuals or as small groups of neighbors, had seemingly succeeded in their confrontation with the school board. They needed leadership and were able to find it within their own ranks. It did not come from influential civil rights organizations or from powerful personalities inside or outside of the community. But even indigenous leaders have problems. Because of the historical subserviant relationship of Negroes to whites, Negro leaders have experienced some unique problems in relating with their followers. As Robert Bland put it, "If the minority group ever becomes suspicious that a member

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is being taken in by the power structure, he is finished as a 'leader'."

In Riverside, some middle class Negroes, suspected of having been "taken in by the power structure" found themselves left outside of the action. It was feared by those in control of the boycott, most of whom were middle class, that the others would not have wanted to press on as hard. They would possibly have settled for a petition, a resolution, an appearance before the board, or some other "more respectable" course. Through a different channel, including one meeting held long into the night with a white former principal at Irving School, they were able to communicate their own recommendations to the superintendent and board. Like those more militant in expression, they too were very bitter about segregated schools. It hurt them to be thought of as "Uncle Toms," but they were still somewhat embarrassed about what they considered to be the crass behavior of those more militant in expression.

Not even the boycott leaders had demonstrated what could be called "militant" behavior in terms of what militancy has come to mean on the national scene. They were militant only in terms of minority behavior expressed within the local context in 1965. There was a fire, but it could not be linked to the petition and boycott drive as part of any master plan of pressure. Violence was feared by school and city authorities, but this fear was the product of their own suspicions and apprehensions. None had been threatened by the protesting parents, or those who assisted them. A grand total of one picket, a middle-aged man carrying a sign "Boycott,

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Don't Burn" appeared outside of Irving School. Even the strongest lan-
guage used at the meetings expressed nothing more militant than a de-
termination to see the boycott through.

Without the petition-fire-boycott sequence, it is clear that the
board would not have acted as soon as it did. Integration, if it had
proceeded at all, would have been far slower. Superintendent Miller
called the fire a great "catalyst" to action. One of his closest assoc-
iates in the administration acknowledged that "the fire made integration
possible," while "the Freedom Schools and the loud meetings helped."
Another intimate associate, when asked to evaluate what difference the
fire made, responded even more succinctly: "Total." It had, after all,
displaced children in need of classrooms, led to the recovery of damages
from fire insurance coverage, thereby permitting the money to be used for
construction elsewhere, provided a good reason for closing a school that
the board had considered closing in 1961, and helped to stimulate the
board to active consideration of an integration plan.

The Riverside Board of Education did not commit itself to a com-pre-
hensive integration plan because it was intimidated into doing so, but
rather because it believed strongly that integration was the right approach.
The petition-fire-boycott sequence, however, helped immeasurably to make
them believers. From here on the superintendent and board would have to
lead. Pressure rarely remains the tool of only one segment in the popu-
lation.

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Statement made to the author by Bruce Miller on May 22, 1968.
CHAPTER V

TOTAL INTEGRATION

Upon returning to Sacramento after his experience in Riverside on September 13, State Department of Education Consultant Theodore Neff, filed his "Report of Assignment and Travel" with only one comment: "Rough!" That day and those immediately preceding it, had been rough, but not violent. A temporary first step toward integration had been made effective immediately. It now remained for the board to come up with a complete plan to match its commitment.

As incredible as it appeared to some distraught Negro parents, the board had not become aware of the serious discontent over segregated education until September, 1965. "We as a board had no inkling that this was coming up and we were really taken by surprise."¹ Something had been needed to stimulate their awareness, and with that they were amply provided during the second week in September.

The board was not alone in its state of unawareness. The administration was equally surprised by the suddenness of the crisis. While the problems surrounding segregated education were clearly visible, and integration had been discussed informally by the administration prior to September, 1965, the crisis atmosphere was clearly the key factor in stimulating action. Given the absence of a burning commitment to integration as the best means of equalizing educational opportunity, it is

¹ Statement made to the author by Mrs. Margaret Heers on July 18, 1967.
completely understandable how both the board and administration could feel that their fledgling compensatory education program was off to a good start. After all, only the year previous they had won a commendatory citation from the N.A.A.C.P. for their initial efforts at meeting problems caused by segregation.

Prior to the crisis there had been no substantial stimulation to push integration. The established civil rights organizations had taken no action; ad hoc groups had not been formed; marches, petitions, and exhortations to action had simply not taken place in the minority community. In the course of a week, a few parents, supported by many more, had successfully won the attention of the board. After Monday, September 13, things would be different. The board had been sensitive and responsive to the petition of minority parents, but school policy cannot be determined solely by responding to petitions. The factor of board leadership is also crucial in meeting public responsibility. Now the board president and superintendent would lead; first by attempting to sell integration, and then by working to make it succeed.

Pressure had been an important factor in stimulating the board to consider actively the merits of integration, and had predated their announced commitment to it on September 13. A final integration plan was not adopted, however, until October 25, six weeks after the original commitment had been made public. If the board had been unduly susceptible to pressure, it never would have approved that plan. Consistent with an attitude common among school boards that have adopted strong integration plans, the Riverside board believed that it had an obligation
to help correct the schools' part in sustaining segregation.

The Riverside Board of Education was, and still remains, a homogeneous body. Ideological splits among members have not hampered its functioning. During the week following the Lowell School fire, all members were kept apprised of developments through communication with their president and the school administration. In planning his announcement of a limited bussing program on September 13, the president encountered no opposition from the other members. They appeared to accept his leadership, and more importantly, they agreed with the principle and practice of integration. As a "middle of the road" board on most social and educational issues, the members had not been disposed to move very far ahead of the community they served. Their obvious willingness to espouse integration put them at least somewhat ahead on that issue. Had the disposition of the board been either more divided or more reluctant toward integration, the product of their efforts would obviously have been far different.

Even boards well disposed toward integration are, to a considerable extent, at the mercy of conditions. No board wants to overcrowd its schools, help split its community, see bond elections fail, and perhaps, as can happen in some states, face a recall election itself. Fear of such harsh possibilities has doubtlessly acted as a moditier of moral commitment.

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3 The Chicago suburb of South Holland, Illinois, provides the setting for a contrasting, but equally poignant, example of a school board asserting its "leadership" in the direction of preserving segregation.
more than once. Fortunately for the cause of school integration in Riverside, both the material and psychological conditions were right, although the board was prepared to extend its commitment of district resources further than was ultimately required. The necessity of housing students displaced by the Lowell School fire meant that integration could be started almost immediately, and with a minimum number of questions asked by the white public. A most important material condition was the availability of space at other schools. In most schools, overcrowded conditions did not exist.

In this regard the board was fortunate, maybe even lucky. Apart from the issue of segregation, it had been considering the question of increasing the size of elementary schools for two years. A bond election passed in November, 1963, provided for the expansion of six elementary schools. During the following year a size-of-school-committee, authorized by the board, suggested that schools could be larger than they were. During the 1964-65 term, the twenty-seven elementary schools ranged in enrollments from 234 to 985. None of the de facto segregated schools were among the largest, thus helping to make integration feasible.

Not all of the good fortune was a matter of complete chance. Neither the board nor the administration were aware that space could be found until they sought it, found some, and took the necessary steps to

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provide the remainder of what was required. Timing and conditions were right, but men were responsible for both. Fortunately, the men empowered to make the decisions were also, at least to some extent, the same ones who served as the masters and architects of conditions. Had the board vacillated before the public, appeared distraught, indulged in sentimental rhetoric over the inherent Americanism of de facto segregated neighborhood schools, complained of rising costs, or otherwise had engaged in self-pity or indecision, the community reaction could have been far different.

It would be deceptive to suggest that the entire school administration was waiting in eager anticipation for the day when it could formulate and implement a school integration plan. In fact, a lack of sensitivity to minorities had characterized some key offices of the administration for many years. Up to and including the week of September 5, some officials in these offices continued to voice serious questions concerning the wisdom of integration. A few were opposed to the idea outright, but said little.

All of the debate, such as it was, remained inside the organization, and was decidedly subdued. It was not deep enough or bitter enough to cause internal disharmony or stimulate a purge of staff. Once the superintendent declared his position, the rest of the administration supplied information, and in very tangible ways worked hard to come up with a complete and workable plan. No signs of disagreement were apparent in the functioning of the organization. All worked fast and efficiently. Fortunately, the two people with whom Superintendent Miller
worked closest, on both a personal and a professional basis, Associate Superintendent Ray Berry, and Assistant to the Superintendent Donald Taylor, were also the ones within the administration who had demonstrated the strongest convictions in support of integration.

Three key groups had a hand in formulating the Proposed Master Plan for School Integration, which was presented to the board for consideration on October 18: the administration, an "Advisory Committee for Integrated Schools," and the board itself. Both the advisory committee and the board helped to determine the direction of the plan, but as expected, the administration did most of the work. It was clear from what had already developed by September 13, that the closing of Lowell School and extensive pupil transportation would constitute major elements in the plan. Not so clear was, whether Irving would remain open for children whose parents preferred having them attend a nearby school; whether white children would be bussed into Irving; how soon Casa Blanca would be integrated; or indeed, how soon full integration would begin at Lowell.

Of all these issues, only the one dealing with Casa Blanca proved really troubling. Just by being sensitive to community thinking, the superintendent and his staff knew that the board would not require white children to be bussed into Irving. They were also fairly certain that the advisory committee and board would accept a clean break with segregation, specifically the closing of Irving as an elementary school. On the last point, there was some slight doubt at first. Nevertheless, working with these assumptions, Superintendent Miller mobilized the administration for a full scale assault on the problem of completing a
full integration proposal by October 18.

The two central administrative decisions to be faced in this situation fell under the general categories of arrangements, programs, and costs. Donald Taylor was asked to estimate what the district would need in the way of school housing. Controller Walter Parks was asked to submit figures on the costs of housing and transportation. Harry Young, assistant superintendent for business, submitted a detailed proposal for the disposition of the Lowell School insurance money and the relocation of portable classrooms. Paul Lockhart, director of transportation, made all necessary arrangements for additional school busses as required. Richard Robbins, assistant superintendent for pupil personnel services, and Associate Superintendent Ray Berry were requested to show how the district could maintain its "same high quality of education or services," and also indicate what new in the way of aides, tutors, reading specialists, counselors, and other personnel would be required to insure the success of integration. The old compensatory education program was not totally scrapped. It now became "transition education," and the district's efforts to procure federal funds was stepped up.

After receiving all of this information, the superintendent would be able to determine somewhat better how fast and how boldly integration could proceed. He was obviously hoping that the program could be shown not to be inordinately costly, that the district would not be flooded with portable classrooms, and that overcrowding would not result. Fortunately, the answers that came back showed no marked difficulties in any of these areas.

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By September 27, a skeleton outline of the desegregation plan had been prepared. It indicated a somewhat slower pace than the one finally adopted. Lowell would be closed by September, 1966. The once "natural boundary" dividing Lowell from Alcott would be crossed, and the Alcott attendance area expanded to include some blocks north of the arroyo, a total of approximately 100 additional pupils. The remaining students at Lowell would be dispersed to other schools with low minority enrollments. Preliminary plans called for full integration at Irving by September, 1967, but only the first three grades would be included in September, 1966. Casa Blanca integration would proceed even more cautiously, beginning with boundary adjustments leading to the absorption of most Casa Blanca territory into the attendance areas of Madison, Washington, and Hawthorne schools during the 1966-67 and 1967-68 terms. Finally, in September, 1968, the school would be closed. A fourth school, Emerson, although its minority enrollment was only fifty-five percent, and had not been a target school of the minority petitioners, also received attention. In September, 1966, approximately 100 of its minority pupils would be transferred to Highland and Hyatt Schools. Final plans would call for earlier or more complete integration at all schools, with the exception of Lowell. During the month it worked on the integration plan, the administration explored -- and rejected -- many variations of the proposal finally settled on. One, for example, considered closing Casa Blanca in the fall of 1966, the same time eventually decided upon for the closing of Lowell and Irving.

Closing schools and transporting students had worked well in White Plains, New York, and although Riverside had three schools to close, not one, it held promise of working well there too. The superintendent was
now in full charge of preparing the district's integration plan. In the five weeks before October 18, he and his staff were able to amass considerable evidence proving the feasibility of the basic plan. Left unresolved was the issue of how soon all of this should be accomplished. By the first week in October, after receiving additional information from his staff and sanction from the advisory committee, Superintendent Miller was able to accelerate the dates of integration: spring, 1966, for a reduction of minority enrollment at Emerson; fall, 1966, for the closing of Lowell and Irving. Casa Blanca still remained a problem. Community opposition to the closing of Casa Blanca was almost unanimous at first, and the issue remained unresolved until spring, 1966.

The administration was writing the plan, but the board and its advisory committee for integrated schools constituted the all important sanctioning bodies. A plan without support from these two groups would end in no plan at all. The advisory committee, a group of thirteen citizens representing a broad cross section of local opinion, was authorized by the board on September 20. Three of the most active Negro advocates of integration were on the committee, as were several Mexican-Americans. The board also succeeded in appointing several individuals believed to be "conservatives."  

Unlike some committees and commissions in other cities that have

7 Members of the Advisory Committee for Integrated Schools were: Percy Baugh, M.D., Robert Bland, Mrs. Richard Boylan, Jr., Jesse Carlos, William H. Davis, Augustine A. Flores, Mr. Matt Frost, Truman Johnson, Mrs. Patricia Kennington, Joseph Palaia, Donald E. Renfro, Mrs. Belen Reyes, and Richard Roa.
actually developed and written plans themselves, need for early action in Riverside limited the local advisory committee's role to providing consent and suggesting ideas. In a way, its deliberations were anti-climactic to the earlier confrontation between minority parents and the board. Yet it was assumed by the board and administration that the final integration plan would contain nothing unacceptable to a majority of the advisory group. Before undertaking their assignment, the committee was furnished with some clear guidelines. (1) Complete integration, kindergarten through high school, was a commitment of the district. (2) Firm dates needed to be established for integration of the schools. (3) Integration would require more than physical desegregation, and the board welcomed committee suggestions as to the means for accomplishing this.

Specifically, the advisory committee was asked to consider, (1) whether integration should be mandated in total, or whether some freedom of choice would be permissible; (2) how integration could best be realized through transportation, boundary changes, or program changes; (3) how the new programs could best be financed (e.g., federal, state, local or foundation); (4) the need for information, understanding and support from the community; and (5) the best ultimate use of school plants (Irving, Casa Blanca, Lincoln).

The thirteen committee members, along with Board President Arthur Littleworth, Board Members Evelyn Kendrick and Margaret Heers,

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8 *Suggested Guidelines and Suggested Considerations*, Prepared by the members of the Advisory Committee for Integrated Schools, Riverside Unified School District, Office of the Superintendent, (Riverside: September 30, 1965); Lincoln School was not a de facto segregated institution. Rebuilt in 1923 on the site of the first school in Riverside (1870), it was located on the northwest side of the old downtown area. In 1966, it was closed for lack of sufficient enrollment and "in the interest of safety."
Superintendent Miller and Associate Superintendent Ray Berry met four times. All on the committee turned out to favor integration, identified with the plan they were reacting to, and became determined to see it adopted. Some discussions bore witness to the overall problem of segregated education, and turned into examinations of the neighborhood school concept. Others involved consideration of the instructional, guidance, and testing programs of the schools. Questions on how the de facto segregated schools could be utilized most effectively after being closed as elementary schools were discussed. Some urged that they be kept open as community centers, head start locations, and centers for summer programs. Minority group members, in particular, were interested in seeing the district eliminate the practice of ability grouping in the secondary schools. All in all, the meetings amounted to a series of rather loose-jointed discussions in which everyone participated. As pieces of the integration plan fell into place, the advisory committee accepted them and recommended modifications, primarily in connection with accelerating the rate of integration.

Several directions in which school officials were moving command special interest. Both the board and administration were opposed to transporting white children into the formerly segregated Irving School, even though the facility was in excellent condition. Their reasoning was based on a feeling that the majority community would not accept such a policy. Attempting it might jeopardize the entire plan. Littleworth was particularly firm in resisting serious consideration of the idea. As it turned out, although the issue came up, no one on the board or the
citizens' committee felt disposed to push for cross-bussing. Even the Negroes who had advocated early integration could see that for Riverside, in 1965, it was not an issue worth pushing.

Cross-bussing could stimulate white resentment, but the questions of location, cost, space, and number of children involved, all helped to make the idea seem not very feasible. Had the enrollment balance between minority schools and majority schools been more nearly equal, and facilities elsewhere severely limited, it is still only remotely conceivable that some kind of cross-bussing plan would have been considered. The idea of utilizing school busses for implementing the integration of minority children into predominately white schools, on the other hand, was accepted easily by all on the board and the citizens' committee. School busses had been common to Riverside streets for many years. Furnishing children with a school bus ride could hardly be viewed as a bold new departure, although utilizing busses for purposes of integration would increase the expense somewhat.

By October 18, a Proposed Master Plan for School Integration was presented to the board by Superintendent Miller for discussion. The administration, board, and advisory committee had all made their contributions to the final document. Its heart, a "Proposed Plan for Integration," was all spelled out on a single page. As expected, it called for the


10 See Appendix J of text.
closing of Lowell and Irving schools by September, 1966. The Irving facility, however, would remain open for special programs such as head start classes, a special reading clinic, adult education, and others. Approximately 126 pupils at Emerson, a school with a fifty-five percent minority enrollment at the time, would be transported to Highland and Hyatt schools, thereby reducing Emerson's racial imbalance.

The complicated problem of integration at Casa Blanca was handled more gingerly. A citizens' committee on Casa Blanca would be formed to study the problem and make a recommendation by May 1, 1966. Nevertheless, the plan itself declared that some concrete steps were to be taken for the reduction of segregation there by September, 1966. Boundary changes, resulting in a one-third reduction in the number of students attending Casa Blanca, were to be made by September, 1966, unless the committee could propose a better plan. If the committee's proposal for 1966-67 failed to cover the entire community, beginning that year, transportation would be provided at district expense to students whose parents preferred they attend an integrated school.

Transitional education, an adaptation of compensatory education to an integrated setting, was also a part of the plan. Tutorial help, remedial reading classes, improved counseling procedures, and various kinds of vocational retraining programs were all to have their place. The administration declared its intent to submit applications for appropriate federal funds to help defray the costs of all special programs.

Moreover, if adopted, the plan would commit the district to the continued prevention of segregation. School boundaries would be changed
and "other adjustments" made to insure that segregated schools would not develop in the future. The proposal to reassign over a hundred minority children from Emerson to Hyatt and Highland seemed to render this part of the statement especially credible. The remainder of the larger document covered such matters as the legal obligation of school districts to desegregate, a review of the limited research on school integration, an analysis of classrooms that would be needed, and an estimate of how much implementation of the plan would cost.  

In all, 565 pupils would be transferred by September, 1966. This would be in addition to those relocated in September, 1965, as a direct result of the Lowell fire and the demands of minority parents. Nineteen additional classrooms would be needed, four of which were already available at the schools to be designated "receiving schools." Nine would be portables already owned by the district which could be moved to the receiving schools. Six would have to be built. After the classroom-shifting was completed, no receiving school was expected to have fewer than 8.5 nor more than 17.8 percent minority students.

The capital outlay involved in new classrooms was estimated at approximately $200,000, almost all of which could be made up by the recovery of $159,000 from the Lowell fire, plus the revenue received from the sale of the Lowell site.  

Bus transportation called for in the

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12 On November 7, 1966, the board sold the Lowell Elementary School property to the St. James Church of God in Christ for $36,200; Minutes of the Board of Education of the Riverside Unified School District, November 7, 1966; The eventual cost of moving four classrooms from Lowell to neighboring Alcott was $56,600, Minutes, May 16, 1966.
plan would cost an estimated $45,700 during 1966-67, but approximately $35,000 could be saved from reduced operational expenses coming as a direct result of integration. According to the Proposed Master Plan for School Integration, the net operating cost to the district would be $10,000 to $11,000 per year.

The drama surrounding the meeting on October 18 was substantial. Some Negroes active in their community, and remembering the fate of earlier integration proposals at the hands of the board, were far from convinced that the proposal would be approved. A few were even cynical. A mimeographed leaflet distributed on the Eastside a few days in advance of the meeting was titled "School Board Bends to White Pressure." Among the comments contained on it were the following: "Here we go again! Do you realize that the School Board has no intention of acting on the desegregation of schools on October 18 as promised?" "Do not let the KKK control our school board! Act now!"

The fear of inaction stemmed from statements by the board president that the plan would be presented and discussed at the meeting of October 18, but would not be acted on until the following week. When informed of this decision at their last meeting, several members of the Advisory Committee on Integrated Schools became quite hostile. They had

13 In February, 1968, the administration estimated the current cost of transportation for school integration at $45,000, based on the fact that an equivalent of seven busses were used for this purpose at a cost of $6,500 each. The total cost of pupil transportation in 1967-68, including all regular pupils, special education, and integration, was $280,000. Of that amount, about $70,000 was reimbursed by the state, while the entire expense for integration, $45,000, was reimbursed by the Federal Government under Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act. Progress Report on Integration, Mimeo, Riverside Unified School District, Office of the Superintendent, February, 1968, p. 2.
put time into the proposal, were committed to it, and wanted it accepted by the board. The basis for the skepticism was a mounting white pressure in the city to either kill the proposal or delay a decision on it. Over the past month, members of the superintendent's staff and two board members, including the president, had appeared before anti-integration groups to explain what was developing. None had given the slightest indication of reversing their commitment to integration. Nevertheless, knowledge of these appearances, mounting white pressure, and a delay of one week in approving the plan, all added up to suspicion that integration itself was in jeopardy.

Cynicism as to what the board might really do was justified on the basis of what earlier boards had failed to do. It was not justified on the basis of anything the present board had done or failed to do since September 13. All five members desired strongly to see the integration plan adopted at the earliest possible time. They had participated in the plan's formulation and had been committed to it for at least two weeks. The earliest possible time, however, was thought by the board president to be one week after the proposal was heard, thereby permitting enough time for a full airing of all views -- but not so much as to allow the opposition a chance to mount a broadly based counterforce against integration.

After the plan was presented to the board in the company of several hundred interested onlookers at Magnolia School on October 18, Superintendent Miller made a strong personal appeal for its adoption. Since

14 See Appendix H of text.
coming to Riverside fourteen years earlier, Miller had never been known to permit losing recommendations to reach the board. The integration proposal was not going to be a loser either.

Doubtlessly owing to the fact that their children would not be affected very directly by the integration decision, most white parents were not particularly distressed with the proposal. For them, the principle of the neighborhood school was still intact. Even those who did object to integration remained guarded in their remarks. It was, after all, not considered proper to voice racist remarks in 1965. But there was some reaction, and by Riverside standards it was moderately intense. Some messages were sent to the board, and some small public meetings were held between September 7, and October 18. Then, during the week between October 18 and 25, the activity quickened considerably. The plan was known, and the last week for attempting to influence the decision had arrived.

For an hour and a half on October 18, approximately 500 persons listened to nearly thirty speakers make their views known. About half made remarks which could be inferred as favorable; the other half voiced negative comments. Most statements were less passionate than at earlier meetings. Organizational support for integration was quite impressive, some of it having been announced even prior to the meeting. Resolutions favoring integration were received from the Riverside Chapter of the American G. I. Forum, University District Democratic Club, and the Junior Chamber of Commerce of Riverside. The president of the last organization later qualified his original indication of support when he wrote that it
was "not intended in any way to endorse a specific time schedule or the mechanics of an integration plan to be put into effect by the Riverside Board of Education." While no formal votes were taken of the membership, the executive committees or chief executive officers of the Riverside Human Relations Council, Riverside Teachers Association, and School Employees Local No. 7239, AFL-CIO, also endorsed the principle of complete integration. Several smaller organizations also sent letters of encouragement.

All in all, the board and administration received about two and a half times as many letters opposed to integration as in favor of it, although there were fewer than a hundred all told. Those who voiced complaints aimed their criticisms in several different directions. The costs of the program, though minimal, did help spark some opposition, including the only paid advertisement against integration. That same advertisement, "Do You Want to Preserve Neighborhood Schools," also raised the awesome threat of "bussing your children from your neighborhood school." Concern about overcrowded conditions and declining educational standards were also heard with some frequency. Only a few of the letters were clearly of the hate or racist variety, although some were very emotional in tone.

Most parent opposition to the proposed plan was centralized in what was known as the Alcott School area, an area of upper-middle class

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homes south of the Tequesquite Arroyo, and approximately one and a half miles from the burned out Lowell School. The superintendent's plan called for a boundary adjustment which would add approximately 100 minority pupils to the school, one that at the time had the second lowest minority percentage in the district, 2.7 percent, but also the second highest pupil-teacher ratio, 31.7 to 1. A large number of parents in this area represented what they considered an infringement of their right to affluence. In a letter to Superintendent Miller, one husband and wife put it this way:

We would not allow our children to be bussed to other schools. Nor do we agree with the idea of changing boundary lines. It is unfair to those of us who, at great personal sacrifice, have built our homes near the schools we preferred and pay taxes accordingly.

Board President Littleworth was himself a resident of this neighborhood, but held a conception of freedom and democracy different from that expressed above. At a meeting of parents unsympathetic to integration on October 5, he acknowledged that "certainly the schools can't begin to solve all the problems of minority groups in the country, but they can do more than they have, and I think they should do more." 18

On October 21, two representatives from the administration met with Alcott parents to discuss the integration issue. According to the Alcott principal, a man whose own convictions concerning integration were unknown, and publicly unstated, parents on that occasion were irritated over the following points:

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(1) Transportation of Lowell-Irving students. Both the costs and the philosophy came under strong attack.
(2) Overall added costs of such a move. Mention of federal and state compensation funds met with a rather angry reception.
(3) Fear of overcrowding Alcott classrooms, playgrounds and cafeteria -- especially prior to the opening of the Shaker Heights School.
(4) Action being planned too hastily and without enough study.
(5) Action being planned under duress and responding to pressure from minority groups.
(6) Action being planned without a proper survey of, or regard for, the feelings of the minority community. (I heard the word "railroad" several times.)
(7) Fear of a greater percentage of minority students in future years.
(8) The discontinuance or removal of good buildings (Lowell-Irving) and the cost of replacing or removing them.\textsuperscript{19}

Opposition was expressed in phone calls, visits to the administration, small meetings, such as the one at Alcott, letters, and finally petitions. It would not be accurate to suggest that opposition to integration ran deep. All indications are that it did not. On the other hand, it was probably fairly widespread. The week between October 18, and October 25, saw the circulation of two petitions opposed to the superintendent's Proposed Master Plan for School Integration. One, signed by 1105 persons, was circulated district wide, with the largest concentration of signatures coming from the Alcott attendance area. It stated that the proposed plan was "presently unacceptable," that it called for too rapid action, and demanded that the board postpone action for a minimum of one year, until "a more comprehensive plan can be presented to the electorate, thereby eliminating gross errors at educational and financial expense."

A second petition was even more blunt and demanding. It called for no bussing of children outside their neighborhoods, no closing of

\textsuperscript{19} Memo [from Kenneth Wood] to Bruce Miller, (Riverside: October 22, 1965).
currently adequate school facilities, and demanded that "the Board of Education table any action on the Proposed Master Plan for School Integration until a detailed factual study of accommodations and finances can be made and presented to the electorate of the Riverside Unified School District." 544 people signed that one, making a total of 1649 anti-integration signatures collected inside of one week. 20

A few pro-integration petitions were circulated among the white residents. One gained 145 signatures, and another 63. Almost all of these were from the Highland Elementary School attendance area, a school serving a substantial portion of the university community. Counting petition signatures is obviously not an accurate way to measure popular support, but it appears certain that if the board had chosen to decide this particular educational and moral issue on the basis of a show of hands, they would have balked at approving the superintendent's integration proposal. As things developed, the petition activity had no impact whatsoever upon the board's decision. As one member stated it accurately and simply, "We weren't going by the number of signatures; we were just trying to do what we thought was best." 21

It appears that at the time the board made its final commitment on October 25, it did so with no public opposition from civic and business leaders, but with little public support either. Mayor Ben Lewis

20 The texts of all petitions received by the board are reproduced in Appendix I. The ones referred to here are numbered 2 and 3.

21 Statement made to the author by Mrs. Margaret Heers on July 18, 1967.
declared support for integration and urged public support for the board's plan, but his lead was not followed by the city council. On October 19, the council shunned a resolution supporting the school board introduced by Councilman John Sotelo from the Eastside. In the council's view this was a school board problem, not theirs. Councilman John Bergin was quoted by the local newspaper as not feeling that "all this bussing is in the best interest of the city," but neither he nor any other member went out of his way to oppose integration. The Riverside Civic League took no stand, while the business community, like the community at large, held divided opinions but made no public comment.

One influential voice of public opinion, the Press-Enterprise Company, publishers of The Press and Daily Enterprise, did become involved. Both papers published editorials supporting school integration and criticizing the city council for failure to support it. Their run of feature stories and handling of news coverage, dating at least as far back as 1962, reflected a sensitivity to minority problems in general and to the issue of segregated schools in particular.

At 5:00 p.m. on Monday, October 25, Ray Lapia, president of KACE, a Riverside radio station, broadcast an editorial supporting school integration in Riverside. "Sadly," he remarked, "some parents in the Alcott school district, to which Negro children will be sent, are protesting." Indeed they were, along with others, and at that very hour.

22 Riverside Press, October 20, 1965.

23 Strong editorial rebuke of the city council's failure to confront the problems of minorities appeared in the Press on September 21, 1965. Other editorials on various facets of race relations appeared frequently in the pages of both newspapers during the first eight years of the 1960s.
Again, but for the last time, nearly 500 persons filed into the Magnolia School Auditorium to hear support and protest directed toward the Proposed Master Plan for School Integration. This time the spokesmen against the plan were decidedly more numerous than those favoring it. Speaker after speaker, all claiming not to be opponents of integration, objected to costs, overcrowding, and the same general objections heard a week earlier.

The board, of course, had made its commitment to integration public on September 13. Three of its members had attended the advisory committee meetings. All had discussed parts of the proposal with the administration and with each other, either in person or by telephone. Each knew how he was going to vote weeks before. Yet only the members and the administration were completely confident about the outcome.

The meeting appeared dramatic to those who watched it and participated in it. Two outright racist statements early in the meeting appeared to embarrass those who claimed opposition solely on grounds of cost and overcrowding at the schools. Delay was their only request, but delay, said the board president, was "not warranted by the facts." Each member made his own short statement affirming the "rightness" of the administration's plan. The vote favoring integration was unanimous. The inevitable decision was received quietly by almost everyone. A few were very pleased, even proud. A few others remained angry. But most were just accepting. The board had permitted all to be heard, but had not abdicated its responsibility for making a decision.
Riverside Unified School District - Board of Education: January 1965 - August 1967 - left to right: Dr. Vernon M. Stern, Mr. Bruce Miller, superintendent, Mr. B. Rae Sharp, Vice-President, Mrs. Evelyn H. Kendrick, clerk, Mrs. Mar. ret B. Heers, Mr. Arthur L. Littleworth, president.
The superintendent, once cautious and but weakly committed to decisive school integration, had skillfully coordinated the formulation of a most acceptable plan. The board never needed to vote on whether or not integration was desirable. That much could be taken for granted. Some members had, early in the discussions, questioned the wisdom of a compulsory bussing program. The practical evidence amassed by the superintendent and his staff, coupled with their recommendation, provided the little persuasion necessary to find it acceptable.

While the superintendent coordinated the shaping of the plan, with ample assistance from his closest colleagues, the board president provided most of the public leadership. After September 10, he was determined to provide Riverside with a complete and workable integration plan, and to do it without developing a deep split in the community. Functionally this meant that the board would have to promise no more than it could deliver, declare a firm position favoring integration early, allow time for public discussion of the issue — but not too much time, participate in community discussions of the issue, and finally adopt a clear and conclusive plan.

The critical stage of the integration controversy ended on October 25, with adoption of the Master Plan for School Integration. One important question remained open, however, even in the master plan. It concerned the fate of Casa Blanca School. Even prior to making its integration decision known, the board learned that no one person or group could speak for Negroes, or Caucasians, or Mexican-Americans.

To be sure, not every Negro favored the closing of Lowell and
Irving schools, although it is likely that sentiment favoring the closing of Lowell was more nearly unanimous than that for closing Irving. Even though they were segregated institutions, their closure meant that parents and children would be subjected to some inconvenience and would have to make some marked personal adjustments. Thus, many Negro and Mexican-American parents on the Eastside viewed the school closings with mixed emotions. It took a considerable effort by the school principals and teachers to convince some parents that integration was indeed in their children's best interest. The Irving principal reported having "dozens of conferences" with parents who were not at all convinced that their children should be transferred to other schools. Some even expressed resentment toward the Negro leadership for pushing integration on the community.

Parents wondered why the bussing couldn't be shared by the Caucasian youngsters. Many feared that their children would be sent to different schools, thus splitting their family. In case of illness they were concerned about how children would get home, particularly if the mother had no car or couldn't drive. Fears were expressed about what would happen to the children once they were placed in classes with stiff competition. These and other concerns would have to be met during the 1965-66 term. Personal anxieties about how integration would affect their own children were expressed, but no public expression of dissatisfaction was registered. Once the mechanics of implementation were determined and set in operation, integration would proceed with general acceptance on the Eastside.
For the most part, Mexican-Americans on the Eastside became little involved with the integration controversy. Publicly, they neither favored it nor opposed it. Some regretted the closing of Irving School. An even fewer number, not residents of the Irving attendance area, tried to convince the reluctant residents that integration was really in their best interest. It all made very little immediate difference. The closing of Lowell and Irving would affect all who lived in the area, and this included almost as many Mexican-Americans as Negroes.

The situation in Casa Blanca was much different. There, a real problem developed in winning support for integration among Mexican-Americans in a community already possessing a clear cultural identity. With a very few notable exceptions, this community was united in its opposition to integration. In October, two petitions stating such opposition were circulated. Together they produced signatures representing 190 adults, mostly the parents of at least 300 children attending Casa Blanca School. Since only 370 students were enrolled at the school, the petitions provided a comparatively accurate indication of sentiment. It had already become clear to the administration that they could not ignore this development.

A history of segregation, produced and enforced by subcultural preference from within and discrimination from without, had clearly established that the predominant majority of Mexican-American residents in the Casa Blanca area would function apart from the mainstream of the larger

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24 See Appendix I, numbers 6 and 7. Most of the signers indicated the number of children they had in attendance at Casa Blanca School alongside of their signatures.
society. Yet, by the 1960s there were some signs that the community was gradually assuming a greater identification with the dominant culture, although this was not occurring anywhere nearly as rapidly as the more aggressive Mexican-American spokesmen desired. The retirement of Casa Blanca School's first principal, after forty-one years of dedicated service, provided an opportunity for the new principal to redirect the orientation of the school somewhat. Like the first, he too was able to relate well with the community, but did so with the realization that the school no longer needed to care for the people in quite the same paternalistic way as it had done in earlier years.

The two years immediately preceding the integration decision witnessed some improvements in the instructional program at Casa Blanca. Residents of the community retained their overall level of satisfaction with the school. The new principal, while modifying his role from that of the former principal, was still looked to as a kind of community spokesman, at least in school matters. He was proud of what had been accomplished under his leadership and held high expectations for the future. As talk began to mount about closing Casa Blanca, and as parents made it increasingly clear that they wanted the school to remain open, the new principal assumed the uncomfortable role of Casa Blanca's defender against the onslaughts of rapid integration imposed from outside the community. He personally favored integration, but preferred a more gradual assimilation of the Casa Blanca attendance area into those of its three neighboring schools. Like many who were residents in the community, he too resented the influence of a few vigorously pro-integration Mexican-Americans who appeared at public meetings claiming
to represent the views of Casa Blanca residents.

Some Casa Blanca parents first became concerned over what integration could mean to their community school after receiving a letter from Superintendent Bruce Miller. In his letter to "Casa Blanca School Parent::," September 16, 1965, the superintendent advised parents that Associate Superintendent Ray Berry would explain in detail the implications of the district's integration commitment to them at a forthcoming PTA meeting. The letter continued:

In addition to what Mr. Berry will tell you, I want you to know that Mr. Arthur Littleworth, president of the board, the members of my own staff and many others are working to assure equal educational opportunities for all children. A general plan to be presented to the Board of Education on October 18, will take the Casa Blanca School into full consideration. Further, the board announced at its last meeting that opportunities made available for Lowell and Irving must include Casa Blanca.

As Miller, Berry, and Littleworth all learned early, talk of "equal educational opportunities" did not elicit the same response among Mexican-Americans in the content confines of the barrio as it had among discontented Negroes on the Eastside. Some articulate Negroes had resented the segregated education their children were receiving at Lowell School. Most Mexican-Americans in Casa Blanca, on the other hand, held their segregated school in high regard and viewed it as an important community entity. Once it became clear to school officials that a few strongly pro-integration Mexican-American leaders living outside of Casa Blanca were not representing the true feelings of the people, the administration made its decision to work closely with both the pro-integrationists and the Casa Blanca residents. The approach amounted to a firm and steady,
but soft, sell of integration.

Unlike the small group of diligent Negroes who sparked the original protest movement, strong personalities were not to have a great impact on the eventual integration of Casa Blanca students. There were, of course, some Mexican-American "leaders" who favored integration and who helped in the drive to achieve it. Their role was largely limited to providing needed support for a direction in which the administration was already disposed to move.

Augustine "Teen" Flores was a former student at Casa Blanca School, but had long since removed himself from that immediate community. He was now a successful businessman, civic leader, and active in national Mexican-American affairs. Although a Mexican-American whose name was well recognized in the community, he was not held in particularly high regard by Casa Blanca residents. In any case, the people there hardly looked upon him as their spokesman. Richard Roa was somewhat slower in declaring his support for integration, but he was a resident of Casa Blanca, had served on the Advisory Committee for Integrated Schools, and soon emerged as an important voice. Joe Aguilar was the most adamant and earliest advocate of integration, but his manner was abrasive to many who resented his reminders of their disadvantaged condition brought on through long years of cultural isolation.

Early in November, a forty-member "Casa Blanca Study Committee" was formed for the purpose of recommending, by May 1, 1966, a specific plan on how best to integrate Casa Blanca. The committee was a balanced
one, dominated neither by Casa Blanca residents nor vocal nonresidents. Complete integration was a given fact and was clearly off limits to further discussion. Some kind of first step toward integration would have to be proposed for implementation by fall, 1966. Ostensibly the committee's task was to devise a plan. In fact, it was to approve one. The personal leadership of the superintendent proved most significant to the work of this committee, as he personally chaired the meetings and successfully communicated a concern for Casa Blanca children.

Between November 19, 1965, and May 12, 1966, the Casa Blanca Study Committee held five meetings. One of its basic purposes was to study relevant information as a basis for making a decision. Particularly during the first three months, the members were supplied with information and discussed all manner of problems relating to pupil achievement in segregated schools, college prospects for students attending Casa Blanca, integration practices elsewhere, language barriers, parental responsibility, school testing programs, ways integration would benefit Casa Blanca children, discrimination by majority pupils, transition to junior high school, ability grouping, socialization of children and many more.

A central point in all of this activity was for the committee to gain a feeling for how segregation and segregated education affects

25 Among the forty members were Flores, Roa, and Aguilar. Others included three teachers and the principal at Casa Blanca School, several other teachers, several known advocates of integration, representatives from P.T.A. groups at neighboring elementary schools, and representatives of the Casa Blanca community itself. The meetings were also attended and participated in by Armando Rodriguez, Bureau of Intergroup Relations, State Department of Education. A list of committee members is found in Appendix K of text.
achievement. Casa Blanca's relative disadvantage was not hard to document. An analysis of test results taken for Casa Blanca School, and released by the office of the superintendent in December, 1965, especially for the benefit of the Casa Blanca committee, revealed that the median "total readiness" score of first grade students at Casa Blanca ranked twenty-third out of the twenty-seven elementary schools in Riverside. On the Lorge-Thorndike Nonverbal Test of Ability, designed to measure abstract reasoning ability, second grade pupils at Casa Blanca ranked last among the twenty-seven schools.

The results were little different on other measures. Median scores for Casa Blanca fell in the lower quartile when ranked with other elementary schools in Riverside. The analysis also revealed that "at every grade level except the sixth, the test scores show consistent increases over the last three years, with the increase tending to be significantly greater within the last two years." This period of time coincided with the district's push in compensatory education, and possibly could have been more than coincidental. For one thing, class size at Casa Blanca, unlike that at Lowell and Irving, had been considerably lower than the district average.²⁶

Other statistics revealed that the dropout rate from high school among students who attended sixth grade at Casa Blanca in 1957 was virtually the same as the number who graduated from Ramona High School on

²⁶ In October, 1964, the pupil-teacher ratio for regular classes at Casa Blanca was 26.88 to 1, compared to a district average of 31.82 to 1. From then until the school was closed in 1967, the ratio became increasingly more favorable.
schedule in 1963. Of the forty-two pupils who completed sixth grade at Casa Blanca in 1959, and for whom records were still available in 1966, thirty-one, or 73.83 percent graduated from Ramona in 1965. Only nineteen percent of the students of record had dropped out of school. Presumably there would be both dropouts and graduates of other high schools among the twenty-one for whom records were unavailable. Of the thirty-one who graduated from high school, fifty-eight percent enrolled as college freshmen in the fall of 1965, compared to about eighty-six percent for the entire 1965 graduating class at Ramona.

At the February meeting, following three meetings of general discussion, attention turned rather sharply to the question of implementing integration at Casa Blanca. It ended with several members, including Augustine Flores as the most vigorous, imploring school officials to take decisive and affirmative action immediately. Several parents sought, and received, assurance that children would not be harmed through inadequate planning or hasty action. The consensus, however, appeared to be that the superintendent should conclude the study and present a firm plan. This he was delighted to do. Accordingly, on March 2, 1966, Superintendent Miller presented his plan, observing that "everybody seems to be for integration." The plan called for transporting approximately 180 children from certain block areas to other schools. This would leave approximately 250 children at Casa Blanca during the 1966-67 term. The school itself would be closed after the 1966-67 term, with the remainder of the

27 See Appendix E of text.
Casa Blanca children transported to other schools. Complete integration would be assured by September, 1967.

By a demonstrated interest in their welfare, and by an apparent willingness to be influenced by their suggestions, the superintendent had accomplished much toward winning the respect of the Casa Blanca Study Committee, but not necessarily the Casa Blanca community at large. A five-month study involving fewer than thirty residents could help win community acceptance of integration, but it could not convert an entire community. Nevertheless, and without a hitch, the Casa Blanca Study Committee approved the plan unanimously. Their final action was two months ahead of schedule, but almost no one was complaining. Integration had been out of the public eye for several months, and no one was complaining about that either, least of all the board who was preparing for a tax override election on June 7. While out of public view, the important and sometimes tedious planning of details preparatory to general integration was still going on.
By the time the Casa Blanca Study Committee had finished its work in March, 1966, a considerable start toward integration had already been made. Some students in the Lowell, Irving, and Emerson attendance areas were already attending classes elsewhere. The early and unexpected transfers in September, 1965, the integration of approximately one hundred Emerson children into Hyatt and Highland schools in February, and the anticipated reassignment of approximately 900 children in the fall, 1966, required considerable planning and preparation.

Several important concerns still faced the administration. Integration would have to apply within classes, not merely within schools. Portable classrooms would have to be moved, and additional ones constructed. Bus routes and schedules needed to be determined. Conferences with teachers, principals and parents were considered very necessary. A few new programs, including the use of tutors and aides, would be explained to those concerned. Plans had to be formulated for the use or disposition of facilities no longer to be used as elementary schools; they hardly could be left standing idle before the eyes of taxpayers as memorials of inefficiency. Not to be forgotten either was that the de facto segregated schools still had instructional programs to maintain and improve upon through the remainder of the year.
Administrators and teachers learned much about transferring large numbers of students by means of school busses during that first year, 1965-66. On September 13, the board declared its intention to integrate Riverside's schools. Two days later, approximately 264 kindergarten and primary grade children moved from their Lowell and Irving classes into classes at ten different schools. With only a couple of days of planning, the arrangements in several cases turned out to be far from optimum. Families obviously were split, as likely could be expected from any transfer plan made according to grade levels. In an extreme case, one family reportedly had each of their seven children attending a different school within the district. Families with three children, each in a different elementary school, were not quite so unusual.

Even with the limitations imposed by hasty action, the school year progressed with a minimum of friction. Although instant integration created a few problems, it was assumed that with careful planning, most could be avoided in the future. The first integration action permitting advance planning was that involving the movement of ninety-five Emerson children in February, 1966. Preparation began early in November, and continued up through the day the reassignment of pupils was effected. It was apparent to both administrators and teachers that ninety-five students could not be sent to other schools in the same way that ninety-five desks or tables could be moved. A brief in-service education program was developed to help acquaint the teachers at Emerson, Hyatt,

\footnote{Donald N. Taylor, written text of remarks made before the National Conference on Equal Educational Opportunity in America's Cities, sponsored by the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Washington, D.C., November 16, 1967.}
and Highland schools with some problems related to inter-group education. Soon the program took on an immediate and personal significance for Emerson teachers as they prepared to visit the families of all children scheduled to be transferred.

Ray Berry, associate superintendent, and Jesse Wall, director of intergroup education, met with the minority parents involved to explain the move's importance. This was not something immediately apparent to all families, first because Emerson was a nearby school, and secondly because, as yet, its minority enrollment was still under sixty percent. To most Negro parents, it simply did not appear as a racially imbalanced school. Most, however, concurred with the plan, but a few remained unconvinced. Robert Bland, leader of the boycott movement, also attended the meeting and indicated his support for integration. As the date for the transfers approached, staffs at Highland and Hyatt, two schools located nearest to the University of California, Riverside campus, met with Berry and Wall to discuss integration and the role teachers would play in it. Shortly thereafter, parents and children visited their new schools. Each principal received the parents and arranged for other meetings with P.T.A. representatives and room mothers. The school program was explained, tours of classrooms and other facilities were conducted, and in the fine tradition of parent-teacher gatherings, refreshments were served. Within a day or two entering children received similar hospitality, but with their principal hosts being the local Hyatt and Highland children. Each incoming pupil met his new teacher, checked out the supplies he would need, and was assigned to a desk.
Beyond question, the district had chosen a good neighborhood in which to begin integration. In order to achieve racial balance in the classrooms it was necessary for some white children to be switched to other rooms at midyear. On this, the white parents were most cooperative. Also, on the very day the former Emerson children were due to arrive, February 1, the district was faced with a school bus drivers' strike.\(^2\) Parents from both the Emerson and Highland-Hyatt areas worked out car pool arrangements to move the children anyway. Three and a half months earlier, the Highland area had been the only one in Riverside to muster a concentrated effort in support of integration.\(^3\) Four months after integration began at Highland and Hyatt, the areas furnished the two highest affirmative vote percentages among twenty-seven school areas in the district voting on a tax-override question.

Indications are that school officials were quite pleased with the events leading up to the successful reduction in minority enrollment at Emerson, and with good reason. They had demonstrated both tact and good judgment. Having had three months to plan the reassignment of pupils, the administration was able to avert separating elementary age children of the same family. The Emerson plan amounted to a modified geographical arrangement, but with some attention given to the space available at Hyatt and Highland. It called for Highland to take all first grade pupils, plus children of all grades from four streets in the Emerson

\(^2\) The strike was not against the Riverside Unified School District, but against the Riverside Bus Company, with whom the district had contracted for bus service.

\(^3\) A copy of the petition favoring integration submitted to the board from the Highland area is found in Appendix I of text, number 4.
attendance area. Hyatt would receive all fifth and sixth graders, plus all children from two streets. Reassignments were then made prior to making the plan operative so that children from the same family could attend the same school. About five families were opposed to having their children removed from Emerson at all. After conversations with the director of intergroup education and the associate superintendent, most were convinced that the district had the best interest of their children in mind, or at least they were persuaded to comply with the decision.

The reassignment of some Emerson children to Hyatt and Highland schools was an improvement over the scramble to find space that immediately followed the boycott. With careful planning the main part of the integration plan, scheduled for implementation in the fall, 1966, could be worked out without separating children from their close neighbors. Dividing the existing Lowell-Irving and Casa Blanca attendance areas into smaller geographical areas, and assigning all elementary age children in each smaller area to a single school, would be the means.

Although additional children were assigned to existing schools, an increase in class load was not expected to result. One reason was that during the 1965–66 term, the class sizes at the three de facto segregated schools were disproportionately low, averaging about twenty-one to twenty-five pupils per class. After integration, class sizes throughout the district would be higher than this, averaging about thirty. Yet the average for the district was expected to improve, as thirty teachers formerly assigned to Lowell, Irving, and Casa Blanca were themselves disbursed throughout the system. Available permanent classrooms could be used, some
existing portable classrooms moved, and six new portables built to accommodate the students being reassigned to new schools in the fall of 1966. During the months of figuring out how students would be reassigned in order to facilitate integration, those who worked on the arrangements kept in mind that costs should not deviate markedly from what was estimated publicly in October.

Costs and available facilities may be assumed to weigh heavily in any school system's plans, be they with regard to integration or anything else. But Riverside's Master Plan for School Integration was not intended as a treatise on school plant efficiency or cost cutting; it was a plan to bring about integrated schools. This would be done as efficiently as possible, but could not be accomplished merely by sending former Irving, Lowell, and Casa Blanca students to the nearest predominantly white school with available space.

The closing of two schools after the 1965-66 term, and the reduction of enrollment at a third by more than forty percent, meant that places would have to be found for about 900 Negro and Mexican-American students. Not included in this total were nearly 120 minority pupils who would again attend Highland and Hyatt, continuing a policy initiated in February, and 334 students, mostly white, who would be leaving Lincoln School, a downtown school being closed for lack of enrollment and inadequate safety conditions.

Several teachers, principals, and other administrators had a hand in formulating the plan to become effective in the fall, 1966. Associate Superintendent Ray Berry kept close watch over many facets of it. The
actual logistics of figuring out where the students would go was handled by the superintendent's assistant, Donald Taylor, after receiving information provided by many sources.

During the 1965-66 term, 16.7 percent of the total district enrollment was minority students. Initially, each elementary school with a minority percentage lower than this was designated as a potential receiving school. Space available was not a criterion. Only three schools with fewer than 16.7 percent minority children were not included among the receiving schools. Highland and Hyatt, although still only thirteen percent minority, were already receiving schools for children from the Emerson area. Mountain View's minority percentage stood at 8.3 during 1965-66, and showed evidence of increasing. The main reason for its exclusion, however, was that its enrollment was already at the one thousand level, the theoretical maximum for any elementary school.

Excluding Hyatt, Highland, and Mountain View, eleven schools remained. All were designated as receiving schools after rough estimates were made as to the number of pupils each would accommodate. To a large extent, that number was based on how many children would be required to bring each school's minority percentage close to the district average.

After having prepared a list of eleven schools, and indicating an approximate number of students appropriate for each to receive, the

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4 Mountain View's percentage of minority students did increase; to 12.6 percent in 1966-67, and to 15.3 percent in 1967-68. See Appendix B of text.
next task was to match children to schools by block areas. This was done by locating the homes of pupils on a map, and then dividing them, block by block, into groups approximating a number already determined as appropriate for each receiving school. In effect, where formerly one geographical area was divided into two school attendance areas, that same geographical area was now being divided into twelve attendance areas. The boundaries, while subject to change as are any school boundaries, were intended to be permanent. With the exception of children who formerly attended Lowell, but who recently had become a part of an expanded Alcott neighborhood, students would no longer be attending "neighborhood" schools, but they still would be attending school with neighbors. In terms of actual distance, the furthest any student was transported to school was seven miles. The average distance was slightly over half that.

Obviously it would make little sense for the district to expend this much work on the mechanics of integration, only to see the effort lost on the classroom level. Accordingly, each principal worked to assure that every class within his school was represented by roughly the same percentage of minority students as was present in the entire school. Principals were advised well in advance concerning the number and grade levels of the pupils they would be receiving. They were thus able to assign students to classes and make some adjustments in class loads prior to the opening day of school.

Reassigning nine hundred pupils from de facto segregated schools

5 Pachappa School served two of the twelve geographical divisions. See map on p. 162 of text.
to other schools with low minority enrollments provided the district with a formidable one-time challenge. Related administrative problems, such as coordinating bus schedules to numbers of children, routes traveled, and school schedules, as well as arranging for the transfer and construction of portable classrooms, were vital support functions. Taken together, all of these efforts assured Riverside of desegregated schools, but not necessarily of integrated ones.

The most substantive responsibility was a human one. It is relatively easier to order a portable classroom set up, schedule a bus, or even reassign a child to a different school, than it is to be assured that the child, his parents, and the larger community will benefit from the newly initiated policy. In Riverside, even as the mechanics of integration were being worked on by some administrators, others, along with teachers and parents, were working to assure its success. This meant that staff, parents, and children would need, first of all, to grasp the importance of what was being attempted, and secondly, be able to relate to each other constructively.

It became apparent to the administration soon after beginning plans for reducing the minority enrollment at Emerson, that parents generally were not well informed of the school board's new integration policy. The specter of unwilling children being sent by unwilling parents to a more distant school that might not welcome them presented a most unpleasant thought. None of the elementary principals and very few of the elementary teachers were believed by the central administration to be racists. On the other hand, it soon became obvious that many were
not ready for the transition in terms of their own knowledge, attitudes, and sensitivities. A relevant academic question is whether or not those who lack these essential characteristics can ever acquire them, and if they can, to what extent?

Teachers and principals occupied by far the most critical roles in meeting the challenges of integration. The central administration was able to make a few changes in principal assignments, one or two of which were undertaken with the probable success of integration as a primary factor considered. Generally, however, making changes in personnel was not a realistic option, nor even one that was required. Helping all staff members to comprehend the critical nature of their positions, and act accordingly, was a realistic option, and the one that was chosen. Even secretaries were briefed concerning their communication skills with minority parents and children. Bus drivers were not briefed during the first year of integration, but the importance of their role in Riverside's plan demanded that they be included in 1967.

Irwin Katz and other social psychologists have pointed to the quality of interpersonal relations as a particularly vital element in the educational success of minority children. For children who have lived in an environment where little hope is held for academic achievement, integration would seem to offer hope, but only where an atmosphere of genuine respect and acceptance prevails. Otherwise, an actual loss could occur. The resulting responses of anger and humiliation following a perceived rejection by teachers or other students would
likely inhibit learning. Assuming this to be true, it would be difficult to overemphasize the crucial role played by teachers in assuring the success of integration.

No one can ever be completely confident about how much in-service education is called for in order to cope with a particular situation. In 1966, Riverside had nearly a thousand teachers, and a total certificated staff of well over eleven hundred. Within that group were individuals whose knowledge and sensitivity were probably adequate to deal effectively in any situation. Others were doubtlessly ill-prepared by reason of inadequate knowledge, negative attitudes toward minorities, or personality traits. The superintendent and some of his staff, particularly the director of intergroup education and the associate superintendent, felt that a distinct need existed for providing teachers with opportunities to familiarize themselves with minority feelings and attitudes. Some teachers, in the course of their family lives, teacher preparation, and professional experience had never related to Negroes or Mexican-Americans. Some had little experience in dealing with children with a history of low achievement. Others felt insecure in dealing with minority parents.

During the 1965-66 and 1966-67 terms, several principals invited the director of intergroup education to their schools to discuss integration with teachers. In addition, three broader efforts were made

through the initiative of the central administration. All were in addition to the regular fare of in-service education courses offered each year. The first began in November, 1965, shortly after the integration decision was announced. Approximately 150 persons, including teachers and members of the community attended. The program was structured along more or less traditional lines, meaning that many listened to constructive presentations, but relatively few participated. Its purpose was to encourage better intergroup relations, but no attempt was ever made to measure the extent to which it succeeded. In all probability, the effect was minimal at best.

By summer, 1966, funds from the California State Department of Education were made available to the Riverside Unified School District and the University of California, Riverside, for a joint study on many facets of integration in the local community. One of the early sub-projects generated from it was an in-service institute directed by Thomas P. Carter of the university, and Jesse Wall from the school district. This time, eighty-two persons were involved, including seventy-one teachers. Like the first in-service attempt, the institute involved lectures, but it also utilized smaller seminar groups, each with a somewhat different approach, thereby permitting a more direct exchange of ideas and feelings. The central goals of the summer program were to "sensitize the teachers" to (1) the concept of culture, (2) human and cultural evolution, (3) the "profound influences" culture has in determining human

personality and behavior, (4) the concepts of caste and subculture as they exist in the modern world, (5) the role played by the school in transmitting the "general culture," and (6) the theoretical and practical aspects of problems involved in cross-cultural schooling. The project's final report clearly was not optimistic in tone. The critical question involving the extent to which teacher behavior toward minority, or "culturally different," children could be changed was left begging. Informal follow-up contacts suggested that participants became more eager to teach, and gained intellectual understanding of culture and cultural diversity through the programs, but that these gains were, in many cases, lost in a school environment incapable of nurturing them.  

Aside from discussions in faculty meetings and other one-time in-service events, these two programs represented the extent of the school system's efforts at in-service education prior to the major integration move in September, 1966. During 1967, however, a more encompassing and innovative attempt was made, one that gained considerable interest and stimulated considerable comment throughout the district. "Education in Transition," it was called. Financial support came from a grant to the school district under the Civil Rights Act, Title IV, Section 405. Much of the jargon was familiar; "sensitivity" was still the goal, but the approach was much more conducive to developing that precious asset than the earlier programs had been.

"Education in Transition" was a series of four seminars held in April, May, August, and November, 1967. It was undertaken at the request of Associate Superintendent Ray Berry, with the assistance of Eva Schindler-Rainman and Angus G. S. MacLeod, specialists in group dynamics and sensitivity training from Los Angeles. It was felt by this time that an opportunity for administrators and teachers to look closely at the implications of integration was needed. The purpose of the series was to open channels of communication, to talk, listen to, and "feel" the problems of integration. Apart from format, an essential difference between this program and earlier ones was that community members, parents, teachers, counselors, psychologists, and administrators all participated -- implying by participation that they did more than occupy a chair.

Prior to beginning the series, the coordinator made several assumptions, including a kind of modern day assumption of original sin, or at least present guilt, it being that for integration to work, a change in behavior and attitude on the part of the participants would be necessary. It was also assumed that in order to learn about, become open to, and communicate with persons different from one's self, one must "meet, talk, eat, be with, and feel these people." The program design included, (1) an "input series" involving the dispensing of information about the community's history, developments taking place in American education, a look at change and how resistance to change can be diminished; (2) small

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group meetings, each with a trainer who helped explore participant feelings, not only about integration, but about themselves and each other, primarily as they related to the school system; (3) interest groups, such as the need for Negro and Mexican-American history in the schools; (4) an opportunity for the interest groups to become task forces that would continue to meet and implement some of the ideas they had worked out in the seminars.

The associate superintendent participated in each series of seminars, although not full time. This support was considered extremely important in helping the participants express their feelings and reduce their sense of futility in the venture. On the contrary, they came to feel that changes really could be made. Part of the plan, which developed after the first seminar, was that the associate superintendent would attend the closing session of each remaining seminar to hear, accept, and respond to suggestions. Another change made after the first session was to decrease the general session, or "input" time, and increase time for small group discussions.

Opening up communication had been the goal, and at least while the sessions were in progress, there had been much of it. Not only was the program more innovative than earlier programs, but the evaluation procedures were more sophisticated and the results of that evaluation more conclusive. According to the district's research director, "long range increases in positive attitude toward the school district seems to be at hand." Approximately one third of the participants were parents, and the grievances they raised undoubtedly left some impression on those
who were school employees.

The Riverside school district was clearly attempting to improve its communication with the minority community, a noble goal, even if school integration had not been the justification for the program. During the 1965-66 term, at the start of partial integration, teachers in the receiving schools and sending schools were expending a considerably greater effort on human relations than was usual. Almost all Emerson teachers visited in homes preparatory to the reassignment of pupils to Highland and Hyatt. Most proved to be concerned and helpful as they explained integration, quieted fears, and reassured parents. A few grumbled, and one became adamant in his opposition toward making house calls.

Even as some former Lowell and Irving children were being transported by bus to different schools, and Emerson teachers were preparing for a partial exodus of Negro pupils from that school, plans were underway for the larger integration effort beginning in the fall of 1966. Teachers would continue to be involved, but only a few would make calls on homes. A new Home-School Program, founded under Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, and coming under the general supervision of the director of intergroup education, would supply the needed personnel to cover most of that responsibility.

During the winter and spring of 1966, eleven "community aides" visited each of the parents whose children were to be transferred that

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10 Mabel C. Purl, Workshops on Education in Transition, p. 5.
fall. In some cases three or four calls were required to explain the reason for the moves, school standards of conduct, attendance regulations, and offer other more specific help upon request. Aides also arranged block meetings in homes where parents could gather and express themselves on issues related to the schools. In all, something over 1500 home visits were made during the first five months of the program. The aides themselves were nonprofessionals; all were members of ethnic and racial minorities. Most had backgrounds very similar to those in the community they were assisting. A few had some education beyond high school, but then too, some had not completed high school. Formal education simply was not a criterion for service. An ability to assist their neighbors and communicate information concerning the district's program was a criterion.

The Home-School Program involved far more than community education aides, although probably they were its most unique feature. School social workers followed through on problems discovered by the aides and attempted to coordinate activities of the program with those of the pupil personnel services division. A school psychologist and a vocational counselor were also part of the program, the latter limiting his efforts to the level of secondary education.

Early in June, 1966, supervisors of the Home-School project, Beatrice Pavitt, Ester Velez, and Ernest Robles, contacted each elementary principal of the receiving schools concerning arrangements for parent and child visitations to the schools. Each principal then set up an orientation program at his school very similar to the ones conducted at
Highland and Hyatt schools in February. Community aides contacted all parents individually and facilitated their attendance at the meetings. Most of the orientation programs featured a child visitation program in the morning, followed by a parent visitation and orientation meeting in the evening. In almost all cases parents were provided with an opportunity to meet with teachers, the principal, and P.T.A. workers, as well as to acquaint themselves with facilities at the school.

During the first year of integration, the district found that its success in communicating with parents was enhanced by the work of community aides. A few principals preferred to make contacts personally, but most welcomed this additional and apparently worthwhile service. Working out of a central location, rather than out of a school itself, the aides were able to maintain close contacts between both the school and the homes. On numerous occasions they provided school staffs with relevant information concerning a child's background, made translations for parents and teachers during parent-teacher conferences, and provided transportation of parents to school and other community agencies capable of rendering them specific assistance; for example, securing eye glasses or other medical aid for their children. The overriding concern was to assure that lines of communication remained open, this by interpreting to both parents and school the point of view of the other. Indications are that they have succeeded in this task.

Between fall, 1965, and fall, 1967, over a thousand Negro and Mexican-American children, most from low income families, found themselves in new schools. What social and educational effects would be wrought
upon them by this change could not be known for sure, although the slight evidence available seemed to promise desirable outcomes. Neither was it known for sure what impact their presence would have upon other children in the school, or upon the educational program of the school itself. An ongoing research project would be formed in an attempt to measure and explain the impact of integration on both majority and minority children, but school personnel would have to make any modifications in the schools' program themselves.

For the most part, principals interviewed during the summer of 1967 reported that their instructional programs had not changed radically, and that the impact of integration on their schools was minimal. Many acknowledged, however, that while little was done by way of adding new programs, both they and their teachers were forced to take a closer look at what was presently being attempted. The arrival of additional students, many of whom had records of low academic achievement, virtually forced the entire school system to become more flexible. At least in this respect, it appeared that all children would benefit from integration.

In some schools the flexibility was undertaken informally and without significant changes in the structure. One principal reported, for example, that two fourth grade boys, both of whom were essentially

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11 Interviews with all twenty-four elementary principals were conducted by the author from a list of questions prepared by Jane R. Mercer, Harry Singer, and the author in conjunction with the Riverside School Study, purposes of which are discussed in chapter seven.
non-readers, were accepted into a low third grade reading group. After the reading instruction, they returned to their regular class. The number of cases where this was attempted was too small for the principal to claim a "cross-age," or "cross-grade" reading program. For the most part, teachers were expected to deal with an expanding range of pupil differences on their own, subject to assistance in the most critical cases from special state and federally funded district projects.

Some flexibility had been built into the system itself, and was not strictly dependent upon the innovative capacity of principals and teachers. By far the most notable program, initiated prior to integration, and applicable at all elementary schools since 1965, was the flexible reading program. Believing that children in the primary grades, first through third, would benefit from small group instruction, half of each class met for reading instruction in a heterogeneously grouped situation at 9:00 a.m. The other half arrived at 10:00 a.m., and studied reading after the morning group had been dismissed in the afternoon. In the case of the reading periods for both groups, the program obviously succeeded in reducing class size by fifty percent, enough, it was hoped, to make a significant difference. An experimental study made by Irving H. Balow, professor of education at the University of California, Riverside, indicated that children who had been in the program for two or more years experienced significantly higher scores on a reading achievement test than did other children. Those entering the program in the third grade, on the other hand, benefited little from it. Also significant
was the finding that the program was beneficial at all levels of aptitude.

Integration did not produce change; it just made it imperative that the schools get on with the job of dealing effectively with individual differences. Many ideas on how to meet student differences had been discussed and tried years in advance of integration, but somehow they had not appeared quite as relevant. Neither team teaching nor various "nongraded" plans were ideas new to the 1960s. Certainly none were unique to Riverside. In Riverside, nine elementary schools began various kinds of team approaches the year prior to general integration. A local movement toward nongraded programs has paralleled the integration program somewhat more closely, although it too has not been necessarily attributable to integration.

A couple of elementary schools in the community were led to initiate programs somewhat unique. One principal believed that the critical element in instituting change was for teachers to become personally convinced that change was warranted. Once this had taken place, he felt that innovation would follow. At this particular school, all children were tested to help the staff determine the skills and weaknesses children had in reading. Each child was then placed in a group emphasizing the particular area in which he needed to improve. This activity occupied approximately twenty minutes out of the reading period. The flexible reading program was expanded to include all six grades, part of the

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children coming early, part an hour later, with attention to reading
given at the beginning or ending of each day, depending on the student's
schedule. Grade level distinctions were eliminated between third and
fourth, and between fifth and sixth grades. Six different teachers were
involved with the program, permitting children to be assigned one of six
different skill groups. Since pupils were not grouped into fast, average,
or slow classes according to total reading ability, the stigma of group-
ing was reduced. For example, a sixth grade student reading at grade
level might be weak in comprehension, and be assigned to that particu-
lar skill group. At no time would all of the Negro or all of the white
children find themselves in the same group, thus helping to avert one of
the critical problems facing desegregated school systems — resegregation
through grouping practices. 13

At the Emerson school, out of which nearly a hundred Negro chil-
dren had been transferred in February, 1966, an experimental social stud-
ies program was being developed for kindergarten and first grade classes.
Conceived by Frederick and Marjorie Gearing, the program became known as
a "3rd culture" approach to the study of people. In this case the third
culture was that of the American Indians, but virtually any culture from
another place or time could serve as well. 14 The first two cultures were

13 This particular program was instituted by David Tew, principal of
Bryant Elementary School, Riverside, California.

14 Frederick Gearing was associate professor of anthropology at the
University of California, Riverside, while Marjorie Gearing was a teacher
at Emerson School. See Frederick O. Gearing, From Desegregation to Inte-
gration, a final report of the initial phase of the Emerson experiment
(September, 1965 - July, 1968), (Riverside: Riverside Unified School Dis-
trict, July 22, 1968).
represented by Negro and white students sitting together in the same classroom; a setting which virtually demanded that they come to terms with each other. Emerson, with a thirty-six percent Negro enrollment, even after the exodus of February, provided an ideal setting for a program intended to stimulate cross cultural understanding.

It may be assumed that once basic decisions are made, the really important job of making integration work rests with teachers, children, and parents. Administrators and school boards are still obligated, however, to promote conditions which will enhance the likelihood of success. The timing of Riverside's decision to integrate its schools coincided almost perfectly with the development and funding of numerous federal and state programs in the area of compensatory education. By January, 1967, the district was already involved with twenty-three such projects, and was still busy writing proposals for continuing grants and new programs. Responsibility for this activity came under the authority of Richard C. Robbins, assistant superintendent in charge of pupil personnel services, the procurement of funds was pursued actively, indeed even aggressively, by Superintendent Bruce Miller as well.

In the securing of government projects, there can be little question as to the district's success. Soon there was a local Head Start program, a Neighborhood Youth Corp program, and other projects ranging from improving counseling practices under the National Defense Education Act to instituting a program in ornamental horticulture under the Vocational Education Act. All programs were put to good use. Several, including the Home-School Program referred to earlier, were particularly relevant to elementary school integration, but the central thrust was directed
toward alleviating reading disabilities. Nowhere in the curriculum, it was felt, would the potential for reversing learning handicaps be better than in an effective reading program.

Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 has been criticized by some for encouraging programs suitable to disadvantaged children apart from advantaged children, thus helping to perpetuate segregation. Even if one accepts the charge, it should be remembered that integrated school systems — indeed virtually all school systems taking the trouble to prepare a proposal — have been allotted funds under provisions of the act. In Riverside, Title I funds were used for financing the Home-School Program, and a program designed to "compensate for deficiency in language development" among children from low-income families. The project provided well-equipped reading rooms and well-prepared teachers in eight elementary schools, plus all junior and senior high schools. The elementary schools selected were those with the highest concentration of low-income families. Children needing help, but whose schools were not equipped with centers, were transported to one of the eight locations having them. In all, approximately four hundred children were included in the program, with each child experiencing a forty minute period of individualized instruction, four days a week.

The maximum load per day for special elementary reading room

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teachers was fifty pupils, divided into sections of not more than ten pupils each. Results of the district evaluation released in July, 1967, revealed that the average increase in reading ability for students participating was approximately one-half of a year. Since that figure represented the average improvement of many pupils, it was evident that some made significant gains, while others failed to achieve, or may even have regressed. "For some children," the report concluded, "one year of special individualized instruction is probably not sufficient to enable them to be successful readers."

This and other programs undoubtedly served worthwhile purposes beyond their stated intent. For example, in the project mentioned above, the eight elementary reading rooms were staffed by Neighborhood Youth Corps aides when available, who assisted as clerks, tutors, and performers of some monitorial duties. All were from low-income homes; all were either high school drop outs, or were attending school part time. Some returned to school after the experience, and most importantly, virtually all related well with the younger children.

Children with more serious reading disabilities were referred to the district's new learning center, a project funded under Title III of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act. Space for this center, consisting of six classrooms and support facilities, was provided at

the recently closed Irving Elementary School. Program objectives were to: (1) provide remedial instruction to small groups of children with severe reading disabilities and related audio, oral, visual, and motor deficiencies which may affect receptivity to learning; (2) function as an exemplary model in demonstrating the use of new and innovative methods and materials for the remediation of gross reading deficiencies, and of the correlated functions of visual perception, auditory discrimination, eye-motor coordination and/or communicative expression; (3) train professional personnel in the theory, method, and use of materials for such remediation. The program soon gained a certificated staff of six teachers, a psychologist, a speech and hearing pathologist, a nurse, and a director. Children with long histories of failure, who had exhibited little response to usual methods of teaching, were now found to experience significant progress in basic reading skills. In fact, according to the project evaluation released in July, 1967, "all Learning Center classes made significant gains in all reading areas." 17

The extent to which these programs benefit anybody, but more specifically, the extent to which they contribute to a lessening in the relative academic disadvantage of many minority children, will not be known for some time. What can be determined is that the school administration has attempted to maximize the potential and efficiency of the projects. In March, 1968, for example, it was able to secure a mid-year approval for additional specialist reading teachers under the

California Miller-Unruh Basic Reading Act of 1965. This permitted the freeing of nearly $25,000 of Title I funds for other purposes. One of the other purposes was to set up a program at three elementary and three junior high schools for the teaching of English as a second language during the summer of 1968. A total of 288 Mexican-American children identified as eligible, and most in need of greatly improved fluency and skill in English usage, constituted the target group. Other plans called for instituting a program with similar goals during the regular school year.

Most programs cost a considerable amount of money, but at least two cost nothing at all. Volunteer aides, mostly parents, donated their services to the learning center and several elementary schools. They were able to assist with small group projects, offer pupils individual assistance, and perform certain clerical functions. University of California, Riverside, tutors from the tutorial project provided assistance to pupils needing help in reading, arithmetic and other subjects. Most of the children receiving this help since 1965 have been Negroes and Mexican-Americans from Emerson, Hyatt, Highland, and Longfellow schools.

Certainly not all programs devised to improve the academic skills of integrated pupils have yielded maximum results. As of 1968, it appeared that the school administration was demonstrating a firm resolve to continue the tasks at hand by coordinating several significant programs from the central office, while at the same time encouraging more

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18 California Education Code, (1967), 404-415, Ch. 2.5 [Added in 1965, Ch. 1233]; The Miller-Unruh Act provided financial incentives to school districts for employing teachers trained in the teaching of reading, encouraging their training, and stimulating the establishment and maintenance of school libraries.
and more in the way of experimentation and innovation from teachers and principals. In a sense the administration was challenging teachers and principals to accept additional responsibility for pedagogical direction. At a time following integration, when no one could be assured that one instructional approach would produce results superior to another approach, the decentralization plan appeared particularly well suited. It remains to be seen what educators in the several schools will be able to produce with their newly found freedom.

New vistas in pedagogy are important, be they large federally funded projects, or small innovations instituted at a single elementary school. Their importance rests not only in what people can accomplish with them, but in their capacity to serve as examples of meaningful change. But they can also be delusional, especially if they detract attention and resources away from where the real test of school integration is taking place. That place is the classroom. It is there where most of the children are. It is there where motivation for constructive learning will or will not be supplied. It is there where positive social relationships have a chance for initial development. It is there where the conflicts are, and there too where they stand to be resolved or intensified.
CHAPTER VII

COMMUNITY REACTION AND EVALUATION

The relative success of school integration can be evaluated on several levels; social, political, and educational. One might choose to determine what impact the policy had on the community at large. School officials outside of Riverside would be interested in learning the fate of the board, administration, and teachers. Most importantly, it would be appropriate to conduct a full evaluation of the new policy's effect on the children themselves.

A complete evaluation can obviously not be made on any of these levels after the passing of only two years. The long range impact on the community, for example, will not be known until children who have attended integrated schools begin to engage actively in the affairs of that community. Society, however, rarely awaits full evaluations before choosing its next course of action. Racial integration in the public schools will doubtlessly be either a functional reality or a discarded dream long before psychologists, sociologists, and historians complete their final analyses of its multiple effects.

A few preliminary observations may be drawn from the events that have succeeded the initial phase of Riverside's school integration program, begun in 1965. Probably the most apparent one is that the community itself has changed very little. School integration neither ushered in the millennium nor brought dark days. There are some indications that middle class Negroes with sound credit have come to experience less
discrimination in the purchase of housing than they did in 1965. Most neighborhoods in the city have been found to include at least one Negro family. Still, the basic problems of unemployment, poor housing, and even discrimination in the sale and rental of housing, are not really very close to solution. The long range visible impact of school integration on the community has yet to be demonstrated.

On the other hand, it is somewhat easier to reach tentative conclusions concerning how much difference integration has made to the school board and school administration. Seemingly, the positive impact outweighed the negative. While remaining a continuing concern following the board's momentous decision of October 25, 1965, integration did not prove to be an issue that would plague the administration and board in the years immediately following. Financial woes unrelated to integration, a controversy over a state textbook, and challenges involving the right of one high school student to wear a beard, and another to refrain from attending physical education classes, proved more troubling to the board than integration.

Only one case related in any way to elementary school integration reached the press. That involved a Negro mother who had been charged with striking a white principal. The principal filed legal charges after the incident on May 19, 1967, and the controversy remained in the news on and off until December 6, when the charge was dropped. In the course of that conflict, Robert Bland, leader of the petition and boycott campaign

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two years earlier, addressed the board and requested removal of the principal. His effort was comparatively subdued. In the end, the superintendent and the board handled the incident in a way intended to preserve morale among teachers and principals, and at the same time, preserve favorable relations with the minority community. Aside from those immediately involved, the legal charges against the parent, and the subsequent request that the principal be removed, generated little heat. Bland himself said that the charges of poor cooperation against the principal were "not connected with the integration program. They could come about at any school."²

This, and several other minor incidents occurring during the 1966-67 and 1967-68 school years, helped to assure that the school integration issue would not be totally forgotten, and that some teachers would feel less secure than in former years. However, even teachers appeared more concerned about the things they have been interested in historically: improved salaries, smaller classes, and support from the administration. The larger community voiced some concern about the impact of integration, particularly as it related to educational standards in the schools, pupil discipline, and costs. The idea of transporting minority children several miles by bus, while at the same time closing three schools, aroused some feeling. Nevertheless, very little was said publicly.

Only a very small number of parents went out of their way to complain. Those who did usually waited until an opportunity presented

² Riverside Press, September 12, 1967; Mrs. Louise George, the parent, and Frank Gibson, principal of George Washington Elementary School, were the central figures in the controversy.
itself to visit with the principal on P.T.A. night, or on some other convenient occasion. Very few went out of their way to complain. On the whole there appeared to be only slight public resentment or reaction to integration, which may or may not have reflected the true underlying attitude. As expected, the administration made statements to the effect that integration was going well, which apparently it was. In any event it was clearly not going badly, at least from the point of view of community acceptance. One of the parents who had led the petition drive to delay or reject integration remarked, "I still object a little as a taxpayer to pay for bussing, but if it's going to have good results, I can't feel too bad about it."³

In terms of the integration program's impact on the careers of the superintendent, his staff, and the school board, the effects were positive. Board president Arthur Littleworth was one of three recipients of the Riverside Civic League's award as an "Outstanding Citizen" for 1966. By its pioneering action in 1965, the local board won favorable recognition from the State Board of Education and the State Commission on Equal Opportunities in Education. In supporting a nomination made by the Riverside Teachers Association for an award to the Riverside board, State Superintendent of Public Instruction Max Rafferty wrote, "I know of no school board in the United States which has done more on its own initiative to solve the problems of ethnic imbalance in its schools."⁴ In May, 1966, the Department of Classroom Teachers of

the National Education Association presented the district with an award of "distinctive merit," for its efforts in the area of school integration.

From all appearances, the administration suffered no ill effects from its commitment to integrate the schools. On June 30, 1968, Superintendent Bruce Miller retired a happy man, after thirty-eight years as a school administrator. His last several years had been challenging, but they were also his most distinguished and rewarding years. The new superintendent, E. Raymond Berry, had worked closely with Miller, the board, and minority leaders since coming to Riverside in 1960. He had been closely identified with the integration program, was one of its earliest advocates, and certainly his career had been anything but harmed by it.

After a heated week in September, 1965, the situation in Riverside normalized rapidly. In September, 1966, when integration took hold throughout the system, the board president received not so much as a single call or letter. The decision on October 25, the year previous, had apparently been accepted as a final and irreversible one. A fear, believed to be common among administrators and board members nationally, that integration will lead inevitably to disarray within the school system, has not been substantiated by the experience in Riverside. Indications are, on the other hand, that the politically moderate to conservative city

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accepted its school board's decision quietly and with a minimum of malice.

In some communities, desegregation, or even serious discussion of it, provides an opportunity for local citizens either to engage in a highly divisive debate, or to express a strong racial commitment to a cause. Riverside's experience reveals neither. Rather, Riverside appears as a community that was led peacefully and effectively into a policy about which few were enthusiastic and a few were bitter. Three opportunities were made available between June 7, 1966, and May 29, 1967, for the citizens to vote against integration, at least indirectly, if they so chose. Two were tax override questions, the other was a school board election.

The first election concerned the board's request to raise the basic property rate from $2.85 to $3.35 per hundred dollars of assessed valuation. School authorities claimed that the proposed tax increase would have been required in the same amount even had integration not become a part of district policy. Considering that the direct costs of integration were absorbing about .003 of the operating budget, there would be little reason to doubt this claim. At the polls on June 7, the issue lost miserably; forty-two percent favoring the increase and fifty-eight percent opposing it. Integration was clearly a major contributing factor to the defeat, but it was probably not the leading factor. A rebellion against higher property taxes, regardless of their nature, and a feeling that the schools were already being adequately supported, were probably more important reasons.
A questionnaire sent to members of a citizen's advisory committee in early 1967, seeking to determine if a second tax election was warranted, also inquired into the chief causes for the 1966 defeat. The largest number of responses, thirty-four, blamed the loss on high taxes; thirty mentioned a general lack of community understanding; thirteen suggested dissatisfaction with some phase of the program, and ten indicated that integration was a factor. Superintendent Miller, and those in the administration closest to him, believed that integration weighed heavily in the negative vote. An analysis of the vote, however, indicates that other factors were important also.

The tax override won majorities in only four elementary school areas, Highland, sixty-one percent; Hyatt, fifty-nine percent; Victoria, fifty-four percent; Irving, fifty-two percent. Highland and Hyatt were two schools most recently and directly affected by integration, but as areas adjoining the University of California, Riverside, they included a population whose views on some social issues varied from those of the community at large. The Victoria area included mostly upper-middle class families with a strong record of supporting the schools. Voters in the Irving area, whose children would be integrated into other schools, supported the tax, but those in the Lowell and Casa Blanca areas, also to be directly affected, turned it down with affirmative votes of forty-eight percent and thirty-eight percent respectively. The Alcott area, center of the best organized anti-integration campaign less than a year earlier,

produced a forty-four percent vote in favor of the tax override, two percentage points better than the district wide total, but less than normally would be expected from a new upper-middle class residential area with school age children.

The heaviest negative vote, seventy-one percent opposing the tax, came in the Arlington Heights citrus area, located in the southern corner of the district, and served by Harrison Elementary School. Of all the schools in the system, none stood to be affected less by integration than Harrison. The next two areas of weakest support, Fremont and Highgrove, with favorable votes of thirty and thirty-one percent respectively, had long standing grievances against the district, ones which were related to integration in only the most remote way. ⁸ There, on the north side of town, residents had expected a new elementary school to be built with funds made available by a 1963 bond election. When anticipated growth failed to develop in that area, the district shied away from any such plans, thereby necessitating that some students in the area be bussed from their homes to the old Lincoln School, located in the downtown area. This was a tolerable, if not desirable, situation until Fremont and Highgrove schools were expanded. Their expansion permitted all north side residents to attend one of these two schools, except that now they would be without bus transportation, owing to the much shorter distances involved.

The failure of a tax election reflected some obvious dissatisfaction with the schools and the rising cost of their support. Riverside's

electorate had demonstrated a consistently strong record of supporting schools. They had approved the last fifty cent increase in the tax rate with a fairly narrow 53.88 percent affirmative vote on May 7, 1963. Three years later the affirmative vote decreased by nearly twelve percent.

There is reason to believe that the economic aspects of integration, particularly the very modest cost of transportation, and the closing of three schools, may have contributed to the local taxpayers' rebellion. Yet the loss of a tax rate increase election in California during the 1965-66 term could hardly be considered unusual, even without integration as an issue. Among unified school districts in the state, fifty-two tax increase elections were held that year. Twenty-eight of them failed. In June, 1967, the Jurupa School District, immediately adjacent to the northwest boundary of the Riverside district, defeated a tax override by a vote of nearly two to one. Integration was not the slightest of issues there.

If voters held strongly negative feelings toward the Riverside Unified School District, they had an opportunity in the fall of 1966 to

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9 Minutes of the Board of Education of the Riverside Unified School District, May 14, 1963; The results of all bond elections held in the school district are listed in Appendix F of the text. Between 1962-63 and 1964-65, approximately one-fourth of the tax override elections held in California failed. During this same period, more than one-third of the bond elections failed; California, Department of Education, Office of Evaluation and Research, School District Bond Elections by School Year, 1960-61 Through 1964-65, ([Sacramento: 1965]); In California, bond elections require a two-thirds vote for passage, while tax elections require a simple majority.

remove either the board president, Arthur L. Littleworth, or the board clerk, Mrs. Evelyn Kendrick. They were being challenged by a single candidate, Raymond P. Horspool. Both incumbents were strong supporters of integration, although the president's views on the subject were better known in the community. Both ran on their records, and both called particular attention to their role in the school integration decision. Their opponent did not attack the concept of integration, but he did attempt to capitalize on the issue. Before an audience of Young Republicans on October 20, he claimed that voters opposed integration because of the cost. As an assessment of conditions, the statement was at least partially accurate, but offered as a part of a campaign speech, it was hardly to be taken as a detached observation. On October 25, at a Civic League candidates' night, the Horspool position was clarified when he suggested that integration achieved by means of bussing did not provide the most efficient use of tax money.

Integration quite clearly could have been a campaign issue had the voters been interested in letting it become one. They were not. If some residents were less than completely supportive of integration, they certainly were not aroused sufficiently to remove a board member. Both incumbents won handily, Littleworth picking up almost exactly twice as many votes as Horspool, with Mrs. Kendrick's margin of victory only slightly less. The challenger had lost convincingly at every one of 110 polling places in the district. 11

11 Riverside County totals for the election were: Littleworth, 27,672; Kendrick, 26,682; and Horspool, 13,839; "Statement of All Votes Cast at the Special Consolidated Election Held November 8, 1966 in the Riverside Unified School District in Riverside County, State of California," (Riverside: November 28, 1966, Donald D. Sullivan, County Clerk).
A second try at passing a tax override, this time a sixty cent increase, succeeded by a very narrow margin on May 23, 1967. Although the vote total increased from a 42 percent affirmative vote in 1966, to 50.7 percent in 1967, the campaign opposed to the increase was at least as intense. Integration was again not a publicized issue. Organized opposition from a "Committee for Better Education" did not even mention integration in its campaign. Several quarter page advertisements and a full page advertisement in the local newspaper complained of high salaries for administrators, too many administrators, high taxes, and the administration's inability to control vandalism, demonstrations, and extortion. Several other minor issues were raised publicly, but integration was not among them.

The administration and school board threatened cutbacks in the school's program as their major issue for attracting favorable votes. Basically, the question carried by a wide margin in all precincts surrounding the University of California, Riverside, including an affirmative vote upwards of ninety percent in one precinct. It lost in all of the older sections on the west side of the central city area. As expected, it also lost by wide margins in the Fremont-Highgrove area on the north side, and in the Arlington Heights area on the south side. The predominantly minority Eastside supported the tax strongly, as did the entire eastern part of the district between Highgrove on the north and Harrison on the south.

Unlike the earlier election, most of the Arlington section of the

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city, including the attendance areas of Jackson, Adams, Jefferson, Madison, and Monroe schools, favored the tax measure by a narrow margin, although where it lost, it lost by relatively convincing margins. Precincts including all or part of the Alcott attendance area posted between 55.1 and 60.7 percent majorities, indicating that any residual feeling against integration was not strong enough to stimulate voting against school taxes. Precincts which included the area of the former Lowell and Irving schools produced 60.7 to 72.7 percent majorities in favor of the tax increase.

One of the more interesting aspects of this election was the dramatic change in the Casa Blanca vote. In 1966, Casa Blanca had voted overwhelmingly against the tax measure (thirty-eight percent in favor), with a total of 505 votes cast. By 1967, it appeared that many persons formerly disposed to vote "no" simply stayed away. Only 231 votes were cast from the two precincts embracing Casa Blanca and parts of the Washington attendance area adjacent to it. However, not only was the vote turn out lighter than in 1966, it ran 72.3 percent in favor of the tax override. Several possible conclusions can be drawn from this. The most apparent is that in 1966, the Mexican-Americans in Casa Blanca were, in a quiet way, expressing their displeasure over the closing of Casa Blanca School. It would also seem that the 1967 vote represented an expression of approval with the district's integration policy on the part of those Mexican-Americans and Negroes who believed in integration. Conjecture might also suggest that those who still opposed the closing of Casa Blanca were becoming resolved to the fact of its closing, and were not motivated to strike another retaliatory blow at the school district.
As a matter of fairly safe conjecture, it would appear that the integration issue helped enlarge the "yes" vote in the predominantly minority and university communities. It was in these precincts that the vote was most favorable. On the other hand, and with some exceptions, it appears that most of the strong opposition was centered in those areas of the city having relatively few children attending public schools. This is consistent with national voting patterns, and demonstrates virtually no relationship to parent backlash against school integration. It would be reasonably safe to conclude that most negative votes in Riverside's 1967 tax election were cast against higher taxes, not against integration. As far as community acceptance of integration was concerned, the board and administration had little to worry about.

In agreeing to integrate the schools, and by taking concrete steps in that direction, the board members assumed a definite public responsibility. They were attempting to improve the educational opportunity of minority children, but the larger implication of their action was that small steps were taken toward the restructuring of community relationships. The existing structure was one of separation; their goal was integration. Both the administration and board realized that their responsibility required a most careful analysis of just what would develop as a result of their new policy. The means for accomplishing this was to be a full-scale

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13 The total vote in the 1967 tax override election was 9,845 for and 9,601 opposed. The highest affirmative votes came in precinct 17 (Highland), 279:97; precinct 19 (Hyatt), 302:76; precinct 20 (Highland-Longfellow), 205:22; precinct 25 (Emerson), 148:47; precinct 54 (Victoria), 188:85; precinct 55 (Victoria-Washington), 199:72; precinct 59 (Washington-Casa Blanca), 78:16; precinct 96 (Jackson), 177:82; "School Election Precincts and Attendance Areas for Tax Override, May 23, 1967," [Office of the Superintendent, Riverside Unified School District].
evaluation of local school integration, particularly as it related to children.

On February 7, 1966, the board approved a research plan, which they entered into jointly with the University of California, Riverside. The Riverside School Study, as the project became known, was launched formally at that time. The obvious opportunity for potentially significant research on integration became immediately apparent to six faculty members in the departments of psychology, sociology, education, and anthropology at the university. As a joint study, the project directors also included the school district's associate superintendent, research director, and director of intergroup education.

Although no school district funds were involved, the venture was able to secure adequate financial assistance from several other sources. In November, 1965, soon after the board made its decision to integrate the schools, Harold Gerard, a university social psychologist, began to explore not only research possibilities with the school district, but sources of financial support as well. During that month, two foundations

14 Some changes have developed in the membership and institutional affiliations of the study's original executive committee as it was constituted early in 1966. As of August, 1968, voting primary investigators from the Riverside Unified School District included E. Raymond Berry, superintendent of schools, Mabel Purl, director of research, Jesse Wall, director of intergroup education, and Ernest Robles, a former elementary principal. Representatives from the university included Harold B. Gerard, professor of psychology, Frederick O. Gearing, associate professor of anthropology, Harry Singer, associate professor of education, Jane R. Mercère, associate professor of sociology, and Irving G. Hendrick, assistant professor of education. Thomas P. Carter, University of Texas, El Paso; Norman Miller, University of Minnesota; and James A. Green, U.C.L.A; all of whom were former staff members at the University of California, Riverside, and involved with early stages of the project, have remained as non-voting primary investigators.
were approached; one, the Rockefeller Foundation, made an initial award of $15,000, and a beginning was at hand. A grant of $25,000 from the Regents of the University of California, and an additional $10,000 from the Rockefeller Foundation helped markedly to launch the early collection of data. Largely as a result of inquiries originated by Thomas P. Carter of the University's education department, the California State Department of Education was approached formally for support. It has been the substantial and continuing support of the state department, as administrators of funds made available through the state McAteer Act, that has sustained a major portion of the operation thus far. In all, $641,979 was made available from this source between the spring of 1966, and August 30, 1968. A large grant to the university from the U.S. Public Health Service, intended primarily for the psychological aspects of the study headed by Gerard, together with continued state support, and other smaller grants, will place the total cost of the research effort at $1,450,702 by the end of the 1968-69 fiscal year.

The intent of those who joined together to form the Riverside School Study was to make a large, longitudinal study of the growth and development of normal children in an increasingly integrated setting. More specific, the prime purpose was to study the short and long term effects of desegregation and eventual integration on the academic achievement, level of aspiration, achievement motivation, peer group adjustment, and emotional adjustment of both minority children being desegregated in the fall of 1966, and children already attending the receiving schools. Two other avenues of university involvement were extended, although these were not as closely related to the basic research activity. One included
the development and evaluation of a special "third culture" curriculum for use with kindergarten and first grade children in racially integrated classes at Emerson Elementary School. The other involved the development and evaluation of an in-service training program for teachers who were to be assigned racially mixed classes.

All children attending Lowell, Irving, and Casa Blanca schools during the 1965-66 term were included in the study, as were those who in September, 1965, were transferred out of kindergarten through third grades at Lowell, and out of kindergarten at Irving in order to attend integrated schools a year before general integration. A random sample of 698 white children, drawn from the eleven receiving schools, was also included. Since the basic research design was longitudinal, intending to measure behavioral and attitudinal change over time, it was absolutely essential that a pre-measure be made of children, their families, and teachers during the spring and summer of 1966. "After" measures were first taken in the spring and summer of 1967, with plans calling for others to be made at regular intervals thereafter. Altogether 1777 children participated in the study, including roughly forty-one percent white, thirty-six percent Mexican-American, and thirty-two percent Negro.

Data have been acquired through a wide variety of means, including tests, teacher ratings of students, teacher self-ratings, teacher interviews, principal interviews, child interviews, parent interviews, school records on the child, and direct observation. After analysis, the seemingly limitless wealth of information is expected to yield insights into relationships between the environmental settings of the school and home,
on one hand, and the child's social, emotional, academic, and attitude
development on the other.

An acknowledged weakness of the design is the absence of a control group, thus making it more difficult to isolate the extent to which changes in children's behavior are the result of integration. Nevertheless, it was felt that by selecting children who will have experienced similar amounts of desegregation, but at different points in time, it would be possible to estimate the amount of change resulting from the integration experience and the amount attributable to changes in the larger environmental context. A second problem, and one which has been completely unavoidable, concerns attrition. A gradual erosion in the size of the sample group has occurred, and promises to continue for as long as the study is in operation. This limitation was considered in the beginning, and the original sample size increased to account for it. Still, however, the smallness of the minority sample at some schools severely limits the number of comparisons that can be made between schools.

There is one other problem from a strictly experimental point of view, which is a virtue in almost every other sense. Although the study is expected to continue for at least six years, and hopefully longer, the schools are not continuing with their 1966 curriculum and instructional approaches just to avoid confounding the research. Both personnel and programs are changing. In the case of at least a few elementary schools in Riverside, that change promises to be quite dramatic.

Limitations notwithstanding, the study promises to reveal much information concerning both the anticipated and unanticipated consequences
of integration. It is expected that the findings will point the way to needed adjustments in the school's program. Informal feedback of findings have been made periodically to both the schools and the community, even though a full statistical analysis has not always been possible. For example, on September 2, 1966, during the first summer of data collection, and even before the last parent interview had been completed, Professor Jane R. Mercer forwarded to the school district's associate superintendent a list of twenty-one concerns expressed by white, Negro, and Mexican-American parents. Within a matter of a few days, the district had reorganized most of the list into categories of problem areas, and distributed copies to school principals and others directly concerned. Some of the problems identified by the parents and communicated by Mercer could be solved almost immediately, while solutions could be at least sought for the others. 15

Community reaction to the study has been generally good. Two groups of parents, one in the Alcott area, and another from the Eastside, objected to certain aspects of the study. Sixteen Alcott parents objected to specific items in the children's interview schedule, especially those bearing on peer group relationships. Concerns of a Mexican-American group from the Eastside were more general in nature, and involved both the line of questioning and the methods used. In the case of the last group, a threat was made not to support the tax election unless

15 Jane R. Mercer, Riverside, California, to Ray Berry, associate superintendent, [Riverside, California], September 2, 1966, L.S.; "Concerns Regarding Integration as Expressed by Parents," Ditto, [Riverside: Riverside Unified School District, [September, 1966]].
reconsideration was given to some parts of the study. Both problems were settled with a minimum of difficulty, and without any significant inconvenience to the study.

After two years of integration and two years of data collection, little in the way of concrete results has emerged. Some early indications concerning the academic performance of integrated children were released by the district's research director in November, 1967. These findings suggested that the academic benefits of integration were "perhaps" not immediately apparent, particularly for very young children. There was some evidence that integrated children were challenged to do their best when working with a group of academically motivated pupils. It appeared that groups of integrated students achieved at different levels according to the level of the children with whom they were grouped. The most able minority students appeared to have gained the most from integration after two years. Clustering minority children together in a single class, or grouping them with low achieving pupils, resulted in continued low achievement. A recent comparison of reading scores made by Harry Singer seemed to reveal neither a deterioration nor an improvement in reading achievement among integrated students after two years. 16

While the addition of pupils from minority areas lowered the mean scores of the receiving schools, it did not lower the achievement of the receiving school students. In summarizing her findings, Dr. Purl stated, "...It is possible to say with assurance that the presence of lower achieving integrated pupils has not affected the achievement status of the

16 Statement made to the author by Harry Singer on August 29, 1968.
receiving children in the primary grades, where test scores are currently available.\textsuperscript{17} If, after one or two years of integration, minority gains in achievement were less than clear, at least the absence of white declines provided some measure of assurance to the community.

The first written analysis of the dilemmas facing teachers, in their attempt to stimulate the cultural and structural integration of Negro and Mexican-American pupils, was presented by Jane R. Mercer in May, 1968. Her report was a non-statistical analysis based on transcriptions of group interviews with more than one hundred elementary teachers and their principals during the first summer following general desegregation. Dilemmas in areas of discipline, grading, and ability grouping were found to perplex the teacher in his attempt to deal effectively with a substantial percentage of the minority students. The problems facing the minority children were substantial too, since by far the greatest burden of adjustment falls upon them.

Specific dilemmas facing the teachers concern the desirability or lack of same in maintaining dual standards of discipline and grading. Teachers have, after all, been admonished at one time or another in their lives to attend relentlessly to the individual needs of their students, while at the same time maintaining clearly defined and consistent standards of discipline and grading. Choices facing the teacher of a desegregated -- but not yet integrated -- classroom are most difficult ones, with the potential of making wrong choices ominous. It is likely, for

example, that some minority parents interpret the lower grades assigned to their children in the receiving schools as discriminatory and are disturbed by them. Yet a double standard of grading, or grading on "improvement" over a sustained period of time, might eventually lead to a dual standard of expectations, thereby helping to defeat one of the primary goals of desegregation, namely the cultural integration of the child.

Dilemmas in the area of enforcing standards of student conduct are even more difficult, because they are far more likely to occur in full view of the class, and on a daily basis. As Mercer described it, the teacher is faced with a choice between following a policy of "even-handed justice," or "respect for individual differences." While the two policies are not mutually exclusive, a reliance on one or the other will likely produce conflict. It is left to the skillful and sensitive teacher to operate effectively on both sides of a thin line which separates a policy of individual accommodations from one of clearly defined standards. A continued and visible application of dual standards in matters of discipline could easily lead to a total dissolution of classroom order. On the other hand, continued dispensing of discipline to a single group — Negroes — would likely lead to further and further alienation. In this respect, the teacher's challenge is not an enviable one.

Thus far, the most extensively publicized report of teacher attitudes concerning integration has not been released by the Riverside School Study, but rather by the city's newspapers. In spite of the obvious

dilemmas which face them, it would appear that teachers have not been overwhelmed by the challenges of integration. On October 5, 1967, the Riverside Press released results from its poll of nearly one-fifth of the district's teachers. While the sample group were critical of school discipline and grading practices, and were less than satisfied with their salaries, most were either satisfied with, or preferred to reserve judgment on the school integration policy. Thirty-two percent indicated that integration had "improved the system despite some problems," while nineteen percent felt that the negative impact exceeded the positive. The remainder were either awaiting further indications or felt that integration had thus far demonstrated no major effect either way.

Individual interviews made with all elementary principals during the summer of 1967, revealed that integration was not seriously disrupting the educational program of their schools. Virtually all supported the district's new policy, and believed that minority children were benefiting from it. Most felt that teachers were doing an adequate job in terms of encouraging both social integration and higher levels of academic achievement on the part of minority children. On the negative side, most observed that minority children had experienced more behavior problems than the receiving school students, and that both they and their parents presented the schools with serious problems in communication. Much of this will likely be attributable to the cultural clash which occurs between the dominant middle class institution and people who have
historically adhered to different values. Part of the explanation could be attributable to simple adjustment problems in a strange school, and might not be related to broader class and cultural conflicts.

In spite of the Home-School Program, and the effective service rendered by school-community aides, communication between the home and school has remained a problem. Some teachers and principals have visited in the homes of minority children, but the practice has not been widespread. Several principals who had made such calls, often "just to visit," found that in each case they were warmly received. The value of this kind of communication, taking place in an atmosphere free of tension, should be obvious. Unfortunately, much of that which occurs between the school staff and the minority parent is decidedly unpleasant, and presents a threat to both. In the course of one interview a principal remarked:

Now, this call I had to this family this morning, I hate to call that family because ever time I do it's a great big hassle. They say the child isn't guilty and that we're picking on him and everything else. The easiest thing that I can do is to just forget it. Take the steel ball-bearings away from the kid and say, "Naughty, naughty, don't do that again," and fail to call his parents. But if I do, I'm letting him down and I'm letting the school down.

It is relatively easy to list the areas of difficulty facing children, parents, teachers, and principals in an integrated school, but it is harder to assess the intensity of individual feelings. However, in spite of some obvious problems, an overriding impression formed in the course of interviewing the principals was that their adaptation to a policy of integration was really proving quite bearable.19

19 A detailed sociological analysis of the process by which teachers and principals adapt themselves to a policy of integration is being prepared by Jane R. Mercer, under the tentative title, "Confrontations: The School in the Vortex of Social Change."
CHAPTER VIII

PERSPECTIVE

Equality of educational opportunity has been an expressed goal of American educational reformers since the dawn of the republic. Its precise meaning has never been defined with clarity, but in recent years it has come to imply that educators should make special efforts to alleviate the very unequal conditions under which most minority children attend school. With extensive federal support school leaders have devised many special programs. A virtual avalanche of "new" approaches, intended either to compensate for the negative effects of minority isolation, or to end the isolation itself, have been advanced. In the case of compensatory education, many proposals have become policy, while progress toward integration has been so slow as to be hardly observable.

Most of the experimental programs and larger projects designed to compensate for an inadequate education in the ghetto have been greeted enthusiastically at first, only to be subjected to misgivings and even disillusionment later. The discouraging conclusion most evaluators have reached is that even the boldest and costliest programs have been shown to be of dubious value — at least in the short run. The More Effective Schools Program (MES) in New York City, for example, began with even more hope than usual. It had affected a marked and seemingly significant reduction in the pupil-teacher ratio, reducing it from approximately twenty-eight to one in 1963, to twelve to one in 1965.
A bolder or costlier compensatory program could hardly have been asked for, but after two years, students in the MES schools were shown to have exhibited no fundamental improvement in academic competence. In discussing the impact of what might be termed the "improved schools" approach on the academic attainment of minority children, David K. Cohen concluded: "Compensatory programs in schools isolated by race and social class have resulted in no substantial or lasting improvement in students' academic competence." ¹

As a matter of honesty, and in spite of some optimistic indications, it is not known for sure whether two years of integration is producing "substantial or lasting improvement" either. If the basic explanation for continued low achievement rests with the family, the culture, or is psychologically based, then it is doubtful that educators can expect to find a solution to the problem within two years, regardless of what they attempt. Nevertheless, assuming that a positive association and academic interaction with higher achieving students will help, integration still holds the greatest hope. So far, evidence collected nationally appears to affirm that the presence of higher achieving students in a classroom does indeed cast a significant influence on lower achieving students in the same class.

The reality of racial isolation in small cities, as well as large ones, is well known. The reality of sustained inaction in the area of ¹

ending racial isolation is equally well known. Unfortunately, in the
nation's largest cities, the remaining alternatives open for bringing
about integration are exceedingly limited. Educational parks serving
relatively large geographical areas are still a remote possibility.
Metropolitanization has also been proposed as an idea for increasing
the racial heterogeneity of the schools. It would require a redefini­
tion of school district jurisdictions to encourage the crossing of city,
county, and even state boundaries, in the interest of securing a broader base from which to draw students. Neither educational parks nor metropolitization appear likely of immediate implementation in the largest cities.

As a social goal, there are signs to indicate that the integra­
tion movement is in serious trouble. Increasingly, some Negro Americans
have spoken in favor of continuing the separatist pattern of existence.
Certainly as the ideology of black nationalism spreads, there is less likelihood that integration will receive even the slight attention it did three years ago. It has not been abandoned, but its primacy among the goals of the black revolution has been challenged. Black power, when discussed within the context of education, has implied a desire to control the neighborhood schools of the ghetto. School decentralization has thus come to be a more current goal among indigenous Negro leaders of the inner city than dispersal of students. Although this approach would do nothing to alter the racial composition of the schools, it could conceivably help to increase the level of community pride. Responsibility for success within such a system would rest squarely with the community itself.
The greatest reason for reluctance in accepting a policy of neighborhood control, or decentralization, is that with it comes a long term lease on separatism. Metropolitanism tends to enhance the possibility of integration, decentralization helps to assure its delay. Dilemmas face both black and white policy makers at every turn. Local control, i.e., black power applied to education in Negro neighborhoods, and integration are both considered good. Because the possibility of integration is so remote in most large cities, it seems likely that public priority in those places will fall to decentralization by default.

Among the comparatively fewer working class and middle class Negroes in middle sized cities, smaller cities, and suburbs, it is probable that integration will be retained as a firm goal. In these places, the option of choosing integration is still open to local school boards. At base their options have numbered three for a long time: some form of integration, improved segregated education, or nothing. Since funds from Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 became available, there has developed an increasing commitment to the second option. There has never been serious question about an historical dedication to the third. But with reference to the first, integration, precious little action has been taken, often for very pragmatic reasons.

As long as residential segregation continues, hope for integrated schools remains dim. As long as economic conditions facing minorities are unfavorable, the prospects of integrated residential areas will remain unfavorable. But while de facto school segregation is probably more immediately the result than the cause of these other inequities,
the relationship is a circular one. Integrated education is certainly a logical step in the long-term solution of problems relating to segregated housing and equal job opportunities. It is in some ways the most dramatic -- and the most challenging -- form of integration possible, since it almost inevitably crosses socio-economic class lines as well as racial lines. Integrated housing, and even equal job opportunities, imply that equality of conditions, e.g., wealth and training, are already equal, and that once discrimination is relieved, integration will be realized. School integration involves more than eliminating discrimination; it is also fundamentally corrective in nature.

The nation as a whole has seemed reluctant to accept this much integration. Desegregation, where it has occurred, has almost inevitably followed requests, demands, extended debate, and, in some cases, court orders. By themselves, and without substantial stimulation, school boards have been helpless to change the segregated conditions which prevail. Some kind of outside stimulus is needed. The most effective supplied thus far has come from federal and state governments, especially the courts. It appears, however, that by about 1963, the courts reached a plateau, beyond which they have been unwilling to move. Generally speaking, based on recent decisions of the federal district courts, circuit courts of appeal, and state supreme courts, the law of the land now prohibits any form of deliberate segregation, be it of the de jure or of the intentional de facto variety -- such as the deliberate gerrymandering of attendance areas to enforce segregation. On the other hand, the courts have not agreed on the affirmative responsibility of school districts to relieve existing de facto segregated conditions which they did not create. In
California, however, the law has been extended to include this interpretation as well.

The perspective on school integration in California appears to be much like that of the nation as a whole. Several relatively small school systems across the nation, including those of White Plains, New York, and Evanston, Illinois, as two of the most notable examples, have devised thorough racial balance plans. In California, the school districts of two very different communities, Riverside and Berkeley, have come forth with plans for the complete desegregation and progressive integration of minority students. Each calls for approximate racial balance to be maintained throughout the entire kindergarten through twelfth grade system. One larger city, Sacramento, has approved a less thorough plan, involving the adjustment of school boundaries and limited bussing as the principal means for reducing segregation. Concern for desegregation in Sacramento followed a preliminary injunction directing the superintendent and board of education to study and to complete a plan for junior high school desegregation.²

In spite of some improvements in Sacramento, Berkeley and Riverside remain the only cities in California (and in the nation) with populations exceeding 100,000, to adopt complete racial balance plans. Berkeley's plan was approved by its school board on January 16, 1968. It involves what may be viewed as an expanded "Princeton plan," or the

reorganization of elementary schools into separate kindergarten through third grade primary units, and fourth through sixth grade intermediate schools. Bussing is to be involved for approximately 3,500 elementary students, including white as well as Negro. District authorities have projected that by September, 1968, no school will have a Negro enrollment of fewer than thirty-two percent, nor more than forty-seven percent.

Berkeley's plan is obviously much different from that of Riverside. Then, too, Berkeley and Riverside are markedly different kinds of cities. Conditions present in Berkeley during 1967 and 1968 were unlike those present in Riverside during 1965 and 1966. But even holding the factor of time constant, the contrast would be almost as great. Riverside is a larger school district, with a total enrollment in 1966, grades kindergarten through twelve, of 25,738. Berkeley's enrollment for the same grades and in the same year was 15,658. Even more significant was the fact that Berkeley's Negro enrollment was 40.8 percent, Riverside's 6.5 percent. In addition, Riverside enrolled 10.7 percent Mexican-American, most of whom were educationally and economically disadvantaged. Berkeley enrolled 7.9 percent Oriental students, a group generally not considered to be educationally disadvantaged at all.

The physical location of schools in the two districts, together with their size and number of minority students involved, helped to

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assure that the plans would be different. With schools dispersed fairly evenly among areas of the city inhabited predominantly by a lower socio-economic minority population in the lowlands, a higher socio-economic majority group in the hill area, and a more heterogeneous middle status group in between, Berkeley was well suited to a plan of dividing schools and cross-bussing. Riverside, with schools spread over a wider geographical area, with a comparatively low minority enrollment, and with twenty-four of its twenty-seven elementary schools being predominantly white, was much less suited to a cross-bussing arrangement.

In other ways, economically, socially, and politically, the two communities differed also. Owing to a greater concentration of industry, and in spite of a much higher percentage of minority residents, Berkeley's assessed valuation per elementary school child was more than sixty percent higher than that of Riverside. Politically, the contrast was marked. Berkeley may be thought of as a liberal city, Riverside as a much more conservative one. In recent years, the voters of Berkeley have consistently supported Democratic candidates, while those in Riverside have somewhat less consistently preferred Republicans.

The presence of the University of California is felt heavily in Berkeley. Indeed in some ways, including economic, it is almost the dominant force. A much smaller campus of the university has begun to play

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4 During the 1965-66 year, the assessed valuation of district property per elementary school child was $11,228 in Riverside, and $17,863 in Berkeley. *Average Daily Attendance and Selected Financial Statistics of California School Districts 1965-1966*, California, Department of Education, Bureau of Educational Research, [Sacramento]: 1966).

5 See Appendix C of text.
an increasingly significant role in the affairs of Riverside, but a comparison between the two would be strained. Berkeley is a university town; Riverside is a town with a campus of the university.

Both school boards underwent struggles and tension prior to announcing their decisions in favor of total integration, but a sheer tally of events in the two places could not convey accurately a feeling for the social climate. Riverside, for example, experienced arson which destroyed one of the segregated schools, a petition to the school board calling for integration, and a school boycott. Yet it all happened inside of two weeks and with a minimum of strong feeling generated either before or since. Berkeley, on the other hand, experienced a far more involved series of events which aroused deeper feelings over a longer period of time, but without a fire and without a boycott. Neither the Berkeley nor the Riverside board were ever in danger of being presented in court. Both acted on their own beliefs, but in response to pressure also. A school board could hardly be expected to venture forth with a plan of social engineering the likes of school integration without some firm basis of support in the community.

The principal lesson in the politics of education is that neither board vacillated, but rather each declared its commitment clearly and unequivocally. Procedurally, each approached the matter differently. Berkeley's plan was formulated after receiving proposals from just about everybody in the community who had a proposal to make -- teachers, P.T.A.'s and citizens.

Taking local conditions and community feelings into account,
nothing could have been gained by this procedure in Riverside. If cross-bussing and school reorganization had been either feasible or desirable, the board undoubtedly would have needed to open the matter to more extensive community discussion. But given the circumstances at hand, extended debate would likely have aroused white parents unsympathetic to integration, would have markedly frustrated Negro aspirations, and probably would have resulted in some less decisive solution. Reasonable conjecture might suggest that an improved open enrollment or optional integration plan would have been formulated. Possibly a plan similar to the one adopted could have been realized, but almost assuredly its schedule for implementation would have been slower. As different as the experiences of Riverside and Berkeley were, the fact that both school boards approved total integration plans means that they shared a common distinction.

Riverside's action in 1965 followed a wave of pro-integration pressure led and supplied by a group of Negroes operating independent of the established civil rights organizations. In spite of considerable tension which was felt over a short period of time, the integration crisis reached an effective and apparently permanent conclusion. The board's decision of October 25, 1965, made the Riverside Unified School District the largest school system in the nation with a fully articulated racial balance plan.

At the time of its commitment, the board was not aware of this historic distinction, although the members did know that school integration had not yet become common practice. It had all seemed so natural, so right, and not overly difficult either. Three elementary schools were to be closed inside of two years. All students formerly attending the three schools would be reassigned to other predominantly white schools, and with bus transportation provided. A firm decision had been made, concrete steps taken, specific dates set, and an indication of the plan's permanency made. In the opinion of Superintendent Bruce Miller, all of these actions helped to assure acceptance of the plan in both the minority and majority communities.  

Bussing has never been a popular approach to desegregation nationally. In fact, judging from the national response, one might even question the popularity of desegregation itself. It is bussing, however, particularly the idea of bussing white children into a minority neighborhood, that has stirred the most passion. By avoiding even serious public discussion of that issue, the Riverside board was able to effect dramatic change in a relatively conservative community without arousing extensive passions. The careful attention to many mechanical details, particularly in pointing out the plan's low cost, also helped keep the situation manageable.

7 Presentation Made by Bruce Miller, Superintendent of Schools, Riverside Unified School District, to the California State Board of Education, transcript, (January 12, 1966).
Since the integration plan was adopted in October, 1965, no pressure has developed to abandon it or to push it back. Most in the community, including both minority and majority citizens, appear to be accepting integration without public comment, as if it had always been the policy. Demonstrated leadership on the part of the board and administration helped immeasurably to assure the acceptability of integration. So did the presence in the city of a favorable newspaper, a point the importance of which should not be underestimated. It is altogether conceivable that an antagonistic press could have stirred considerable hostility to integration in the community.

Paradoxically, in spite of the basically more liberal nature of the Berkeley community, an almost exactly opposite situation has developed with regard to the local newspapers. In 1964, when the Berkeley board adopted its junior high school integration plan, the Berkeley Gazette bitterly opposed both the board and the plan, and even sparked an unsuccessful recall drive to oust the board. Riverside's experience could not have been more different. The Press and Daily Enterprise supported the school board at every turn, and if anything, helped spur it into taking affirmative action.

A course of action can be approved by a school board, and if the community concurs with it, or at least if they are not negatively aroused by it, the matter is often forgotten. Integration decisions, even when popularly supported, cannot afford to be forgotten. If they are, integration itself will likely be lost. Even the best conceived integration

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8 "It's Time for a Showdown with the School Board" (editorial), Berkeley Gazette, May 20, 1964.
plan begins as little more than a plan to desegregate children. Actual social integration is achieved through the sustained efforts of school boards, administrators, teachers, parents, and children themselves. For the schools even to maintain desegregation, periodic attention is required. As evidence of its continuing commitment to the 1965 policy statement, the Riverside board took three actions in 1968, intended to extend and sustain the policy's effectiveness.

Of the twenty-seven elementary schools operating in 1965, one was not touched immediately by the integration decision, and one other was dealt with only partially. In 1965, the minority enrollment at Longfellow School was 48.6 percent. The administration had considered reducing the ratio of minority to majority students at that time, but instead decided to delay action. Sentiment among the residents of the area was clearly in favor of staying at Longfellow, and while the school was out of balance ethnically, the situation was less than critical. By the 1967-68 term, the minority enrollment had risen to 57.9 percent. In the case of a second school, Emerson, a similar situation was developing. In February, 1966, the first steps were taken toward reducing the minority percentage there, but while the effort succeeded in lowering it from 55.4 percent to 42.9 percent, an upward trend was still evident.

The 1968 solution to the Emerson problem was merely an extension of the 1966 boundary revision, but with students already attending Emerson permitted to remain there. New students would enter either Hyatt or Highland schools. The Longfellow policy called for the removal from
INTEGRATION OF EMERSON SCHOOL AREA
1966 AND 1968 BOUNDARY CHANGES

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA CITRUS EXPERIMENT STATION

Emerson Boundary
Prior to 1966

1966 Boundary

1968 Addition

* Only New Families Bussed to Hyatt and Highland

Hyatt

Dwight

Douglas

Eucalyptus

Sedgewick

Highland

Victoria Country Club
that school's attendance area of a narrow six square block area known as the Longfellow "corridor." The corridor had remained as an unpleasant symbol of boundary policies instituted during an earlier day. A total of 111 students in this area were reassigned to six different elementary schools. Just as in 1966, a public meeting was held to explain the plan, and each family whose child was to be transferred received a call or visit from a community education aide. Following final board approval of the plan on August 6, the community aides made another call, this time advising each family of the new policy.

Probably the most significant of the 1968 decisions concerned a specific extension of the integration policy to include the junior high schools. It had been assumed earlier by the administration and board that the secondary schools did not require attention, since they were already integrated. Integrated they were, but by December, 1967, the five junior high schools were becoming increasingly imbalanced, ranging in minority registration from a low of 5.3 percent to a high of 37.3 percent. The plan adopted on May 6, 1968, promised to narrow that range to between twelve and twenty-five percent.

Aside from the educational merits of the plan, which had grown increasingly apparent to many as the difficulties grew more intense at the junior high school with the highest minority enrollment, was the fact that it had been initiated by the administration without prior public pressure.

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9 Minutes of the Board of Education of the Riverside Unified School District, May 6, 1968; See Appendix L of text.
Integration had been confirmed as a viable policy, one that the district could be trusted to keep alert to and introduce modifications in when warranted. It is significant also that hardly a breath of community opposition was raised.

No one can fault the Riverside board and administration for a lack of sensitivity to the need for racially balanced schools. A continuing concern for the success of integration would have to be focused on the individual schools themselves. As a matter of district policy, several actions have been taken in order to facilitate integration, although their purposes have been more global than that. Conceptually they have centered around greater school autonomy and staff involvement, the purpose being to encourage individual teachers and principals to take a more active hand in improving instruction. In order to facilitate this, the administration has instituted a policy of partial decentralization, permitting school staffs to experiment with new ways of organizing instruction. Conceivably this will include attempts to reorganize parts of the curriculum and seek ways to permit maximum flexibility and instructional efficiency.

Each school is to be given its own budget for purposes of planning and encouraging autonomy. The district administration plans to assume more of a role in reviewing and evaluating school programs, but less responsibility for directing those programs. In effect, the policy amounts to something of a new pedagogical honesty, the realization at last being that no single instructional approach, or set of instructional approaches, have been proven most effective. Once this is admitted,
it makes little sense to require that twenty-four elementary schools adhere to the same means of instruction. Integration was not required in order for the schools to take a hard look at their curriculum and instructional approaches, but it helped. The stresses and frustrations with which some teachers and students have been beset have provided an additional and very important stimulus to change.

The Riverside Board of Education and school administration have met their social responsibilities well. Although their integration plan was not as bold as that adopted in Berkeley a little over two years later, it was really rather progressive for its date and community setting. Since its adoption, the plan has been extended to meet new contingencies as they develop. What was a written plan in 1965, has been turned into an on-going commitment. Racial balance will be maintained. Teachers and principals have been encouraged to introduce policies they can justify in order to help achieve the reality of integration.

It is often assumed that the community at large will be looking to achievement results as a key indication of whether or not integration is succeeding. In some ways it is unfortunate to judge the value of integration by its ability to stimulate higher academic competence. Such a criterion is narrow at best. School integration was never intended as a means of instruction, to be evaluated in the same way as one would judge the worth of team teaching, or instructional media. If ever there was any doubt, it is becoming increasingly clear from the early experience in Riverside, that meaningful school integration cannot be effected rapidly enough to provide an instant cure for social
and educational maladies. One hardly should be disappointed when the
impossible is not attained.

Compensatory education could not offer such a cure, and in all
probability, neither will any other form of social organization de­
vised within a school setting. Faith in school integration, as the
best and most just form of social organization, is based on a fundamen­
tal democratic belief in the equality of man. In a fully integrated and
equitable society, there are ample reasons to believe that group differ­
ences in educational attainment would not appear. While it does not
represent full equality in and of itself, school integration is an im­
portant step toward full equality. For that reason, it should also hold
the best long-term promise for educational gains, assuming that inter­
vening social and psychological factors do not arise to confound the
issue.
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BIBLIOGRAPHY


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APPENDICES
APPENDIX A

CITY OF RIVERSIDE

POPULATION CHART 1870-1968

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SOURCE: Census data, 1870-1960

A Special census

## APPENDIX B

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1964-65 (December, 1964)

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|             | Chemawa | 1,300   | 1,231 | 5                | 59              | 5              | 69              | 5.3                        |
|             | Gage    | 1,010   | 776   | 59               | 172             | 3              | 234             | 23.2                       |
|             | Sierra  | 1,285   | 1,223 | 16               | 42              | 4              | 62              | 4.8                        |
|             | University | 899   | 580   | 168              | 144             | 7              | 319             | 35.5                       |
| **TOTAL**   | 5,547   | 4,683    | 317   | 522              | 25              | 864            | 15.6                       |

|             | Poly    | 2,653   | 2,279 | 172              | 195             | 7              | 374             | 14.1                       |
|             | Ramona  | 2,873   | 2,617 | 66               | 179             | 11             | 256             | 8.9                        |
| **TOTAL**   | 5,526   | 4,896    | 238   | 374              | 18              | 630            | 11.4                       |

|             | DISTRICT | 25,024   | 21,001 | 1,496            | 2,348           | 179            | 4,023          | 16.1                       |
1967-68 (December, 1967)

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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gage</td>
<td>1266</td>
<td>1036</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>18.1</td>
<td>24.7</td>
<td>19.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra</td>
<td>1349</td>
<td>1253</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>6.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University</td>
<td>995</td>
<td>623</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>372</td>
<td>37.3</td>
<td>32.9</td>
<td>35.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North</td>
<td>1243</td>
<td>937</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>306</td>
<td>24.6</td>
<td>22.4</td>
<td>22.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poly</td>
<td>1654</td>
<td>1426</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>228</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>11.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ramona</td>
<td>2772</td>
<td>2510</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>204</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>262</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>8.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adult Ed.</td>
<td>1173</td>
<td>958</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>215</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Learning Cen.</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
<td>17</td>
<td>32.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lincoln Cont.</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>35.2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| District Totals | 27,818           | 22,545            | 1881         | 3107                    | 285                   | 5273            | 18.9                     | 18.2                     | 16.7                     |

* School for physiologically handicapped children.
APPENDIX C

POLITICAL PARTY REGISTRATION AND VOTING PATTERNS
BERKELEY AND RIVERSIDE, CALIFORNIA, 1962-1968

Tables I and II compare voter registration and voting records of Riverside and Berkeley, two California cities with the most extensive school desegregation plans, with the state pattern.

Report of Registration
(percentage of registered voters by party affiliation)

Table I

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Democratic</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State</td>
<td>50.7</td>
<td>57.1</td>
<td>56.2</td>
<td>57.9</td>
<td>59.6</td>
<td>56.6</td>
<td>53.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berkeley</td>
<td>52.1</td>
<td>54.5</td>
<td>55.1</td>
<td>59.0</td>
<td>59.9</td>
<td>63.3</td>
<td>47.8*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Riverside</td>
<td>45.9</td>
<td>47.1</td>
<td>46.2</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>50.1</td>
<td>49.3</td>
<td>46.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>39.8</td>
<td>39.9</td>
<td>40.9</td>
<td>38.9</td>
<td>48.4</td>
<td>40.2</td>
<td>40.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Reflects significant loss to Peace and Freedom Party. In January, 1968, the Peace and Freedom Party claimed 20,284 registrants in Alameda County; only 800 in Riverside County. The total registration in Alameda County, January, 1968, was 425,299; Riverside County, 150,393.
Results of Selected Contests in 1962-1966
General Elections: by percentage of total vote

Table II

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>State</th>
<th>Berkeley</th>
<th>Riverside</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>Gubernatorial (Nov. 6, 1962)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Edmund G. Brown (Democratic)</td>
<td>51.9</td>
<td>60.7</td>
<td>48.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Richard M. Nixon (Republican)</td>
<td>46.8</td>
<td>39.3</td>
<td>51.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>Presidential (Nov. 3, 1964)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lyndon B. Johnson (Democratic)</td>
<td>59.2</td>
<td>75.1</td>
<td>56.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Barry Goldwater (Republican)</td>
<td>40.8</td>
<td>24.9</td>
<td>43.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>Proposition 14 (Initiative to repeal state fair-housing law)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yes (for repeal)</td>
<td>65.4</td>
<td>35.1</td>
<td>67.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No (against repeal; for fair-housing law)</td>
<td>34.6</td>
<td>64.9</td>
<td>32.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>Gubernatorial (Nov. 8, 1966)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Edmund G. Brown (Democratic)</td>
<td>41.6</td>
<td>73.0</td>
<td>37.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ronald Reagan (Republican)</td>
<td>56.7</td>
<td>27.0</td>
<td>62.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX E

SCHOOL DISTRICT BOUNDARIES

Riverside Unified School District

1966-67

(Maps 1-6)
Pupils transferred effective September 1, 1966

1. Bryant
2. Liberty
3. Victoria
4. Palm
5. Pachappa
6. Alcott
7. Jefferson
8. Adams
9. Jackson
10. Magnolia
11. Pachappa
12. Monroe
CASA BLANCA

Pupils transferred to Jefferson, September 1, 1966

Pupils transferred to Jackson, September 1, 1966
Pupils transferred to Hyatt, February 2, 1966

Pupils transferred to Highland, February 2, 1966
JUNIOR HIGH

Central ............................................. 4795 Magnolia Avenue
Chemawa ........................................... 8830 Magnolia Avenue
Gage .................................................. 6400 Lincoln Avenue
Sierra ............................................... 4950 Central Avenue
University Heights ............................... 2060 Eighth Street
SENIOR HIGH

North ............................................................ 1550 Third Street
Poly .............................................................. 5450 Victoria Avenue
Ramona ........................................................... 7675 Magnolia Avenue
APPENDIX F
SCHOOL BOND ELECTIONS
OF THE
RIVERSIDE CITY SCHOOLS, 1896-1963

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Amount of Bonds</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
<th>% Yes</th>
<th>% No</th>
<th>Action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nov. 18, 1896</td>
<td>$13,000.00</td>
<td>Elementary Facil.</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Passed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul. 20, 1900</td>
<td>40,000.00</td>
<td>High School Facil.</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Passed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan. 11, 1902</td>
<td>7,000.00</td>
<td>Furn. &amp; Ins. H.S.</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Passed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun. 7, 1902</td>
<td>9,000.00</td>
<td>Elementary Facil.</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Passed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 26, 1908</td>
<td>40,000.00</td>
<td>School Facilities</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Passed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul. 15, 1910</td>
<td>250,000.00</td>
<td>School Facilities</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>Passed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb. 24, 1914</td>
<td>50,000.00</td>
<td>School Facilities</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Passed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun. 6, 1916</td>
<td>40,000.00</td>
<td>School Facilities</td>
<td>Unavailable</td>
<td></td>
<td>Passed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun. 12, 1917</td>
<td>50,000.00</td>
<td>School Facilities</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Passed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 10, 1922</td>
<td>250,000.00</td>
<td>Elementary Facil.</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>Passed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 10, 1922</td>
<td>175,000.00</td>
<td>High School Facil.</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Passed</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jun. 7, 1926</td>
<td>250,000.00</td>
<td>Elementary Facil.</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>Passed</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jun. 7, 1926</td>
<td>850,000.00</td>
<td>High School Facil.</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>Passed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct. 28, 1926</td>
<td>850,000.00</td>
<td>High School Facil.</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>Passed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 15, 1945</td>
<td>500,000.00</td>
<td>Elementary Facil.</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>Passed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 15, 1945</td>
<td>800,000.00</td>
<td>High School Facil.</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>Passed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 29, 1949</td>
<td>1,000,000.00</td>
<td>Elementary Facil.</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>Passed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 29, 1949</td>
<td>1,500,000.00</td>
<td>High School Facil.</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Passed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 27, 1954</td>
<td>3,200,000.00</td>
<td>High School Facil.</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>Passed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 22, 1956</td>
<td>1,770,000.00</td>
<td>Elementary Facil.</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>Passed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 22, 1956</td>
<td>5,350,000.00</td>
<td>High School Facil.</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>Passed</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### SCHOOL BOND ELECTIONS

**OF THE**

**RIVERSIDE CITY SCHOOLS, 1896-1963**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Amount of Bonds</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
<th>% Yes</th>
<th>% No</th>
<th>Action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>June 9, 1959</td>
<td>4,300,000.00</td>
<td>Elementary Facil.</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>Failed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 9, 1959</td>
<td>5,000,000.00</td>
<td>High School Facil.</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>Failed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov. 17, 1959</td>
<td>4,300,000.00</td>
<td>Elementary Facil.</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>Passed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 7, 1960</td>
<td>4,500,000.00</td>
<td>High School Facil.</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>Failed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov. 8, 1960</td>
<td>4,500,000.00</td>
<td>High School Facil.</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>Passed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar. 4, 1963</td>
<td>5,800,000.00</td>
<td>School Facilities</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>Failed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Nov. 5, 1963</td>
<td>5,900,000.00</td>
<td>School Facilities</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>Passed</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Riverside Unified School District
APPENDIX G

FREEDOM SCHOOL APPLICATION, SEPTEMBER, 1965

Freedom School will be in operation Monday in many churches and halls which have offered their facilities. The many certified teachers who have volunteered their services will be on hand to insure that the students get first-class instruction. Included in the staff are professors of education, math and psychology from near-by colleges. Tutorial service will be available from many of the UCR students who participated in last year's tutorial project at Irving and Lowell. Well-known local artist Lee Larkin will be on hand to provide instruction in arts and crafts. Volunteer parents will assist teachers and supervise recreation.

Registration for the freedom schools will be conducted on a door-to-door basis Sunday afternoon.

People outside of the Lowell-Irving attendance district and those not contacted by volunteers from boycott headquarters should register by calling 682-5466.

Children attending the freedom schools should report to the Masonic Hall, 2943 12th St. by 9 a.m. Monday. From there transportation will be provided to the various classrooms. Snacks will be provided for Kindergarteners. Other students should bring sack lunches.

Many sources have donated school supplies and funds.

REGISTRATION FORM

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STUDENT'S NAME</th>
<th>AGE</th>
<th>GRADE</th>
<th>ADDRESS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

PARENTS' NAME __________________________ PHONE __________________

Residing at __________________________

We, parents of the above child(ren), are desirous of having our children enrolled in Freedom Schools at a location to be designated by the Committee, its authorized agents or representatives from any liability for accident or injury to my said children in the transportation, [sic] handling or care of such children and do, by the signing of this document, consent their being enrolled in or participating in the Freedom School Program.

(Signed) __________________________
While the plan which has just been presented has been thought through and worked out by several members of my staff, together with the Board of Education and the members of the Advisory Committee, I want to close by saying some things for which I alone am responsible.

This time I am speaking not only as superintendent of schools in this city, but also as a father, a grandfather, a person who loves this community and as one who has deep roots in it.

This is a time of great trouble in the world. On the one hand are the symbols of almost unimaginable progress in the field of science, yet many people live in fear and many live in want.

It is also a time when great changes are taking place. All phases of our lives are constantly changing. Our very way of life is changing daily. Fortunately this is true, for where there is no change there is no life.

The thing that is disturbing to so many of us is the suddenness of change. In the present instance, we are experiencing a gigantic civil rights movement which is engulfing the entire nation. Overnight communities across the country are having to re-think through their responsibilities to people. Riverside is not alone in this great social revolution, nor can it hope to turn its head and pretend that change will not take place here.

As every thinking individual knows, schools have changed enormously within the last few years. With great suddenness an educational revolution has and is taking place. We are constantly seeking better answers in raising the level of educational opportunities for all boys and girls in response to the new and ever increasing demands on the educational process.

The acceptance of change is one of the great lessons we can capture from the child. It is beautiful to behold how quickly, how completely, children adapt themselves to change. We do not need to fear how the children are going to respond to the plan which has been outlined here tonight. I can cite as evidence for this what happened when we transported Lowell and Irving pupils to other schools and how magnificently the pupils adapted themselves from the very first day of school.

As part of the adaptation to what was a very sudden change for all of us, I think we should give credit to the teachers involved who rose to the situation beautifully and who indicated both formally and informally their earnestness and sincerity in the hope that their obligations, opportunities, and privileges would be met.
We know that children can adapt to change and I am confident that our teachers and other staff members will meet all responsibilities. However, to put this plan into action, we as a school staff and Board of Education cannot possibly hope to do the job alone.

I believe in the integrity of all the people. I also believe in the capacities of people, on occasions of great stress and turmoil, to control their individual emotions, their likes and dislikes, and work together, even under pressure, to reach new and higher levels of educational opportunities.

During these past few weeks I have sensed, through all the tensions and differences, a unity of purpose and a singleness of goal. We are, after all, anxious to reach the same high objectives.

The plan which has been presented here tonight is a major step toward that goal. The plan, when it has been carried out, will be an historic occasion for this community.

I call upon all parents and all citizens who are thinking of the interests of all boys and girls to support this plan. In the weeks and months which follow there will be a mountain of work to perform, ideas to explore, and details to be carried out. We must do this together as a community, as teachers, and as parents.

Justice Stanley Mosk, speaking last Saturday to the Human Relations Council, said "how each individual acts in his daily relationships with his fellow individuals will determine the success or failure of society as a whole. It will be as individuals that we make our various laws work or fail."

As a community, as a school system, as a group of people dependent upon the resources of our minds and our environments, we should be held tragically wanting were we not to bring our best judgments to bear in prompt but well considered action. I believe in this proposed plan and would earnestly recommend its adoption.
APPENDIX I

PETITIONS RECEIVED BY THE RIVERSIDE UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT CONCERNING SCHOOL INTEGRATION ISSUE, SEPTEMBER-OCTOBER, 1965.

1. September 3, 1965

A PETITION

To: The Riverside Unified District School Board

We, the undersigned parents of the Riverside school district, do hereby petition the Riverside School Board to take affirmative steps to improve the educational opportunities for minorities and to eliminate segregation in city schools by closing Lowell and Irving schools and by reassigning these students to other schools in the area which have previously had less than 10% minority group students.

[396 signatures]

2. [October, 1965]

WE, the undersigned taxpayers and parents residing in the Riverside Unified School District find the Proposed Master Plan for School Integration presently unacceptable.

WE feel that the time limitation (Sept. 1966) as stated in the proposal is not adequate to provide proper facilities and financing.

WE, therefore, demand that the Board of Education postpone action on the Proposed Master Plan for School Integration for a minimum of one year until a more comprehensive plan can be presented to the electorate, thereby eliminating gross errors at educational and financial expense.

[1105 signatures]
Appendix I (continued)

3. [October, 1965]

We, the undersigned taxpayers and parents residing in the Riverside Unified School District, do hereby make the following demands:

1. There shall be no bussing of any children outside the boundaries of the neighborhood school in which they reside.

2. There shall be no random changing of neighborhood school boundaries.

3. There shall be no closing of currently adequate school facilities.

FURTHERMORE, we demand the Board table any action on the Proposed Master Plan for School Integration until a detailed, factual study of accommodations and finances can be made and presented to the electorate of the Riverside Unified School District.

[544 signatures]

4. [October, 1965]

We, the undersigned parents of children now enrolled at Highland School and/or children who will eventually be enrolled in Highland School, declare our support for the Bruce Miller plan for the complete desegregation of Riverside schools.

[145 signatures]
5. October 22, 1965

To the Riverside Unified School Board

Believing in the fairness of integrated schooling for all children, we, the undersigned residents of Riverside, accept the Riverside School Board Plan as a reasonable and workable method of creating equal opportunities in education for all the students in our city.

[63 signatures]

6. [October, 1965]

Bruce Miller
Supt. of Schools and
Riverside Board of Education

We humbly petition the following:

Street

1. That the boundary of Evans not be switched to Madison School and our children continue attending Casa Blanca School.

2. That the Evans parents be included in the study committee to express our views or a meeting be held with us prior to any decision.

3. That the Casa Blanca students not be bussed out except on an optional basis.

4. We do not want our children crossing the tracks, Indiana and the exit and entrance of the freeway.

5. Under no circumstances do we want Casa Blanca School closed.

[138 signatures]
7.

[October, 1965]

We strongly petition the following:

1. That the Casa Blanca area bounded by Lincoln and Victoria remain as "optional" territory.

2. No boundary changes should be made without a response from the people involved either by survey, ballot, town hall meeting, etc.

3. Leaders should not speak for the people unless the "leaders" have consulted a large portion of the people concerning their desires, beliefs and expectations.

[52 signatures]
APPENDIX J.

RIVERSIDE UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT

PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTEGRATION, OCTOBER 18, 1965

LOWELL
Close Lowell September, 1966, move buildings and dispose of property. Change boundary north of the arroyo to include approximately 100 K-6 pupils in Alcott. (See map for proposed boundary change.) Transport and integrate all others to schools in which racial balance will allow additional minority pupils.

IRVING
Close Irving as an elementary school September, 1966. Transport and integrate all pupils to schools in which racial balance will allow additional minority pupils. Begin to utilize the physical plant at Irving for special purposes to improve education opportunities for all pupils in the district, such special purposes to include head-start classes, a district-wide reading clinic, adult education, and other programs.

EMERSON
In February, 1966, transfer part of area bounded by Pennsylvania, Eighth, Kansas and Chicago (approximately 126 pupils) from Emerson School to Highland and Hyatt as a means of reducing Emerson's racial imbalance.

CASA BLANCA
On November 1, appoint a broadly based committee representative of the major interests and parents of the Casa Blanca area, to study the issues and alternatives of how best to completely integrate the pupils of Casa Blanca, and to make specific recommendations in that direction by May 1, 1966, with recommendations for the beginning steps by September, 1966. In September, unless the study committee arrives at a better plan, boundary changes will be made involving approximately 1/3 of Casa Blanca pupils, such as moving the "optional" territory (area between Lincoln and Victoria) to Washington. In the event the committee's proposal for the integration of pupils does not cover the entire community for the 1966-67 school year, beginning in September, 1966 provide transportation for all wishing to transfer to other schools in which the racial balance will allow additional minority pupils.

TRANSITIONAL EDUCATION
Provide transitional and enrichment programs to all pupils in the district where needed, including tutorial help, remedial reading classes, smaller classes where possible, etc. Apply for appropriate Federal funds to cover cost of special programs. Open suitable libraries and other facilities where a service can be provided for study areas, research, etc. Continue progress in curriculum development aiming toward broad, flexible programming in all areas. Continue to improve counseling procedures. Provide reading and language labs and workshops. Encourage participation in adult education and retraining programs. Use neighborhood youth corps. Continue and broaden research, including the dropout and vocational education studies -- apply results to curriculum development.

PREVENTION OF SEGREGATION
Housing patterns in the community could result in the development of other segregated schools in the future unless remedial measures are taken. Boundary changes and other adjustments will be made from time to time as needed to prevent such development.
APPENDIX K

RIVERSIDE UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT

OFFICE OF THE SUPERINTENDENT

November 19, 1965

*CASA BLANCA STUDY GROUP*

Mr. Joe Aguilar
Mr. Richard Ardrey
Mrs. Grace Bailón
Dr. Percy Baugh
Mr. Ernest V. Bandor
Mr. Gerald Burke
Miss Jean Crockett
Mrs. Pauline de la Hoya
Mrs. Elodia Díaz
Miss Gloria Elizarraraz
Miss Frances Escalera
Mr. Jerry Egge
Mr. Augustine Flores
Mr. David Foley
Mr. Refugio Garcia
Mrs. Rose Gomez
Mr. Larry Gordon
Mrs. Jean Grier
Mr. Jess Hernandez
Mr. Raymond Holden
Mr. Robert Honaker
Mr. Alvin Jellsey

Mrs. Kurk Kazarian
Mrs. Esther Knowles
Mrs. Theresa Livingstone
Mrs. Lily Lopez
Mr. Ed Martinez
Mr. Arthur Mendoza
Mr. George Moody
Mr. James Morgan
Mr. John A. Neal
Rev. Belen Perez
Mrs. Mary Perez
Mrs. Belen Reyes
Mr. Richard Roa
Mrs. Soledad Romero
Mrs. Lucretia Uhrich
Mrs. Samona Velaro
Miss Felicia Velasquez
Miss Esther Velez
Mr. Bill Vernon
Mrs. Dorothy Wells
Mr. Carl Yoder

*Approximately half of the committee attended its meetings regularly.*
APPENDIX L

RIVERSIDE UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT
OFFICE OF THE SUPERINTENDENT
May 6, 1968

Junior High School Integration

Proposal
To extend the District's policy of racial balance among schools to cover the junior high schools.

Means
Change policy to allow in-coming 7th grade pupils to attend the junior high school according to where they went to elementary school rather than according to residence.

Background
When the District formulated its plan for school integration in September, 1965, the secondary schools were considered already integrated because of their relatively larger (than elementary) attendance areas. Since 1965, however, there has emerged a trend of growing imbalance among the junior high schools. It is this trend which the proposed change of policy is designed to correct.

Probable Effects
If begun next September and continued with succeeding in-coming 7th grade pupils, the racial percentages in the next 3 years are expected to be approximately as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Central</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chemawa</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gate</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Minority growth not projected. Assumes in all cases the same number of minority pupils affected as in 1968-69.

Community Reaction
Since the proposal was first reported to the Board on April 15, the Community Aides have visited the parents of all in-coming 7th graders who would be affected by a change of schools next year. Of approximately 150 home visits, only 8 resulted in problems involving 2 children in the same family attending different junior high schools with the policy change. An effort will be made to avoid splitting families this way. All other parents reacted favorably to the proposed change.
Appendix L (continued)

Numbers of Pupils

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Minority Pupils from East Side and Casa Blanca without change</th>
<th>Minority Pupils from East Side and Casa Blanca with change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Central</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chemawa</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gate</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra</td>
<td></td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University</td>
<td>54</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Effects on Schools – 1968–69

Central Net loss of 17 pupils
Chemawa Increase of 41 pupils. Will need one additional teacher and 1 portable beyond allocation.
Gate Net loss of 15 pupils.
Sierra Increase of 40 pupils. Can absorb.
University Reduction of 54 pupils.

Transportation Approximately 116 pupils to be bussed -- can be absorbed in 1968–69 by utilizing buses relieved by transfer of 9th grade from University to North.